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This study centers on the trade relations between the United 
States and Nigeria from 1960-1984. Economic relations between the 
United States and Nigeria began to take direct shape soon after 
Nigerian independence in 1960. In its present form, the relations 
significantly undermine Nigeria's development. 
Divergent perceptions exist as to the developed country that 
has accounted for Nigeria's current underdeveloped status. Some views 
see it as Britian, because of its former position as Nigeria's colo¬ 
nial master. The general thesis of our research is that Nigeria depen¬ 
dency on Britain has shifted to a greater dependency on the United 
States. As we see it, the present US-Nigeria trade relations will 
continue to undermine Nigeria's development insofar as the unequal 
trade relations continue. 
In order to substantiate our hypothesis, we investigated three 
major areas of trade: the petroleum oil industry, the agricultural 
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sector, and the commerce industry. Our research methodology involved 
the task of collecting and analyzing a significant body of statistical 
data relating to the volume, commodities, direction of trade, as well 
as the sectoral distribution of US investment and participation in the 
Nigerian economy. Our strategy also involved the task of locating the 
empirical trends within a theoretical framework as it pertains to the 
historical dynamics of the political and economic relations between 
both countries. 
Our findings revealed that although Nigeria truly wishes to 
develop, she runs into policy choices because of the dilemma posed by 
the desire to solve acute national problems which often exceed her 
system capabilities, and the desire to maintain system's autonomy even 
when it is clear that the system can no longer hold sway to the modern 
realities of Nigeria. The United States seeks to take advantage of 
this phenomenon to balance her deficit trade position with Nigeria 
as well as cultivate the enormous Nigerian market for U.S. goods and 
services. 
Our study concludes that poverty, hunger and frustration, which 
are manifestations of underdevelopment, cannot be eliminated through 
open door policy towards United States investment in Nigeria. The 
process that will lead to the elimination of the above factors, and 
thus lead to a genuine economic development,must involve internal 
restructuring which will entail the adoption of an inward, need oriented 
and self reliant development strategy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Our study investigates the trade relations that have existed 
between the United States of America and Nigeria between 1960 and 1984. 
For a thorough understanding of the study, it is important for the 
reader to have a concise understanding of the chapter layout. 
Chapter One discusses the character of Nigeria in interna¬ 
tional trade. In this process we charted the trade relationship that 
existed between Nigeria and Britain, and illustrate how Britain lost 
its position to the United States as Nigeria's greatest trading partner 
by 1966. 
Chapter Two discusses the political economy of US-Nigeria 
relations. The relationship has been examined in three epochs, 1960- 
66, 1966-1979, 1979-84. The objective has been to examine the factors 
that contributed to the pattern of relations that existed with the 
United States during the respective governments of Nigeria that 
existed in each of the epochs. 
Chapter Three conducts detailed analyses of three major sectors, 
the petroleum oil industry, agricultural sector, as well as commerce 
and industry. The objective is to examine the indeptedness of US 
participation in each of the sectors. 
Similarly, Chapter Four examines the impact of the trade 
relations with the United States on Nigeria. Major areas examined 
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include the impact of President Reagan's macro-economic policies on 
Nigeria, the lack of technology transfer to Nigerians as well as the 
utter disregard and defiance of Nigerian trade laws by US firms and 
affiliates. 
Our final chapter concludes the study and makes recommenda¬ 
tions as to what steps Nigeria could take to embark on a genuine road 
to economic development. 
CHAPTER 1 
Statement of the Problem 
Nigeria has been experiencing severe economic difficulties in 
the areas of high unemployment, inadequate consumer goods, as well as 
massive wage and salary reduction since 1980 because of a dramatic 
fall in export earnings and heavy debt service payments by the federal 
government. 
The present economic crisis is a manifestation of Nigeria's 
earlier reliance on foreign made consumer products such as dresses, 
confectionaries (milk, tea, sugar), cars, television sets, shoes and 
beauty cosmetics. It is also a reflection of Nigeria's predicament 
for allowing easy foreign access to economic investments in Nigeria 
without first encouraging the development of local entrepreneurs 
who could use local resources to create and satisfy the economic needs 
of Nigerians, thus creating a base for expansion. 
Since independence, Nigeria's development efforts have been to 
catch up with the developed countries, and as such, have created the 
passionate want for goods and services obtainable in the developed 
societies which cannot be produced in Nigeria. Thus, 
In spite of the newly-found cultural nationalism, 
Nigerian academics, social, political, and military 
leaders look at the development of the country in terms 
of seeking to achieve many of the conditions of good 
life in Western Europe, America, and Japan. These 
include industrialization, economic affluence, military 
hegemony, advanced technology, and urbanization. Hence 
3 
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the concept of development involved here is that of a check¬ 
list of artifacts.^ 
Additionally, since these countries have luxury cars, wear designer 
jeans, make up their faces with lipsticks, perm their hair, organise 
trade fairs, these also became the value system of Nigeria. The 
belief is that the more of the above listed items Nigeria can produce 
and apply efficiently, the closer it is presumed to come to the 
standard of the advanced countries and thus the more developed it 
claims it becomes. 
Under the above circumstance, Nigeria has lacked the capacity 
to create commodities from its own local resources, experience, and 
civilization upon which the nation’ could expand, without first look¬ 
ing up to the standards set by the advanced countries. Therefore, 
the potential for technological transformation has thus been stunted. 
This is particularly evident in the lack of technology transfer to 
Nigerians by the foreign multinational corporations operating in 
Nigeria who concentrate their research and development efforts in the 
parent firms outside Nigeria. 
Beyond these shortcomings, the international trading arrange¬ 
ment which makes Nigeria reliant on imported goods and services have 
come to be manifested in the following characteristics: 
1, A divorce between local resources utilization for indus¬ 
trialization and those resources (essentially foreign), that go into 
^Okwudiba Nnoli, "Development/Underdevelopment: Is Nigeria 
Developing?" Path to Nigerian Development (Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA, 
1981), p. 21. 
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actual production processes. Using the brewery industry for illustra¬ 
tion, one finds that barley, which is the main ingredient for beer 
production, is imported to Nigeria from the United States and Europe, 
whereas soghum, millet and rice, which have been scientifically proven 
to be alternative raw materials to barley, which Nigeria produces, are 
neglected. A decision to use soghum, millet or rice for beer produc¬ 
tion in Nigeria will enhance a Nigerian ethnic economic development. 
With an average of four breweries in each of the nineteen states of 
Nigeria, the use of soghum, millet or rice will create an expanded 
market for more Nigerian growers, as well as facilitate the drive for 
merchanised production of these commodities. 
Additionally, since the raw material for beer would be readily 
available in Nigeria, many Nigerian entrepreneurs will invest in the 
brewery industry which will lead to forward linkage such as the 
creation of employment, development of independent beer distributors 
and other intermediary services in the brewery industry. 
2. Alienation from production processes which affects the 
capacity of Nigerians to be committed to the task of mobilizing mass 
energy for development. During the colonial period, the Nigerian 
economy was dominated by commercial multinationals like the United 
African Company (UAC), John Holt, A. G. Leventis and Paterson Zochonis. 
With the attractiveness of the Nigerian market, these companies were 
eager to secure a strong foothold by establishing semi-autonomous 
manufacturing firms in Nigeria. These foreign-owned companies had 
less competitive pressure from Nigerian traders. The companies, in 
6 
fact, used advertising techniques to instutionalize Nigerians to 
consume foreign made goods. At the same time, these companies had 
access to the respective infrastructural and credit incentives as 
well as tariff protection designed to aid industrial development. 
The Aid to Pioneer Industries Ordinance of 1952, the Industrial 
Development (import duties relief) Ordinance of 1957, and the Indus¬ 
trial Development (income tax relief) Act of 1958 serve as examples. 
In this manner, the import of consumer goods by the foreign 
merchant firms disrupted local artisan and handicraft production 
which would have developed to massive scale production over the years. 
This view is well supported by Bade Onimode et al. who asserted that: 
The outright elimination of indigenous modern firms 
(firm displacements) or the reduction in their market 
shares (market displacement) appears to have been less 
pronounced in Nigeria than say Latin America. The main 
reason of course is that there were hardly any indige¬ 
nous modern manufacturing establishments before 1960. 
There is no doubt, however, that pre-emptive displacement 
has been widespread. The MNC's that first entered the 
country were able to keep indigenous enterprise out due 
to their control of sources of credit. The process was 
greatly facilitated by the colonial government policy of 
keeping public surpluses or government savings outside 
the country. Therefore, the potential indigenous entre¬ 
preneurs were discouraged by the simple fact that they 
did not percieve their chances of success to be good, 
given?the very nature of the business environment at the 
time/ 
3. A system of export that is not based on the sale of 
Nigerian made goods. In many cases such as in agriculture, during 
the 1960s and oil in the 1970s, the export sector has been developed 
p 
Bade Onimode (ed.), Multinational Corporations in Nigeria 
(Ibadan: Les Shyraden Nig., Ltd., 1983), p. 49. 
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first and foremost with local consumption assuming a secondary role. 
Hence, while there is acute shortage of electricity in Nigeria the 
Republic of Niger, which receives electrical energy from Nigeria's 
Kainji Dam, does not suffer shortage of electricity. The same applies 
to petroleum, where many motorists suffer for lack of adequate gaso¬ 
line at the expense of exported crude petroleum. 
4. Adoption of foreign values, usually rationalized by the 
myths of international standards. For example, Nigerians like to 
spend holidays overseas when there are beautiful holiday resorts such 
as Yankari Games Reserve and Forcados Bar in Nigeria. Compared to 
domestic tourism, international tourism has become an increasingly 
important source of foreign exchange earnings not only to countries 
like England and the United States, but others such as Kenya, Egypt, 
Jamaica and Greece. Considering the enormous tourist attractions, in¬ 
cluding the examples above, that abound in Nigeria, tourism has not 
been recognized as a dynamic source of foreign exchange which 
could be used to finance capital development and also serve as a means 
of raising national income even when the multiplier effects are not 
considered. 
The main source of tourists to Nigeria, as measured 
by amounts received, are the United Kingdom and the United 
States. By 1973, over 40 percent of Nigeria's tourist 
receipts came from the U.K. with the U.S.A. accounting for. 
14 percent. Receipts from African countries were only 
7%. The geographical distribution of Nigeria's tourist 
speriding abroad is, to a large extent, symmetrical with 
the source of receipts. For example, the U.K., which is 
the greatest source of receipts, also takes the largest 
share of Nigeria's tourist spending abroad. What is obvious 
from this situation is that the U.K. and the U.S.A. have 
8 
been the greatest attractions for Nigerians travelling abroad 
(mostly for summer holidays, educational and business trips). 
Table 1 depicts the purpose of Nigerians travel abroad as well as the 
destinations of travel. 
5. A high rate of rural-urban migration without increased pro- 
4 
ductivity either in the urban areas or in the rural areas. 
The Nigerian internal developmental problems have largely been 
shaped by her trading relations with Great Britain, and presently with 
the United States of America. This is because Nigeria's development 
plans and budgets are based on the revenues from her foreign trade for 
which Britain and the United States have had greater patronage. From 
the colonial era to 1966, Nigerian export revenues were largely from 
the sale of agricultural commodities for which Britain was the greatest 
purchaser. In this manner, Nigeria was in a situation where she had to 
adjust to the market needs of Britain in terms of the commodities to 
lay emphasis on, the qualities to produce, and the price at which they 
could be sold. 
With the advent of military administration beginning in 1966, 
Nigeria shifted from the sale of agricultural commodities to the sale 
of oil for her foreign exchange earnings. This also marked the decline 
of Britian as a dominant economic force in Nigeria as well as giving 
impetus to the United States emerging as Nigeria's main trading' partner. 
3Michael Obadan, "The Role of International Tourism in the Economic 
Development of Nigeria," Nigerian Trade Journal, vol. 29, no. 1 (1982):14. 
40kwudiba Nnoli (ed.), Path to Nigerian Development (Dakar, 
Senegal: CODESRIA, 1981), p. YT. 
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TABLE 1 
INTERNATIONAL TOURISM: ANALYSIS BY PURPOSE OF TRAVEL 
Credit 1970 1971 1972 
Recreation N 388,200 Nl,048,200 N 628,458 
Business 2,256,320 2,297,800 3,630,434 
Government 
Official 420,500 892,500 587,270 
Formal Study 447,800 172,280 591,578 
Miscellaneous 1,049,520 1,040,900 1,149,770 
Total N4,582,340 «5,451,680 N6,588,610 
Debit 
Recreation «23,275,317 «17,313,608 «12,500,466 
Business 2,506,572 998,950 3,750,206 
Government 
Official 358,081 907,990 2,493,968 
Formal Study 8,593,963 9,981,326 4,677,718 
Miscellaneous 1,074,245 750,854 7,786,622 
Total N35,808,180 «29,962,728 N31,208,980 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (unpublished records), 1972. 
Notes: (1) The figures are expressed in the value of the 
Nigerian naira (millions). 
(2) The miscellaneous account relates to expenses as 
a result of visits to friends or relatives, atten¬ 
dance of sporting or special events. It also 
includes expenses in connection with health needs, 
and Mecca pilgrims' expenses. 
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TABLE 2 
INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL: ANALYSIS BY NATIONALITY 
OF TRAVELLER, REGION/COUNTRY VISITED 
Receipts from 1970 1971 1972 1973 
United Kingdom Nl, 777,980 $2,454,850 N3,040,326 N3,244,458 
U.S.A. 788,200 828,040 967,300 1,053,510 
Western Europe 
(excluding U.K.) 832,500 903,610 1,075,050 1,245,674 
Africa (excluding 
Nigeria) 172,280 146,440 240,164 559,898 
Others 1,011,380 1,118,740 1,265,770 1,620,644 
Total N4,582,340 N3,451,680 N6,588,610 N7,641,220 
Payments to: 
United Kingdom N15,397,517 N13,915,028 N10,553,416 N10,261,110 
U.S.A. 6,445,472 6,708,172 6,629,944 7,329,728 
Western Europe 
(excluding U.K.) 5,371,227 4,007,220 5,495,156 5,667,368 
Africa (excluding 
Nigeria) 2,148,491 849,274 2,604,442 3,245,670 
Others 6,445,472 4,483,034 5,926,022 6,201,310 
Total N35,808,180 N29,962,728 N31,208,980 N32,705,186 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (unpublished records). 
Notes: (1) The figures are expressed in the value of the 
Nigerian naira. 
(2) The table compares the receipts and payments 
between Nigeria and the United Statesas well 
as Western Europe for the period 1970 through 
1973. The figures point to the fact that 
Nigeria makes more substantial payments on 
travel and tourist activities to the United 
Kingdom, Western Europe and the United States 
than she receives from these countries. 
11 
It is from this time that the United States' impact on Nigerian develop¬ 
ment became manifest. Between 1970 and 1979, Nigeria experienced a 
boom in construction of infrastructure, education and standard of 
living. This was because the United States purchase of oil from 
Nigeria was sufficient in quantity to provide Nigeria with the substan¬ 
tial amount of financial capital she needed. The stability of the 
United States as a purchaser also gave Nigeria the impression that she 
could continue to rely on the United States as a ready-made market for 
her crude oil sales. But by 1980, the policies of the United States 
changed. 
The Reagan administration focused on balancing the budget and 
deficits with trading partners. His stringent economic policies became 
detrimental to Nigeria. These economic policies were summarized by 
Floyd W. Hayes III, who noted that: 
  in a nutshell, the tenets of Reagan's new federalism 
have been to: 
1. reduce the size of the federal government by cutting 
deficit spending, balancing the budget, constricting 
government employment and terminating numerous social 
programs ; 
2. provide tax breaks for big business to stimulate 
investments; 
3. retard the growth of money and credit in order to 
stabilize the dollar; 
4. cut back social programs for the poor; and 
5 
5. increase military expenditures. 
5Floyd W. Hayes III, "Reagan and Reagonomics, Policy Choices in 
Changing Society" (unpublished paper presented at the National Confer¬ 
ence of Black Political Scientists, Houston, Texas, 1982). 
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The fact that the United States also extended its policies to 
the global economy cannot be contended, especially when Vice President 
Bush stated that: 
The present state of the global economy is not of 
Africa's making. In the world economic system, the 
United States has a special responsibility not only to 
put its own house in order but to help rekindle growth 
in other lands. We are deeply committed to that task, 
and to achieve it the American people are making real 
sacrifices. We are confident that when we are success¬ 
ful, Africa will benefit quickly and significantly.6 
Similarly, American corporations used the Nigerian indigeniza- 
tion program as an excuse to adopt disinvestment policies in Nigeria 
by 1980. According to the survey conducted by the Financial Times: 
From 1977 until 1980, as the Nigerianization programme 
was being progressively implemented, the net inflow of capi¬ 
tal into Nigeria came to a halt. American investors still 
had serious reservations about the Nigerianization decrees. 
Some companies like Citibank and IBM preferred to withdraw 
from the Nigerian market rather than comply with the new 
guidelines. Others adopted a disinvestment policy in spite 
of the improvement in political relations between the U.S. 
and Nigeria.7 
These assertions are best comprehended when we examine the 
trading relations between Nigeria and Great Britian vis-a-vis her trad¬ 
ing relations with the United States between 1970 and 1984. 
6Vice President George Bush, "A New Partnership with Africa" 
Current Policy, no. 438 (Washington, D. C.: United States Department of 
State, Bureau of Public Affairs, November 19, 1982). 
7Daniel C. Bach, "Nigerian-American Relations: Converging 
Interests and Power Relations," Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy (London 
George, Allen and Unwin, 1981), p. 46. 
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When Nigeria emerged from colonialism in 1960, her economy was 
largely agrarian. The major export commodities were palm produce, 
cocoa, cotton and rubber. We have attached table 3 which depicts the 
relative importance of these commodities, their annual tonnage produc- 
tion, and their monetary value at independence. 
TABLE 3 
NIGERIAN EXPORT 
AND VALUES IN 
COMMODITIES, THEIR TONNAGE 
POUNDS AT INDEPENDENCE 
Commodi t.y Tonnage Value 
Palm Kernel 433,000 19,616,000 
Palm Oil 174,000 13,777,000 
Ground Nut 507,000 30,267,000 
Cocoa 113,000 25,605,000 
Cotton Lint 29,000 7,098,000 
Cotton Seed 42,000 925,000 
Rubber 40,000 7,024,000 
Bananas 78,000 2,822,000 
Source: Economic Survey of Nigeria (Lagos, 
ment Printers, 1960), p. 27. 
Nigeria: Govern 
Notes: (1) Table represents Nigeria's main commodities of export 
at independence. Produce are mainly agricultural in nature. 
(2) Monetary value of produce is in the British pound 
sterling. 
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Similarly, the entire labor distribution of Nigeria was centered 
on agricultural activities. This is also reflected in our table 4 which 
illustrates the distribution of Nigerian labor force between 1960 and 
1963. 
TABLE 4 
NIGERIAN LABOR DISTRIBUTION, 1960-1963 
Occupation Number '000 % of Labor Force 
1. Professional and 
Technical Related 441 2.41 
2. Administrative, 
Managerial, 
Executive 39 0.21 
3. Cl erica! 228 1.25 
4. Sales 2,806 15.33 
5. Agriculture 10,201 55.73 
6. Mines, Quarry 14 0.08 
7. Laborers, Arts 
and Crafts 2,190 11.96 
9. Others 891 4.89 
10. Unemployed 345 1.88 
Source: Federal Office of Statistics, Population Census of 
Nigeria (Lagos: Labor Statistics Division, 1963), 
pp. 39-40. 
Note: Table represents Nigerian labor force between 1960 and 
1963. Figures do not add to totals. Table excludes the non-working 
sector such as children, the elderly and the handicapped. Figures 
reveal that over 50 percent of the Nigerian labor force at independence 
were engaged in agricultural activities. 
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Although less transnational capital was invested in the 
agrarian system in the early years of Nigerian independence, the value 
of her agricultural exports was much greater than the value of mineral 
exports. The main reasons which accounted for this phenomenon was that 
the export activities of Nigeria were largely controlled by foreign 
merchant firms (mainly European companies) who had successfully acquired 
substantial market shares in the distribution section during the colonial 
period. Jonathan Barker noted that: 
The changing demands of Western capital from slaves to agri¬ 
cultural raw materials and minerals led to a proliferation 
of Euro-based trading firms specializing in tropical exports, 
and supported by banks and shipping companies.® 
These companies had the control as to what commodities whould 
be cultivated and the volume at which they could be purchased. In like 
manner, Thomas Hodgkins pointed out that: 
Traders, shippers, and bankers collaborated in the purchase 
of peanuts, cocoa, and palm products for shipment to Europe 
where they were manufactured into salad oil, margarine, 
chocolate, and other products which in turn, were sold on 
European and world markets. The transnational corporations 
adapted themselves to peasant production by integrating all 
kinds of import and export trade over a wide geographical 
area in a process of horizontal expansion.9 
Among the larger of the companies who controlled the operations 
in Nigeria right from the colonial era are, John Holt, the Compagnie 
Française de l'Afrique Occidentale (CFAO), the Société' Commerciale 
de T Quest African (SCOA), the Elder Dempster Shipping Company, the 
Jonathan Barker (ed.), Politics of Agriculture in Tropical 
Africa (London: Sace Publications, 1984), p. 39.” 
9Thomas Hodgkins, Colonialism in Africa (New York: Mew York 
University Press, 1959), p. 68. 
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Standard Bank of West Africa, as well as the United African Trading 
Company. 
However, the significance of Great Britain as Nigeria's leading 
trade partner declined as Nigeria took firmer control of her economy. 
One of the reasons which accounted for this was the change of leadership 
in Nigeria on January 15, 1966. The military coup which ushered in a 
new era in the Nigerian political economy presented Nigeria with a 
leadership which wanted a self-reliant economy. This was a deviation 
from the status quo oriented civilian government of Abubakar Tafawa 
Balewa who inherited the mantle of leadership from the British colo¬ 
nialists. With the developmental policies of the military leaders, 
Nigeria began to embark on the road to industrialization. The Nigerian 
indigenization decree (Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree, 1972), 
the creation of the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank as well as the 
creation of the Ministry of Technology are examples of these policies. 
The effect of these policies was that those items such as cocoa, 
palm produce, cotton and rubber which were previously exported, now 
became raw materials for the local processing plants, as provided by 
Schedule 11 of the Indegenization decree. 
Schedule 11 listed 57 businesses in respect of which the 
ratio of Nigerian share capital to foreign share capital 
should be 3:2, i.e. ownership must be shared 60 percent 
Nigeria and 40 percent foreign. Examples of enterprises 
included in this group were all categories of banks, beer 
brewing, clearing and forwarding, departmental stores 
and supermarkets having annual turnover of not less than 
N2,000,000, distribution agencies for machines and tech¬ 
nical equipment, distribution and servicing of motor 
vehicles tractors and spare parts, or similar objects; 
fertilizer production, manufacture of cement, cocoa, 
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chocolate and sugar confectionary and plantation agricul¬ 
ture for tree crops, grains and other cash crops.^ 
With the above provisions, many Nigerian entrepreneurs were encouraged 
to invest in various food processing businesses, thus items which origi¬ 
nally served as cash crops were now being used as food crops. Addi¬ 
tionally, the rise in Nigerian population without a corresponding 
increase in the number of farmers meant that more of the food items 
that were originally met for export served as food items, more so when 
the late 1960s witnessed mass relocation of the Nigerian rural dwellers 
to the urban centers. 
Additionally, the rise in Nigerian population which rose from 
51.6 million in 1960 to 66.2 in 1970 and to 80.6 million in 1980** 
also accounted for the lack of ability to export agricultural commodi¬ 
ties since Nigeria had many people to feed. Most important was the 
Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970). To successfully fight the war, the 
Nigerian military government sought alternative sources of revenue to 
augment her export commodities. It was at this time that emphasis was 
placed on oil trade. More government attention was drawn to the oil 
industry at the end of the civil war. At this time, the government 
had embarked on the reconciliation and reconstruction programs aimed at 
reconstructing the war damaged areas. 
*^Central Bank of Nigeria, "Policies and Strategies Towards 
Foreign Investment in Nigeria," Economic and Financial Review, vol. 18, 
no. 1 (June 1980): 10 
**Michael Simmons, "Vital Statistics," in Nigerian Handbook 
1982-83 (Lagos: William Collins and Co., 1982), p. 36. 
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Another reason was to upgrade the overall outlook and standard 
of the newly created states, which had been created at the brink of 
the Nigerian Civil War. The Nigerial Civil War started shortly after 
the original four regions were dissolved for a twelve-state structure. 
Since many of the states were created from rural areas of the country, 
the military administration felt that the new states needed modern 
infrastructures to make them function efficiently as administrative 
arms of the country. Hence infrastructures such as the construction 
of Administrative Secretariats, modern roads, staff quarters and state 
police headquarters had to be built. Although these development 
efforts were necessary in 1967 when the states were created, they had 
to be delayed until the early 1970s when the Civil War was over. 
The oil embargo against the United States and other Western 
industrial countries by the Arabs in 1973/74 also turned out to assist 
Nigeria in becoming prominent in the world oil trade. The United 
States, which is the world's greatest oil energy consumer, sought to 
trade with Nigeria. With their patronage, the United States soon 
became Nigeria's greatest trading partner, ousting Great Britain. 
We have attached table 5 (five), which reflects the gradual 
decline of agricultural commodities in favor of oil and other minerals 
between 1960 and 1981. 
With the oil trade having opened up opportunities in Nigeria 
for the United States, additional links were established. American 
businessmen started participating in the scramble for Nigeria business, 
both in investment opportunities, educational opportunities, as well as 
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TABLE 5 
NIGERIAN IMPORT AND EXPORT TRADE BY CATEGORIES 1960-1981 






















1960 8.8 32.1 97.3 47.8 11.1 
1961 23.1 323.8 93.3 45.4 10.2 
1962 33.5 300.7 90.0 47.0 11.6 
1963 40.4 331.1 89.1 43.8 10.6 
1964 64.1 365.1 85.1 41.2 8.1 
1965 136.2 400.6 74.6 46.0 8.3 
1966 183.9 384.3 67.6 51.6 10.1 
1967 144.8 338.8 70.1 42.6 9.5 
1968 74.0 348.2 82.5 28.4 7.4 106.2 27.6 
1969 261.9 374.4 58.8 41.8 8.4 149.6 30.1 
1970 510.0 375.4 42.4 57.8 7.6 234.4 31.0 
1971 953.0 340.3 26.4 88.2 8.2 303.0 28.1 
1972 1176.2 258.0 18.0 95.2 9.6 263.8 26.6 
1973 1893.5 383.9 16.9 126.3 10.3 327.6 26.7 
1974 5365.7 429.1 7.4 154.8 8.9 573.7 33.0 
1975 4563.1 362.4 7.4 298.8 8.0 1002.9 26.9 
1976 6321.6 429.5 6.4 440.9 8.6 1313.0 25.3 
1977 7075.8 557.9 7.3 736.4 10.4 1641.1 23.2 
1978 5401.6 662.8 10.9 1020.7 12.4 1913.3 23.3 
1979 10160.8 670.0 6.2 766.5 10.3 1726.2 • 23.1 
1980 13523.0 554.0 3.9 1091.0 11.3 1588.4 26.8 
1981 10280.3 189.8 1.8 1506.8 12.5 2931.2 24.4 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report,various issues 
compiled in 1981. 
Note: Figures compare Nigeria import and export activities by 
categories. Figures show a corresponding decline of other exports as 
the volume of oil export increases. 
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in cultural exchanges. This came to the attention of Nicholas Taylor, 
who observed that: 
The open-air here is awash with business types, all of them 
from somewhere other than Nigeria. They pause in the lobby's 
plump wicker chairs waiting for $80.00 a day drivers to 
ferry them on rounds of meetings with agents, joint venture 
partners, bankers and government officials. They are here 
to fill the vast needs of one of the world's wealthiest 
developing countries.^ 
Although Nigeria gathered quite impressive influence in world 
trade, especially between 1970 and 1980, there have also been grounds 
for concern. The rapid growth of the economy laid bare the inadequate 
level of skilled labor in Nigeria. Manufacturing still accounted for 
less than 10 percent of Nigeria's gross domestic products by 1984, 
while manufactured and semi-finished goods formed approximately three- 
quarters of the country's total imports. It is in light of these 
shortcomings that we posed the problem of analyzing the trade relations 
between the United States and Nigeria, with a view of finding out how 
the trade relations are preventing Nigeria from attaining the "just and 
egalitarian society" she has set as her national objective, and if they 
are,how they are doing so. 
The Role of International Trade 
in World Economy 
The importance of trade between and among nations cannot be 
overlooked in present day world economy. In the early 19th century, 
the classical economists examined the relative importance of trade 
1 ? Nicholas Taylor, "Is Nigeria Really a Goldmine for Atlanta 
Business?" Business Atlanta (June 1983), p. 72. 
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to nations. They distinguished international trade from domestic trade 
by the process of factor mobility. They assumed that the factors of 
production, such as natural resources, capital, management and labor 
did not exist in each country. Hence, although a nation might have a 
sufficient variety of productive factors to produce some of what it 
wants, it would not be able to have sufficient productive factors for 
all it requires. Therefore each country specialises in producing those 
commodities whose production require relatively intensive use of produc¬ 
tive factors found locally in abundance. 
Contemporary economies have been shaped by the international 
trade and specialization of the past. The Nigerian economy in this 
regard, has developed alongside the shape initiated by the British 
colonialists - a disarticulated and incoherent development, which lacks 
forward and backward linkages. Although both private and public sectors 
were created in the Nigerian economy, both sectors have not been able 
to complement each other to enhance a coherent development so that the 
concept of 1 Nigerian interest1 can evolve. The public sector, for example, 
is supposed to protect the interest of the private sector through a 
process of legislations, regulations, and police protection so that the 
enterprises could generate profit. In turn, the private sector would 
pay taxes, support and finance public sector programs, as well as spear¬ 
head the economic expansionism of the country. This symbiotic relation¬ 
ship between private and public sectors is lacking in the Nigerian eco¬ 
nomy. Rather, the Nigerian public sector serves the interests of foreign 
enterprises through contract awards, patronage and professional advice. 
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Consequently, Nigerian businessmen undermine national economic indepen¬ 
dence through junior partnerships with foreign companies who export 
Nigeria's wealth to their countries. The lack of consensus between 
the Nigerian public and private sectors is well noted by Gavin Williams, 
who pointed out that: 
Expatriate domination of investment opportunities and sources 
of capital accumulation inhibits the accumulation and reinvest¬ 
ment of capital by indigenous entrepreneurs who lack the 
resources to compete with vertically integrated multinational 
corporations. Consequently, indigenous entrepreneurs became 
compradors, i.e., intermediaries between expatriates and the 
indigenous polity and economy, and/or turned to the state as 
a source of capital. The increasing intervention of the state 
in economic life has caused it to control lucrative contracts 
and the disposal of monopolistic advantages. Consequently, 
politics has become the primary source of capital accumulation 
by Nigerians. Through the political process professional men, 
bureaucrats, and merchants, were able to accumulate capital 
and carve out monopolistic advantages for themselves within 
the neo-colonial political economy and thereby form a bour¬ 
geoisie. 13 
To better maximise exploitation of Nigeria, the British invested in 
those areas dictated by their economic interest and not where develop¬ 
ment was necessary. In the transportation sector, for example: 
... the Kano-Apapa Railway Line was built to facilitate 
the collection of cotton, groundnuts, and cocoa'for 
export. The Enugu-Port Harcourt line was built to 
serve the oil palm trade. They did not constitute any 
coherent system of communications, neither did they 
contribute to the building of a coherent economy.14 
Since colonial jobs could only be secured in these transportation centers, 
many people moved to settle in the cities located at the railway lines. 
1 ? Gavin Williams, "Class Relations in a Neo-Colony: The Case of 
Nigeria," African Social Studies: A Radical Reader (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 197177 pT"7H4“ ' 
14Claude Ake, Political Economy of Africa (Lagos: Longman 
Press, 1981), p. 44. 
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Having developed this pattern of settlement, British firms 
were able to organize their activities in and around the Ibadan-Lagos, 
the Kano-Kaduna, Zaria-Jos complexes, the Port Harcourt-Warri-Lagos 
axis, and the Port Harcourt-Aba-Enugu axis. This colonially instituted 
settlement pattern has been at the heart of Nigeria's political and 
economic underdevelopment. 
These centers have continued to remain economically isolated 
from the larger part of Nigeria. The non-cohesive national economy 
has thus encouraged Nigerian tribalism and sectionalism "since any 
economic segment can break up to form a separate entity without actually 
being affected by the other economic groupings as manifested during the 
Nigerian Civil War."^ 
Developing nations who embark on developmental efforts make 
economic and political alliances with those developed countries who 
could help facilitate the achievement of their development strategies. 
The experience under British hegemony explains why there was the move¬ 
ment of Nigeria towards the United States. Examining the over-prolonged 
sojourn Nigeria had under Great Britain, Akeredoula Ale maintained that: 
The predatory and exploitative orientations and activities 
of foreign monopoly capital, its inherent tendency to 
resist and hamper local industrialization and to perpetuate 
mercantile capitalism, and its determination and deliberate 
efforts to retard the growth of indigenous entrepreneurship 
- all these have heavily influenced Nigeria's economic his¬ 
tory for well over a century.!® 
15Kirk Green, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary 
Source Book, vol. II (London: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 186. 
16Akeredolu Ale, "Private Foreign Investment and the Underdevelop¬ 
ment of Indigenous Entrepreneurship in Nigeria," Gavin Williams, ed, 
Nigeria: Economy and Society (London:.Rex Collins, 1976), p. 106. 
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In the efforts to overcome the above problems, Nigeria looked 
up to the United States to assist in her development efforts. In a 
direct appeal to U.S. businessmen and investors, Nigeria declared that: 
... the Nigerian economy remains open to all U.S. investors 
who are interested in contributing towards the development 
of the country as partners.1? 
Considering all the aforementioned, it becomes evident that a 
clear distinction exists between Nigerian earlier dependence on Britain 
and her current dependence on the United States. Under Britain, 
policies regarding trade and other economic activities of Nigeria rested 
in the hands of Britons. 
Under the present arrangement, dependence on the United States 
is machinated through economic and political pressure on the Nigerian 
leaders by the United States. Although Nigerians now control the 
policy making process, they cannot exclude the interest of the United 
States in the considerations of Nigerian economic and political 
interests. Our concern here can best be explained in a 1981 incident 
when President Shehu Shagari warned during his visit to Britain that 
Nigeria was committed to the independence of Namibia and the eradica¬ 
tion of apatheid in South Africa. He further announced Nigeria's 
intention to "use any means at our disposal including oil to secure 
18 
Western support for the liberation of Southern Africa." 
170naolapo Soleye, "Nigeria Assures U.S. Investors," Nigeria 
Concord Internalional, vol. 1, no 3 (February 21-18, 1984): 1. 
18Daniel C. Bach, "Nigerian-American Relations: Converging 
Interests and Power Relations," p. 50. 
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But by April of that year, Chester Crocker stopped over in 
Lagos to discuss Nigerian views on Namibia. An American company - the 
American Atlantic Richfield Corporation (ARCO) notified the Nigerian 
government of its intent to terminate two oil supply contracts for 
about 60,000 bpd, owing to the continued high price of Nigerian oil. 
In the circumstances, Nigeria had to rule out any considera¬ 
tion of using oil as a weapon to pressurise the U.S. over 
Namibia or South Africa. On this very issue Chester Crocker 
sternly commented to Nigerian leaders that the U.S. had 
economic interests throughout Africa and we are not going 
to be forced by anybody to choose between them.19 
As the example above suggests, Nigerian actions and policies 
are curtailed because Nigeria relied on the revenues from the sale of 
oil for which the United States is the major purchaser. The implica¬ 
tion is that Nigeria's economic activities and projections then depend 
on the economic situation in the United States. 
In agriculture, while Nigeria supplied the Western capitalist 
countries with agricultural commodities in large quantities at the 
direction of British merchant companies that operated the Nigerian 
economy previously, today, Nigeria indulges in massive importation of 
food. But this time food import is from the United States. In fact, 
as Robert Shenton noted, "underpriced North American rice and wheat 
imports have further undercut domestic production. And it is here 
20 that the analogy with early nineteenth century Britain ends." 
19 
Ibid., p. 52. 
^Michael Watts and Robert Shenton, "State and Agrarian Trans¬ 
formation in.Nigeria." Jonathan Barker (ed.), The Politics of Agricul¬ 
ture in Tropical Africa (London: Sage Pub!icatiosn, 1984), p. 181. 
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It is here that our study delineates Nigerian dependence under 
Britain from Nigeria's greater dependence on the United States in the 
current economic relations with the United States 
Although cash crop production was encouraged more than food 
crop production under British dominance, Nigeria was self-sufficient 
in consumable food items. But its dependence status today requires 
that Nigeria import food to sustain its citizens. The situation is 
worse for Nigeria at the present time because she is forced to sell 
more oil to the United States and at the same time import those essen¬ 
tial food items from the United States. This, no doubt, has serious 
consequences on Nigeria when we consider the glutted nature of oil in 
the international market. 
Buying massive food from the United States deepens Nigeria's 
reliance on foreign food imports. This is because cheap food import 
from the United States increases the prices of domestically produced 
food, as Nigerian farmers will increase their prices of foodstuff to 
meet costs associated with farming, distribution and competition with 
American imported food. Attached is our table 6 which reveals the 
increase of Nigerian dependency of food imports from the United States. 
Another problem generated was that with emphasis on oil produc¬ 
tion to satisfy the US demand, and the massive infrastructural con¬ 
struction the oil economy generated, there was a drift of population 
from the rural areas to the urban and oil producing cities such as 
Warri, Port Harcourt, Ughelli and Patani for wage and salary employment. 
This drift allowed the able-bodied youths and would-be farmers to desert 
the rural areas while leaving behind the old people, the sick, and 
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children who are incapable of performing farming activities. Thus, 
The disintegration of the rural economy created a class of 
individuals who are too poor to farm. The exodus of these 
citizens in turn increased the burgeoning demand for cheap 
food in urban areas. These have been the central elements 
in the making of Nigeria's current agrarian crisis.21 
TABLE 6 
VALUE OF UNITED STATES FOOD IMPORTS 
TO NIGERIA ($ million) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 
Food and 
Live Animals 21 40 64 77.9 
Wheat 
(unmi11ed) 19 35 51 61.8 
Cereals 
(unmilied) NA 2 2 0.2 
Preparations 
of cereals, 
flour, starch 0.5 0.9 2 1.7 
Rice 0.2 NA 2 3.7 
Source: Michael Watts, The Politics of Agriculture in Tropical 
Africa (London: Sage Publications, 1984). 
Note: Table illustrates the continuous trend of food import 
from the United States by Nigeria, thus revealing that Nigeria was 
doing less to develop independent food policy, while the US was 
doing more to export food to Nigeria. 
Another important point is that while Nigeria was exploited 
because Britain controlled the Nigerian agricultural commodities 
market, this time, the United States is invited to invest in the actual 
21 
Ibid., p. 193. 
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productive agricultural sector of Nigeria. Such open invitation 
was witnessed in July 1980 when, 
The United States and Nigeria signed a memorandum 
encouraging American agribusiness, in conjunction with 
the United States Department of Agriculture, to increase 
investment in Nigerian agriculture. The memorandum 
provides for the opening of Nigerian trade and investment 
centers in the United States, the development of a United 
States Department of Agriculture Trade Office in Lagos, 
and the creation of an intergovernmental working group to 
design and implement specific agricultural projects in 
Nigeria.22 
This accord has been signed only with the United States and 
not with any other country. This study shows that inviting the United 
States to invest in Nigerian agriculture will more serious conse¬ 
quences for Nigeria. Many Nigerian agriculturists, especially those 
in rural areas, will be displaced because of the higher investment 
funds and advanced technology available to the United States. 
Moreso when the American investors include giant financial 
concerns and agribusiness such as the Ford Motor Company, Pfizer, 
Occidental Petroleum, Carnation, Allis Chalmers, First National Bank 
of Chicago, and Chase Manhattan Bank. Evaluating the developments, 
it is our view that the current penetration of the Nigerian economy 
by the United States is more diversified, and would make Nigeria 
more dependent and will impact negatively on Nigerian development 
aspirations than that of Britain,in the past and currently. This 
22 Ibid., p. 193. Also, Federal Government, The Green Revolu¬ 
tion: A Food Production Plan for Nigeria (Lagos: Federal Ministry of 
Agriculture, 1980), p. 10. 
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penetration is being encouraged not for the interest of the majority 
Ü 
of Nigerians, but for the interest of the Nigerian petty bourgeoisies 
who use state apparatus to enrich themselves. 
Purpose and Significance of the Study 
The widespread view about Nigeria has been that she is one 
of the world's fastest developing nations in the third world, with 
Western orientation. 
This view is held by Ekundare, who asserts that: 
There is a strong belief that the Nigerian economy has 
passed the stage of economic take-off and reached that 
of self-sustaining growth. Nigeria was one of the few 
African countries to realize that the survival of modern 
competitive capitalism as a philosophy of economic growth 
depends not so much on attacks on the economic systems 
of their countries as on the ability and the willingness 
of capitalism, guided by a proper national policy, to 
accept the increasing challenge facing it in a rapidly 
industrial circle.23 
Nigeria dropped the British parliamentary mode of government 
for the American type of presidential system in 1979 after thirteen 
years of military rule. During the adoption of the presidential 
system of government in Nigeria, scores of study tours were organized 
for Nigerian politicians and policy makers to study the operation of 
the United States political process. Similarly, when Nigeria thought 
of the construction of a new Federal Capital at Abuja, American-companies 
Robert Ekundare, An Economic History of Nigeria (London: 
Methuen Publishing Co., 1974), p. 400. 
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were invited to participate in the architectural design, general equip¬ 
ment supplies and were allowed to participate at various other profes¬ 
sional levels. All these activities have no doubt strengthened the 
trade relations between Nigeria and the United States more than with any 
other country. 
In like manner, the United States welcomes a continued trade 
relations with Nigeria. She sees Nigeria as a country which "... remains 
as a viable long term market, which offers excellent opportunities for 
24 American firms willing to accept the challenges." 
Following these business prospects in Nigeria, the United States 
International Trade Administration, the State Department, as well as 
non-governmental agencies have all taken interest in studying the poli¬ 
tical and economic set up and operations of Nigeria. But while publish¬ 
ing their findings about Nigeria, most of the analyses have presented a 
one-sided story - the American side. Their analyses have centered 
around how Americans could continue to tap the resources of Nigeria 
through trade and not how Nigeria could benefit from U.S. technology or 
expertise in various other sectors. It is this American centered ten¬ 
dency that has given impetus to our study which seeks to unveil the 
Nigerian side of the many years of trade relations with the United 
States. Through a process of establishing causal relationship, our 
study analyzes the impact of the U.S.-Nigeria trade relations on the 
Nigerian society. 
24Jean R. Tartter, "Government and Politics," Nigeria: A Country 
Study (Washington, D.C.: The American University Press, 1981), p. 228. 
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A second reason for this study is the discovery of anomalies in 
the existing literature on Nigerian-U.S. relations. The studies already 
done have been broad analyses encompassing too many facets, thus pro¬ 
viding too shallow information needed to comprehend the sectorial dyna¬ 
mics of U.S.-Nigeria relations. Our study is specific, comprehensive 
and geared specifically to the analyses of U.S.- Nigeria trade relations. 
Additionally, Nigeria's role as an ex-British colony which has 
had substantial British investment has made many intellectuals believe 
25 
that Nigeria is still a "British responsibility," and thus could be 
the country responsible for Nigeria's inability to attain her desired 
just and egalitarian society. The period following 1966 has been of a 
continued decline in the political economy of both Nigeria and Britain, 
with the United States assuming the role Britain used to occupy with 
Nigeria. 
Politically, Nigeria gave up its British-oriented parliamentary 
system of government in 1979 for the American presidential system. This 
was more enhanced when many Nigerian politicians and bureaucrats were 
sent to the United States to understudy the working mechanisms of the 
American presidential system. 
Also, in the cultural sphere, especially viewing it from the 
educational point of view, we notice a larger inflow of Nigerian students 
to the United States universities than to British schools, especially 
25 
Isawa J. Elaigwu, "The Nigerian Civil War and the Angolan 
Civil War, Linkages Between Domestic Tensions and International Align¬ 
ments," Journal_of_Asjan_andjûi^^ vol. XII.(Fall 1982):82. 
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during the Jimmy Carter presidency. The role of education is viewed 
as an aspect of trade in our study for the following reasons. The move¬ 
ment of students from Nigeria to the United States for educational pur¬ 
poses is well regarded by the Nigerian government because of the vital 
part the movements play in the invisible account and balance of payment 
position between the United States and Nigeria. Secondly, foreign 
exchange for the remittance of school fees to Nigerians studying in the 
United States have often occupied a focal policy position in the respec¬ 
tive administrations in Nigeria because "Nigerian students alone claim 
25 percent of the degrees awarded at Howard University, U.S.A.," with 
payment of fees to Nigerians studying abroad amounting to the sum of 
N335 million in 1983 alone. Our table 7 depicts a comparison of 
Nigerian students to other African countries in the U.S.A. 
Apart from this drift to American Universities by Nigerian students, 
there has also been tendencies for Nigerian universities to copy the 
pattern and processes of American educational system. This is most 
glaring with the shift from the British term system to the American 
semester system. These phenomena have aptly been described as the 
Americanization of Nigerian future intellectuals. Yusufu Bala Usman, 
examining the implication alerted that: 
The issue of the state of our foreign policy, especially the 
drift of subservience to America calls for vigilance, but so 
also do the current American plans to virtually take over 
Onaolapo Soleye (Finance Minister), "Students Problems A 




COMPARISON OF NIGERIAN STUDENTS AND STUDENTS FROM 
OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 





South Africa 12.7 











Source: "1979-80 Report on International Educational Exchange," 
Open Doors (New York: Institute of International Education, 1980), 
p. 8. 
Note: Table compares the movement of Nigerians to the United 
States for studies before and after Nigerian independence. Nigerians 
studying in the United States doubled after independence, especially 
in the 1970s. Figures also show that unlike the period before 
Nigerian independence, Nigerians studying in the United States are 
more than students from other African countries. Figures represent 
percentage of total African students in the United States. 
key aspects of our universities. This plan seems to be in 
collision with the National Universities Commission.^7 
Similarly, the crave for American music in Nigerian di.scotheques 
and social gatherings, the popularity of American jeans among Nigerian 
youths, the wearing of dresses with inscriptions such as "Miami Vice," 
27 
Usman Bala Yusufu, "American Plans for Nigerian Universities," 
For the Liberation of Nigeria (London: New Beacon Books, 1978), p. 73. 
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"University of Chicago," "I Love New York," "Los Angeles," as well as 
the general desire of the Nigerian youths to be in the United States, 
all contribute to the rapid acculturation of Nigerians into American 
O Q 
ways of life. 
A thorough examination of the aforementioned in this study makes 
our study a new approach to the investigations of Nigerian political 
economy. With special interest in United States-Nigeria trade rela¬ 
tions, our study will foster more research into the different areas 
such as education, diplomacy and culutral exchanges, where Nigeria has 
relationship with the United States. It is in light of this that the 
findings of our study provide a major resource base for further 
studies into United States-Nigeria political economy. 
Scope of the Study 
Our research analyses examine U.S.-Nigeria trade relations in 
three areas: petroleum oil, agriculture, commerce and industry. 
Apart from exchanges of commodities, our analyses also include invest¬ 
ments in each of the areas under examination. 
In our sectorial investigations we have examined the following 
areas: The importance of petroleum oil in U.S.-Nigeria economy; the 
history of oil exploration in Nigeria; and the extent of U.S. involve¬ 
ment in the exploitation, production and marketing of the Nigerian oil. 
In the agricultural sector, we examined the growth and structure 
of Nigerian agriculture, its position in world trade, especially to 
Britain and the United States up to 1966, and the decline of agriculture 
as Nigeria's vital source of foreign exchange earnings. We have also 
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examined the trade and direction of agricultural commodities, especially 
identifying those agricultural commodities being imported from the 
United States. We also examined American investment in the vast 
Nigerian agricultural industry. Our study analyses the pre-emptive 
effect of such investment on Nigeria's future. 
In our investigation into commerce and industry, we charted and 
detailed the importation of merchandise and equipment in the trade 
process. We also examined professional services and tourism as an 
aspect of commerce between the United States and Nigeria. 
Hypothesis 
In conducting the study we hold the assumption that the trade 
relations between Nigeria and the United States have made Nigeria 
dependent on the United States. 
As we illustrated in our statement of the problem, political 
economic relations between the United States and Nigeria pre-date 
Nigeria's independence. But there was a higher volume of trade between 
Nigeria and Britain up to 1966. Following the decline of Britain as 
Nigeria's greatest trading partner, the United States assumed the role 
as Nigeria's leading trading partner with its substantial import of 
Nigerian oil. 
While Britain, France and other Western European countries still 
retain their position as Nigeria's trading partners, it is important 
to note that reliance on revenues from these sources has diminished 
because by "July 1981, Nigeria was selling over half of its oil exports 
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to the United States which clearly became a constraining factor of 
2g 
dependency." Consequently, Nigerian budget was being based on the 
revenue from oil sales. Apart from being the main source of capital 
inflow to Nigeria, the United States equally continued to invest in 
the Nigerian economy, especially in the oil and agricultural sectors. 
Definition of Concepts 
The proper use of concepts employed in research has often evoked 
confusion for students and scholars alike in the field of social 
sciences. A variety of terms are used loosely and interchangeably 
provided the concepts are accepted within the sets of related genera¬ 
lizations. The following concepts are intended as a guide, both for 
the researcher and also to the reader; so that our study can be read 
with some common understanding. Therefore, we have refrained to 
delineate in an exhaustive manner the meaning of each term insofar as 
they are employed in this study. However, we hope to provide the 
reader with more detailed understanding in a political science pers¬ 
pective as he goes through the content of the study. 
Dependent 
Dependent in our analyses has been used to mean that Nigeria has 
virtually found itself in a situation where she has to rely on trade 
with the United States to be able to generate such items as food, 
financial capital and technology, which she needs for her economic and 
social survival. 
28ibid., p. 19. 
37 
Oil Trade 
It involves the exporting of crude oil by Nigeria to importing 
countries, especially the United States. We also extend the defini¬ 
tion to investment and participation in the Nigerian oil industry by 
the United States. 
Aqriculture 
Throughout the study we have used agriculture as an umbrella 
under which we examined the trade transactions in agricultural pro¬ 
ducts such as wheat and rice, as well as U.S. investments in various 
segments of Nigerian agriculture. 
Commerce and Industry 
This refers to trade activities and relations in merchandise, 
equipment and professional services such as consultancy, insurance, 
banking and tourism. It also includes transactions involving tech¬ 
nology transfer, as well as educational services and opportunities. 
Investments 
In investigating the areas enumerated above, we have used invest¬ 
ment as a concept to denote the use of substantial amounts of money to 
establish income-producing projects such as farms, factories or irri¬ 
gation dams. 
Research Methodology 
The historical method was used in carrying out the study. The 
historical method of research is a universally accepted method of 
38 
social science investigation, 
... which isolates variations in single causes and 
their associated effects. These variations may be 
in time, from month to month, year to year or epoch 
to epoch. They may also be in space, from farm to 
farm, country to country, or region to region, ordi¬ 
narily called geographical.29 
We believe that the historical method would provide us with the advan¬ 
tage of being able to investigate the pattern of U.S.-Nigerian trade 
relations since 1960, by examining both primary and secondary evi¬ 
dence of historical nature. 
We also augmented the historical method with a technique called 
the critical evaluation and selective use of existing studies tech¬ 
nique. This technique is a process whereby the researcher uses 
research data from various sources which he (researcher) considers 
useful to the successful validation of his assumptions. This tech¬ 
nique provided us with the basis of examining various area study 
researches already conducted by the U.S. Department of Commerce, 
various studies by intergovernmental agencies, the Nigerian Ministry 
of Trade and Industry, as well as newspapers, magazines, radio broad¬ 
casts, and trade journals. 
In order to substantiate our hypothesis, we posed the following 
questions to be examined: 
1. What has been the pattern of U.S.-Nigeria trade relations 
since Nigerian independence in 1960? 
2. What factors encourage the trade relations between the 
29 Wilson Gee, Social Science Research Methods (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950), p. 280. 
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United States and Nigeria? 
3. To what extent has Nigeria benefited from the trade rela¬ 
tions with the United States? 
Each of these questions relates to our hypothesis because the 
search for answers to each of the questions provided the totality of 
the study upon which our findings were based. 
Question One, for example, enabled us to examine U.S.-Nigeria 
trade relations under the different administrations Nigeria has had 
since independence. The first civilian government 1960-1966, the 
military administration 1966-1979 and the second republic (return to 
civilian rule) 1979-1984. 
Similarly, Question Two was crucial to our ability to substan¬ 
tiate the hypothesis. By searching for the factors that have encou¬ 
raged U.S.-Nigeria trade relations between 1960 and 1984, our research 
became thorough because we examined both political, economic and 
social factors to determine their contribution to U.S.-Nigeria trade 
relations. 
Question Three related to our study because it helped us to 
examine the summary effect and consequent impact of Nigeria's trade 
relations with the United States. The examination entailed findings 
on the political, economic and social impact on Nigeria. 
To answer Question One we examined Nigeria in three historical 
epochs: 1960-1966, which was Nigeria's early years of independence 
and ruled by the first civilian administration, as well as being a 
major agricultural export country; 1966-1979, this second period was 
the era of the military in Nigeria politics, a period that saw Nigeria 
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in a civil war. At this time Nigeria also suddenly emerged as an oil 
rich nation. The third epoch, 1979-1984, was also unique. This 
period marked the return of Nigeria to civilian rule with the adop¬ 
tion of the presidential system of government which had been alien 
to Nigeria and typical of the United States. 
In each of the historical epochs we examined trade policies, 
economic situation and such related historical information on 
Nigerian trade relations with the United States. Data that we 
analysed pursuant to this question were trade data such as indexes, 
statistical charts, direction and movement of goods. These data 
analyses are important because they enabled us to determine the volume 
of trade and items of trade between Nigeria and the United States. 
We have also applied the segmented periods in our analyses of 
Chapter Two. But instead of examining evidence such as statistical 
data and trade indexes, we were examining the factors that determine 
the trade relations between the two countries. In this regard, we 
examined evidence such as political factors, the Nigerian civil war, 
the creation of twelve states in Nigeria. We also examined economic 
factors such as the economic conditions of Nigeria in each of the 
three epochs. These included the economic policies of Nigeria such 
as the need to move from an agribase economy to a diversified economy, 
the need to feed the teeming population as well as the perception of 
the United States as a more liberal country to acquire technology from. 
The data we have used here are secondary evidence. We used 
books already published in the field on Nigeria,the United States 
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and third world countries. We have also examined trade pacts, 
treaties, and memoranda signed by both countries. In addition, we 
examined political statements, radio broadcasts made by leaders of 
the United States and Nigeria on different occasions as they affect 
the trade relations between both countries. 
Other sources of evidence for our analyses are newspapers, edi¬ 
torials and articles of the Nigeria news media. Specifically, we 
used periodicals such as West Africa, The African Concord Interna¬ 
tional , The African World News, Times International, and The States¬ 
man. Beside these sources, we used numerous copies of periodical 
studies published by the United States Department of Commerce. These 
included Marketing in Nigera, American trade reviews and opportuni¬ 
ties survey reports. 
Primary data used for the study included statistical data on 
Nigerian import and export activities. These included data such as 
number of visitors to Nigeria on business from the United States, 
volume of exports by commodities, volume of imports, country of 
import, and amount in Naira. Data on investors in Nigeria, their 
country of origin, amount of money invested and by industry. Our 
study also utilized primary data such as economic indexes featuring 
revenues, sources of revenues, as well as dates on expenditures on 
agricultural, manufacturing and commercial activities. Our sources 
of these data are the Central Bank of Nigeria, The Federal Ministry 
of Finance, Federal Ministry of Trade and Industry, and the Depart¬ 
ment of Commerce of the United States. Other primary evidence for 
our study included radio broadcasts, communique by both Nigerian 
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and American political leaders. Sources of these data were The 
Federal Ministry of Information in Lagos, Nigeria and also through 
government gazettes. Similar information were also secured from 
the Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D. C. 
The collection technique for our data was made through application 
processes. Specific data and information necessary for our study were 
applied for through the telephone and by letter writing. 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework utilized in the research is derived 
from the theories of dependency referred to by Ronald Chi 1 cote as 
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"Theories of Development and Underdevelopment." 
One of the dominant features of the present day world economic 
order is the unequal relationship between the developed countries and 
the developing nations. The developing nations have relied on the 
doctrine of comparative advantage (a classical theory of international 
trade) often initiated by the developed countries, without favorable 
result. According to this theory, countries like individuals, should 
specialize in limited range of production in the areas where they 
have comparative advantages. In this process, the classical theorists 
argue that there would be proper international division of labor and 
technological diffusion. As it turned out, the benefits of comparative 
advantage of international trade accrued disproportionately to the 
30 Ronald H. Chilcote, Theories of Comparative Politics: The 
Search for a Paradigm (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), p. 271. 
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developed nations at the expense of the less developed countries. 
As Michael Todaro pointed out in his study: 
It reflects the highly inegalitarian institutional social 
and economic ordering of the global system in which a few 
powerful nations and their multi-national corporations 
control vast amount of world resources.3* 
The inequality of international trade under the classical 
arrangement included the manipulation of the less developed countries 
through non-compliance with the provisions of General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Since World War II, the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade has provided the framework of rules for 
nations management of their commercial policies. GATT was established 
on the underlying assumption that participants in international 
exchanges are relatively equal. Thus GATT's most pervasive concern 
has been that: 
... trade restrictions not discriminate between supplier 
countries. Any advantage, favour, privilege, or immunity 
granted in trade with one country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to like trade with all 
GATT members.32 
Consequently, GATT structures its provisions in three areas--discrim- 
inatory trade controls, quantitative restrictions, and the settlement 
of disputes over trade policy of countries. 
GATT attributes the rapid growth of exports of labor-intensive 
manufactures from some less developed countries in Asia and Latin 
America to its success. For instance a study bÿ the Organization for 
•^Michael P. Todaro, Economics for a Developing World (London: 
Longman Publishing Co., 1977), p. 13. 
■^Richard E. Caves and Ronald W. Jones, "GATT and Multilateral 
Trade Liberalization," World Trade and Payments (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1981), p. 240. 
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Economie Cooperation and Development (OECD) pointed out that: 
... a group of newly industrialized countries such as 
Spain, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, had expanded 
their world share of exports of industrial commodities 
from 2.5 percent in 1963 to more than 7 percent by 1977 
The United States percentage of manufactured imports 
from these countries rising from 5.9 percent in 1973 
to about 20.0 percent in 1977.33 
Despite these success stories, the less developed countries have been 
conscious of the mountainous tariffs, policies of reverse preferences 
and other non-tariff barriers the developed countries have imposed 
on the kinds of goods that the less developed countries have to 
export. 
The disillusionment of the less developed countries over trade 
barriers on their commodities is not unfounded. A thorough examina¬ 
tion of the tactics used by the developed countries include: 
1. Technical Standards.-Technical and administrative barrier 
to trade arises from the differences in technical standards employed 
from country to country such as in electrical voltages, chemical 
strength or other complexities of manufacturing. The use of tech¬ 
nical standards as a weapon against a developing country comes about 
when manufacturers are forced to redesign their products to meet a 
specific country's specification before they are allowed access. 
Manufacturers in less developed countries are not able to undertake 
this hardship because of their limited finances. Therefore, they 
concentrate on their home markets. 
33 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, "The 
Impact of the Newly Industrializing Counties on Production and Trade 
in Manufactures." (Paris: Report by Secretary General, 1979). 
45 
2. Customs Valuation.-The determination of the tariff on an 
import usually involves two steps. These are the process of estab- 
lishig the rate of duty to be paid, and the process of setting 
appropriate value of the imported goods on which ad valorem rate 
would be paid. Customs valuation practices are thus used to increase 
the incidence of tariffs by raising the value of foreign import. 
A well-known feature of the Ü.S. tariffs has been the 
valuation of certain imports not on the usual basis of 
their selling prices abroad but rather on the wholesale 
prices of competing goods produced in the United States. 
This is called the American Selling Price (ASP) system. 
Because the protected American procedures charge higher 
prices than their foreign competitors, this practice 
increases the incidence of tariffs.34 
3. Preferences.-Some developed countries grant preferences to 
some countries of their choice from whom they allow import of com¬ 
modities. The United States, for example, granted this preference 
to many Asian countries such as Taiwan, Singapore, and Thailand 
under the Trade Reform Act of 1974. The preferential strategy is 
mostly used by members of the European Economic Community (EEC) who 
have adopted the "Rules of Origin Principle." According to Monique 
Garrity, "These rules are intended to enable the customs administra¬ 
tion to identify exactly which products it can regard as having 
originated from a chosen (A4) country and as such eligible for free 
access."33 
34 ^Ibid., p. 13. 
35 
Monique P. Garrity, "Implication of the Lome Convention for 
African Trade and Development," The Review of Black Political 
Economy (Fall 1983): 23. 
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Another area of contradiction has been with technological 
transfer. It soon became clear that the multinational corporations 
and advanced countries are not transferring appropriate technology 
to the less developed countries. This fallacy of supposed technolo¬ 
gical transfer is best explained by Thomas J. Beirsteker who observed 
that: 
The limited transfer of technology has several adverse 
second-order consequences. Economic capabilities are 
reduced because the technological dependence that is 
created strongly inhibits the creation of technological 
and scientific capabilities in national manufacturing 
activity. In addition, because they transfer so little 
technology, multinational corporations largely deter¬ 
mine patterns of production and consumption in host 
countries.36 
He further argued that the importation of inappropriate technologies 
to the third world countries by multinational corporations leads to 
actual reduction in the economic activities of these countries because 
Capital intensive techniques tend to discourage 
production linkages either backward or forward37 
which are needed to contribute significantly to added employment and 
production which set off a chain of growth throughout the economy. 
The third worldcountries have not slept over the imbalance in 
the trading relations. For more than a decade, the developing coun¬ 
tries have pressed a collective demand on the developed countries 
for new policies and institutions that would reorient the world 
economy toward a New International Economic Order (NIEO), in order 
3^J. J. Bierksteker, Distortion or Development? A Contending 
Perspective on the Multinational Corporations (Massachusetts: MIT 
Press, 1981), p. 13. 
37Ibid., p. 14. 
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to rectify the abnormalities between the rich and poor countries, as 
well as bring about a balanced economic development. 
A program of action on the establishment of a New International 
Economic Order was first enunciated in Algeria by the Group of 77. It 
was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1974. This 
program identified several actions that could be taken to bring about 
maximum economic co-operation and understanding among all countries, 
especially between the developed and the developing countries. Some of 
these programs included actions designed to: 
1. Facilitate the functioning and further the 
aims of producers associations; 
2. Expedite the formation of international 
commodity agreements to stabilize world 
markets for raw materials and primary 
commodities; 
3. Improve access to markets in developed coun¬ 
tries through the progressive removal of 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers and the 
enlargement of the generalized systems of 
preferences; 
4. Support initiatives in the regional, sub¬ 
regional and inter-regional co-operation of 
developing countries, and thereby promote 
collective self-reliance among them. 
5. Increase the flow of financial resources to 
the developing countries and mitigate the 
burden of external debt; and 
6. Formulate and implement an international code 
of conduct for transnational corporations.39 
36united Nations General Assembly Resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 
3202 (S-VI), May 1, 1974] 
39 Franklin R. Root, International Trade and Investment 
(Cincinnati: South-Western Publishing Co., 1978), p. 437. 
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Beside the efforts of the United Nations and of third world 
countries through the Group of 77, many economists, political scien¬ 
tists and social scientists have come to be extremely critical of the 
trading relationships between developed and less developed nations. 
First to conduct theoretical analyses of the problems were 
the intellectuals of the advanced countries, who propounded the 
modernization theories. Pioneers of this theory argued that the 
experience of Western European and advanced countries suggested a 
linear path toward modern development by pursuing a path through suc¬ 
cessive stages of development. The most influential proponent of this 
theory was the U.S. Economic Historian, Walter W. Rostow. In his 
Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-communist Manifesto, he outlined 
five stages of path to development, namely: 
1. The Traditional Society.-The traditional society, 
he notes, is grounded on pre-Newtonian science 
and technology and pre-Newtonian conceptions of 
the physical world. He thinks there is a ceiling 
on pre-capital output and income because of the 
absence of modern science and technology. Accord¬ 
ing to him, the early civilization of the Middle 
East and the Mediterranian region belonged to the 
traditional stage of economic growth. 
2. The Pre-conditions for Take-off.-According to W. W. 
Rostow, this is a transitional stage when societies 
develop the conditions necessary for the next stage. 
Pre-condition societies are a mixture of the tradi¬ 
tional and the new. A few enterprising people take 
up the new ways, mobilizing capital and investing' 
in modern production facilities, but the masses of 
people remain peasants, clinging to the traditional 
ways that spell low productivity and stagnation. 
Hence, the decisive factor in this stage is political 
- the building of a centralized national state. 
3. Take-off.-This is the stage of the great watershed 
of economic growth. Traditional resistances weaken 
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and are finally overcome as the society enters 
upon a process of cumulative growth. Modern 
technology, modern organization and modern atti¬ 
tudes come to dominate economic activity. 
4. The Drive to Maturity.-In this stage of growth, 
the economy moves beyond the industries that 
originally gave impetus to its take-off, such 
as textiles and steel. The society now has the 
capacity and technology to produce anything it 
chooses to produce, although it would be uneco¬ 
nomical to do so given the advantages of inter¬ 
national specialization. Industrial processes 
become progressively more sophisticated; imported 
goods are now produced at home, export goods are 
then enouraged. 
5. Age of Mass Consumption.-In this stage the Society 
develops affluent standards of living and an 
emphasis on the production of durable consumer 
goods and services. The key symbol of this stage 
is the mass production and consumption of automo¬ 
biles with their pervasive influence on life styles.40 
Rostow's stage theory opened up for A. F. K. Organski, who 
examined the role of government through four stages, in his Stages of 
41 
Political Development, namely: 
1. Primitive national unification; 
2. Industrialization; 
3. National welfare; and 
4. Abundance. 
These views wielded influence in the early 1960s when many third 
world countries were becoming independent (Nigeria became independent 
on October 1, 1960). 
40Walter W. Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-communist 
Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960). 
41A. F. K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965). 
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Criticizing these theories which have come to be known as 
Orthodox theories, a newer generation of theoreticians developed. 
These writers felt that the diffusionist approach always recommended 
by the former was not resolving the problems of the third world 
countries. 
These later theoreticians thus took a radical position in their 
analysis and prescription as to the causes and effect of third world 
underdevelopment and dependencies. 
The analyses of this group revolved around three structural 
features: The unevenness of productivity, disarticulation of economies, 
and domination of the economies of the third world countries through 
the imperialism of the developed countries. 
The ensuing discussions of the theories of international trade 
provide the basis of this relationship, while our review of the 
literature makes the studies done in the field from the third world 
perspective more vivid. 
Contending Theories of International Trade 
The human race as we know it today is organized in a society 
of nation states characterized by a people, a territory, an economy 
and a sovereign government. Therefore, each nation state seeks to 
have relations with other states that will help enhance or promote the 
national objectives as perceived by the leaders of the governments. 
Foremost among these national interests is the continuous survival of 
the state itself, followed by the desire for a sustained economic 
growth and development. 
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The economists have been the forerunners in the theories and 
discussions regarding economic interdependencies of nations. More 
often than not, they have ignored political factors in the process, 
and have thus emphasized on balance of payments, comparative advantage, 
tariffs, quotas, and indifference curves in their studies of interna¬ 
tional trade. 
Similarly, the political scientists in the quest for profes¬ 
sionalism had neglected the role of economic factors in their studies 
of international relations. For a long time the political scientist 
emphasized descriptive analysis of international politics and institu¬ 
tions (traditionalists); studies of the logic of deference and impact 
of possible new weapons on deference (the strategists); as well as the 
exploration and empirical analysis of selected aspects of political 
phenomena (middle range theorists). 
But as Liziannian, the Chinese president, pointed out: 
Good political relations are an indispendable condition 
of the development of economic cooperation.42 
The fusion of the thoughts of political leaders, economists 
and the political scientist in analyzing international relations in 
contemporary times has led to one of the fastest growing areas in the 
field of social sciences called International Political Economy. The 
phenomenal growth in this new area of studies is attested to by the 
numerous theoretical and empirical analysis appearing in various profes¬ 
sional journals and books. Joan Alderman Spero attributes this 
AO 
Atlanta Journal and Constitution, January 30, 1985. 
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development to the fact that: 
Students of international relations are increasingly becom¬ 
ing aware of the interrelationship of economics and polir 
tics in the choice of relations among nations.4 3 
Apart from Spero's conclusion, events and development, espe¬ 
cially in the post World War II era in international relations, suggest 
an increasing use of economic instruments such as economic sanctions 
and embargos in achieving political objectives against an adversary. 
The League of Nations sanctions against Italy prior to World War II, 
U.S. economic sanctions against the Castro regime in 1962, U.S. grain 
embargo against the Soviet Union following the invasion of Afghanistan 
(1979-80) and the imposition of martial law in Poland (1983), the Arab 
oil embargo against the Western industrialized nations in 1973-74, all 
serve as evidence as to the need for more studies in the area of inter¬ 
national economic relations. Hence, in his study, Michael Mastanduro 
noted that: 
The strength of economic warfare as a strategic weapon 
rests upon the strength of two relationships - that 
between trade and the economy, and that between the 
target economy and the military.44 
Furthermore., the post World War II alliances, the birth of the 
United Nations and its quest to make the world a peaceful place for 
harmonious co-existence, the development of new international patterns 
Joan Elderman Sp'^fO, The Politics of International Economic 
Relations (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), pp. 4-?5. 
44 Michael Mastanduro, "Strategies of Economic Containment: 
U.S. Trade Relations with the Soviet Union," World Politics: A 
Quarterly Journal of International Relations, vol. XXXVII, no. 4 
(July 1985): 506. 
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of production and distribution of goods and services giving rise to a 
more complex international division of labor as well as the burning 
desire of third world countries to enhance economic development, have 
all combined to inject political issues into the economic relationship 
among countries. 
In light of these developments it becomes important that for 
our study of U.S.-Nigeria trade relations to be well-grounded, that 
we first examine the theoretical basis of international trade. 
In doing this, we have discussed the comparative theory of 
international trade. We also discussed the international trade as seen 
from a third world perspective. The latter is made vivid in our review 
of literature. 
Theory of Comparative Advantage 
According to Franklin Root's illustration: 
Since the ending of the Middle Ages, almost five cen¬ 
turies ago, two bodies of theory have dominated explanations 
of international trade: Mercantilism (1500-1800) and the 
pure theory (1800-present). Both theories have had a pro¬ 
found effect on the trade policies of nations, and the pure 
theory of comparative advantage remains today the simple 
strongest intellectual influence on the trade policies of 
the United States and other industrial countries.45 
The theory of comparative advantage has an impressive lineage 
to the economic thoughts of Adam Smith in An Inquiry into the Nature 
46 and Causes of Wealth of Nations (1776). The theory of comparative 
45Franklin F. Root, International Trade and Investment (Cincin¬ 
nati: South-Western Publishing Co., 1978), p. 27. 
45Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of Wealth 
of Nations (New York: Random House, 1937). 
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advantage was rendered as a substitute to the criticisms levied against 
the mercantilist theory which argued for the regulation of international 
trade for England to secure a favorable balance of trade. In the theory 
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of comparative advantage both Adam Smith and David Ricardo applied 
the doctrine of laissez-faire to international trade. Under this 
arrangement, the theory suggests that all nations of the world would 
benefit from unregulated free trade. They felt this would allow indivi¬ 
dual countries to specialize in the production of goods and services 
where they have better natural and acquired advantages. Following this 
assumption, the advanced countries have emphasized the mutual benefit 
that accrue to all trading partners in international trade because under¬ 
lying the assumption of comparative advantage is that: 
... countries can increase the total volume of consumables 
at their disposal by shifting inputs into the production 
of the commodity for which the ratio of domestic input 
costs to foreign input costs is lower.48 
However, the theory of comparative advantage has severe short¬ 
comings arising from the fact that it failed to put into consideration 
natural 1 imitations such as the prior destruction of indigenous handi¬ 
craft industries or the colonial development of mineral or agricultural 
mono-product economies as happened in the case of many third world 
countries. 
470avid Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1948). 
48Sheila Smith and John Toye, "Three Stories About Trade and 
Poor Economies," Trade and Poor Economies (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1978), p. 9. 
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It is the attempt to correct the growing discontent with the 
comparative theory of the classicist that gave birth to the Neo- 
Classical school of thought. 
The Neo-Classicals 
Through the insights of Ricardo regarding labor and production 
and Thomas Malthus theory of population which perpetuates the oppres¬ 
sion of the poor people, a group of utopian socialists emerged in the 
early 19th century who protested against capitalism, the distribution 
of income, the allocation of status as well as the distribution of poli 
tical power. 
It is the effort to correct some of the imperfections in the 
economy that led to the formation of the marginalist theory of value, 
and hence neo-classical political economy. Chilcote pointed out that: 
The popularization of Ricardo's thought, the impact of 
the influence of Karl Marx as well as Engels, all led 
not only to a bourgeoisie onslaught on Marxism, but to 
efforts of the labor theory of value, which had evolved 
through Smith, Ricardo and the classical thinkers.4^- 
The neo-classicals in their anlaysis thus attempted to be very 
rigorous, detailed and abstract in the tradition of micro-economics. 
Notable among these writers were John Stuart Mill, who contributed The 
Principle of Reciprocal Demand to explain the terms of trade between 
countries. In 1933, another neo-classicist,Bertil Ohlin, published his 
50 Interregional and International Trade, in which he further developed 
49Richard H. Chilcote, Theories of Comparative Politics: The 
Search for a Paradigm (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), p. 410. 
SOBertil Ohlin, Interregional and International Trade (Cam¬ 
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1952). 
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the proposition of Eli Heckscher - that a country exports those goods 
that use most intensively the country's most abundant factors of pro¬ 
duction. 
In the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, Bertil Ohlin attempted to give 
a specific account of how comparative advantage arises by rooting them 
in international differences in what are called "factor endowments," 
their stocks of capital and labor at a given point in time. This study 
thus introduced a change in assumption from those that underlie compara¬ 
tive advantage theory. Whereas the latter depended on the assumption 
of different techniques of production which accounted for the large 
difference in absolute productivity between rich and poor countries for 
any given product, the Heckscher-Ohlin theory begins by reversing this 
assumption so that each commodity is produced by the same technique in 
each country. Differences in the factor - intensity of products com¬ 
bined with stocks of capital and labor varying between countries are 
then left to account for comparative advantages. Sheila Smith and John 
Toye note that: 
It is on the strength of this reasoning that poor countries 
are recommended to specialize in labor-intensive products 
and trade their surplus of such products for imports of the 
rich countries capital-intensive goods.51 
The above discussion highlights the genesis of the theory which 
provides the basis of international trade adopted by the Western capi¬ 
talist countries. But over two-thirds of the world's people live in a 
daily round of grinding poverty occupying the vast stretches of Asia, 
51 Sheila Smith and John Toye "Interregional and International 
Economies," Trade and Poor Economies (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1978), p. 3. 
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Africa and South America. These people inhabit more than one hundred 
countries that are encouragingly committed to programs of economic 
development intended to break the vicious circle of poverty. Most 
development economists of these countries have now agreed that the tradi¬ 
tional economic theory of the Western advanced countries has very 
limited relevance for understanding the economic problems of the third 
world. This was made explicit by Gunnar Myrdal who stated the case 
against the use of Western economic concepts and theories in the third 
world nations, when he observed that: 
Economic theorists, more than any other social scientists, 
have long been disposed to arrive at general propositions 
and then postulate them as valid for every time, place 
and culture. There is a tendency in contemporary economic 
theory to follow this path to the extreme .... When theories 
and concepts designed to fit the special conditions of the 
Western world and thus containing the implicit assumptions 
about social reality by which this fitting was accomplished 
- are used in the study of underdeveloped countries, where 
they do not fit, the consequences are serious.52 
In the accompanying section, we have presented a review of the 
relevant literature dealing with the contemporary studies on interna¬ 
tional political economy. Emphasis has been laid on those studies 
that clarify our understanding of political economy from dependency 
perspective. 
Review of Literature 
There are quite a number of works dealing generally on U.S.- 
Nigeria relations. The majority of such analysis are published as 
52 
Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry Into the Poverty of 
Nations (New York: Pantheon, 15-Î68), pp. 16-17. 
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articles in the journals of political science discipline, and also in 
various areas of studies which deal with the relationship between 
developed countries and third world nations. 
We have reviewed the relevant analyses so that our study and 
contribution to political economy could be delineated from the contri¬ 
butions made by other researchers. 
Daniel C. Bach's article on "Nigeria-American Relations: Con- 
53 
verging Interests and Power Relations" examined the relations between 
Nigeria and the United States in the post Nigerian Civil War era (1966- 
1970). The central thesis of his analysis is that in spite of the aid 
which Nigeria received from the Soviet Union during the Civil War, 
Nigeria continued to maintain very close political and economic rela¬ 
tions with the United States after the war. He further argues that, 
considering all the technical and financial assistance Nigeria received 
from the Soviet Union and the East European countries, one would have 
expected some redirections in Nigeria's political leaning as soon as 
the war was over. 
Bach's analysis has not examined other reasons which makes 
Nigeria to have closer ties with the United States than with the Soviet 
Union. There are other factors which have been responsible for Nigeria- 
U.S. relations. These include the common legal system which both 
Nigeria and the United States inherited from Britain who was a common 
colonial master. In addition is the common heritage created by slavery. 
^Daniel C. Bach, "Nigerian-American Relations: Converging 
Interests and Power Relations," in Nigerian Foreign Policy Alternatives 
Perceptions and Projections (New York: St. Martinrs Press, 1983), pp. 
40-52. 
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The Blacks in the United States constitute 13.5 percent of the American 
population. They, as well as Nigerians still believe that the separa¬ 
tion created by slavery could be bridged through political and economic 
processes. Apart from examining these factors, our study disproves 
Bach's analysis by comparing the volume of assistance both financial 
and technical which Nigeria received from the United States and the 
Soviet Union before and after the war. By doing this comparative 
analysis, it is clear that the United States' assistance to Nigeria 
has been more than the one time assistance Nigeria received from the 
Soviet Union. 
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In another study titled Marketing in Nigeria, Dorothy L. 
Luther of the U.S. Department of Commerce, analyzes various aspects of 
U.S.-Nigeria trade relations such as U.S. economic treaties with 
Nigeria, the Nigerian political structure, Nigerian trade policies, 
the pattern of and investment climate in Nigeria as well as general 
marketing tips which could assist the American businesses wishing to do 
business in Nigeria. 
In the effort to properly guide the American entrepreneurs 
hoping to do business in Nigeria, the author identifies the enormous 
opportunities that exist in Nigerian business as well as exposes the 
shortcomings such as high rate of bribery and corruption among Nigerian 
government and private officials. 
Luther's analysis clarifies the understanding of our study since 
it provides us with those information on the areas where Nigeria needs 
54Doroghy L. Luther, Marketing in Nigeria (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Department of Commerce, 1984). 
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to improve its business practices. Consequently, our study evaluates 
Luther's assertions and thereby provides a basis for making recommenda¬ 
tions on what to do to improve Nigerian business practice. 
Gavin Williams' work on "Class Relations in a Neo-Colony: 
55 
The Case of Nigeria," examined the contradiction between the 
expatriate domination of investment opportunities in Nigeria and its 
accompanying problems. He agrees that the domination of the Nigerian 
economy by foreign owned multinational corporations relegates Nigerians 
to the position of compradors instead of entrepreneurs. He thus con¬ 
cluded that the dependent nature they find themselves in restricts 
Nigerian businessmen to competing among themselves for the limited 
resources available and thus manifests in ethnicity, regional and cartel 
type organizations, preventing the possibility of a coherent national 
unity. 
In light of this conclusion, Williams' essay further traces the 
root of underdevelopment in Nigeria, observing that since people who are 
rich earn the admiration of the less fortunate Nigerians, social vices 
such as armed robbery, misuse of government funds, and all forms of 
corruption become accepted norms in Nigeria. He historically traced 
such anomaly to colonial influence as well as the activities of foreign 
owned multinational corporations operating in Nigeria. 
Williams' paper focused its analysis on the exploitative 
activities of foreign-owned corporations in Nigeria. It is here that 
55 
Gavin Williams, "Class Relations in a Neo-Colony: The Case 
of Nigeria," African Social Studies: A Radical Reader (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1977), p. 2B4, 
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his study will depart from our study. Multinational corporations func¬ 
tioning in Nigeria have their home base in varied countries. Examples 
are England Kingsway Stores, United African Trading Company (UAC), 
Lever Brother Ltd.; France - Elf, CFAO, Société1 Generale'; Germany - 
Guffanti Construction Company, Dumez Construction Company, Volkswagen 
Automobile Company; United States - Gulf Oil Company, Exxon Oil Company, 
ITT Communications Company, Colgate-Palmolive Soap Company, Seven-Up 
Bottling Company, American Assurance Company. 
Instead of looking at the activities of all these corporations, 
our study will examine the activities of those companies from the United 
States. In this process we will be able to examine the activities of 
companies such as the Gulf Oil Company, Texaco, International Telegraph 
and Telephones (ITT), American Assurance Company, Colgate-Palmolive, 
among others. Our analyses will investigate issues such as compliance 
with Nigerian commerce laws, technology transfer to Nigerians as well as 
their modus operandi in servicing contract from the Nigerian government. 
Kwame Nkrumah uses his Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of 
Imperialism56 to denounce the relationship between African .countries and 
the advanced Western capitalist nations. According to Nkrumah, 
... the essence of neo-colonialism is that the state which 
is subject to it is in theory independent and has all the 
outward trappings of international sovereignty; in reality 
its economic system and thus its political policy is directed 
from the outside.57 
56 
Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism 
(New York: International Publishers, 1980), p. ix. 
57Ibid., p. ix. 
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In addition, he pointed out that the methods and forms of mani 
pulation could come through various shapes, the main example being 
through economic and monetary means. In this regard, he felt that the 
result of neo-colonialism is that foreign capital is used for the 
exploitation rather than for the development of a neo-colonialist 
country. Consequently, investment under neo-colonial ism widens rather 
than closes the gap between the rich and the poor; aid then becomes a 
revolving credit paid by the neo-colonial masters passing through the 
neo-colonial state and returning to the neo-colonial masters in the 
form of increased profit. 
Our study does not contradict Nkrumah's analysis. Rather, we 
used some information in his study to substantiate our hypothesis. 
This includes how the reliance on foreign capital for development has 
increased Nigerian dependence on the United States. In doing this, our 
study examined the Nigerian oil sector by finding out the source of pro 
ductive machinery, financial capital, technology, who markets the oil 
and who buys it. We then examined the political ramification of such 
unequal relationship. We also examined the influence U.S. exacts on 
Nigerian policies by virtue of the volume of oil Nigeria sells to the 
United States. 
In addition to the above studies, Nicholas Taylor's "Is 
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Nigeria Really a Goldmine for Atlanta Business" looks at the burning 
desire of the American entrepreneur, especially those in the Atlanta 
CO 
Nicholas Taylor, "Is Nigeria Really a Goldmine for Atlanta 
Business?" Business Atlanta, June 1983, p. 78. 
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area, to do business with Nigeria. According to him, for a successful 
trade relation with Nigeria, the American investor should be equipped 
in the areas of agribusiness, building materials, hotels and tourism, 
as well as in high technology,which are presently the main needs of 
Nigeria. 
Taylor's study denotes a journalistic report flavored to pro¬ 
mote the entrepreneurship of the Atlanta business community. It showed 
several biases against Nigerian politicians and businessmen as abso¬ 
lutely corrupt without historically examining those factors which have 
made Nigeria a corrupt society. 
Thus, in our study we examined the strategies the United States 
uses in securing business transactions in Nigeria. In doing this, we 
adopted Terisa Turner's "Triangular Triad" to explain how multinational 
representatives seek to influence Nigerian policy makers by hiring them 
to accepting deposited sum of money in foreign countries, as undue 
influence on Nigerian policy makers to help contravene constituted legal 
system to the benefit of the American traders. 
Similarly, Samir Amin's Unequal Development: An Essay on the 
59 
Social Transformation of Peripheral Capitalism in a multidimensional 
analysis explored pre-capitalist formations, laws of the capitalist 
mode, dependency, the development of underdevelopment and social forma¬ 
tions in the periphery. In this study, Samir Amin acknowledged the 
different patterns of transition to peripheral capitalism and to central 
59 
Samin Amin, Unequal Develop: An Essay on the Social Trans- 
formation of Peripheral Capitalism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1976). 
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capitalism as a consequence of the impact of the capitalist mode of 
production and its mechanism of trade upon pre-capitalist formations 
resulting in the destruction of crafts without their being replaced 
by local industrial production. He also criticized the present inter¬ 
national economic order which is governed by the pure theory of 
international trade. According to Samir Amin "unequal international 
specialization is manifested by distortions in the export activities, 
bureaucracy, and light industries of the periphery." Given the peri¬ 
phery's integration within the world market, the periphery is without 
adequate economic means to challenge foreign monopolies. The under¬ 
developed countries should not be confused with the advanced countries 
at an earlier stage of their development, for the underdeveloped coun¬ 
tries are characterized by an extreme unevenness in the distribution 
of production which primarily serves the needs of the dominant center. 
Underdevelopment is accentuated and growth is blocked in the periphery, 
making autonomous development impossible. 
Our study agrees with Samin Amir's analysis that the inter¬ 
national specialization which evolved from pure theory of international 
trade distorts a balanced relationship among nations. Hence, in our 
study, we used the historical method to trace the chronology of U.S. 
trade relations with a view of determining the extent to which the 
relationship has made Nigerian development impossible. 
Another analysis is Imperialism and Underdevelopment in 
Nigeria: The Dialectics of Mass Poverty,60 by Bade Onimode. 
60Bade Onimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria: 
The Dialectics of Mass Poverty (London: Zed Press, 1982). 
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In his analyses, Bade Onimode examined the roots of Modern 
Nigeria's continuing mass poverty and political instability. He pre¬ 
sented the study in a three-part format. Part One deals with Nigeria's 
pre-colonial modes of production and the impact on them of the era of 
colonialism. Part Two examines the nature of colonial mode of produc¬ 
tion, the reasons for emphasizing on primary products. It also dis¬ 
cusses the exploitative roles of the colonial infrastructure in servic¬ 
ing the exploitative trade between Nigeria and Europe. The final part 
examines Nigeria's assimilation into neo-colonialism and the resultant 
agricultural stagnation, misused oil wealth, massive corruption, and 
the widening social inequalities in-the Nigerian State. 
Our analyses differ from Onimode's study in scope and concern. 
Our study examines the political economy of U.S.-Nigeria relations, 
specifically contending that the United States is being largely respon¬ 
sible for Nigeria's inability to accomplish its egalitarian objectives. 
To substantiate our contention, our study presents statistical data to 
establish the fact that the United States has provided over 50 percent 
of Nigeria's total annual revenue for over one decade of Nigeria's 
independence. In addition, our study illustrates through the use of 
statements by government officials, and American corporations, instances 
where Nigeria had to refrain from implementing its foreign policy 
objectives because the United States felt such actions threatened her 
(USA) interests. 
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In addition to the above analyses, Claude Ake, in his A Poli¬ 
tical Economy of Africa61 illustrated the salient features of contem¬ 
porary African economics. How they have come to be, what they are 
presently, and how they might change in the future. Although this study 
is a broad analysis of the African situation, detailed work is done on 
Nigerian economic relations with the developed countries. 
Ake's analysis served as a useful resource book in our 
research. Particularly, his discussions on the structure of manufactur¬ 
ing, cumulative private investment by country and indicators of 
Nigerian technology dependence are areas that were of considerable value 
to our study. 
Sutrcnary of Chapter One 
We introduced Chapter One by discussing the character of 
Nigeria in international trade relations. In this process, we charted 
the trade relations between Nigeria and Britain as well as with the 
United States. This was to enable us to illustrate how Britain, which 
was Nigeria's leading trading partner, gave way to the United States at 
the end of 1966 when the emphasis on Nigerian export of agricultural 
commodities shifted to the sale of mineral oil products. 
Chapter One also investigated the theoretical basis for inter¬ 
national trade by examining the classical theories. Both the theory of 
comparative advantage and the neo-classical theory were examined. This 
was followed by a discussion on the event which led to the demand for a 
61 
Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (Lagos: Longman 
Press, 1981). 
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new International Economic Order. Our purpose of conducting the exten¬ 
sive study in this manner was to establish a theoretical link to our 
research efforts. The second part of the chapter was devoted to estab¬ 
lishing our hypothesis, statement of the problem, research methodology 
and the significance of the study in such a fashion that our contribu¬ 
tion to knowledge would be made explicit. 
In the following chapter, our discussion will entail a detailed 
examination of both the trade and political relationship that existed 
between the United States and Nigeria since 1960. Issues examined 
include factors that contributed to the pattern of relations in each 
of the three ëpochs discussed. However, it is important to note that 
facts are not presented in chronological order of events. 
CHAPTER TWO 
0. S.-NIGERIA POLITICAL ECONOMY: 
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Until the mid 1970s when Nigeria became prominent in world 
politics arising from the oil boom and the Civil War, analyzing the 
relationship between Nigeria and any of the superpowers was a rare 
exercise. In matters of international peace and war, Nigeria's posi¬ 
tion counted very little. Since independence, the primary concern of 
the leaders has been domestic, rather than external affairs. Even when 
she experienced a peaceful and stable era (1970-1975) with accelerated 
economic growth, congenial for active international affairs,-Nigeria 
was parochial in emphasizing on Africa which up to now is still central 
to her foreign policy. 
On attaining independence in 1960, the bulk of Nigeria's 
external ties in trade, education, culture, and sports were mainly with 
Great Britain, her former colonial master. Although a wave of radi¬ 
calism was prevalent in the third world, in the 1960s for self- 
government, and in some cases hostilities against former colonial 
master, Nigeria remained loyal to Britain. Many countries, including 
the Soviet Union, for example, wanted Nigeria to disengage herself 
from Britain. Olajide Aluko pointed out in his analysis that: 
Apart from offering discrete and clandestine financial 
and moral assistance in the early 1960s to some radical 
elements within the Nigerian Trade Union Congress (NTUC), 
68 
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and to some militant parties such as the banned Nigerian 
Youth Congress and the Nigerian Socialist Workers and 
Farmers Party (NSWFP), they were by 1964 realistic enough 
to accept the fact of British dominant position in the 
country as well as the pro-British orientation of the 
Nigerian leaders.62 
As a colony, the United States contact with Nigeria was mainly 
through Britain. But when she attained independence,the United States 
then began to have direct contacts with Nigeria. The nature of the 
United States interest in Nigeria both in trade and politics must, in 
our analysis, be seen within specific timeframes. Hence, throughout 
this chapter we have studied the relationship in three epochs - 1960- 
1966, 1966-1979, and 1979-1984. In each of the epochs, we examined 
those events and state the pattern of relationship that existed. 
U.S.-Nigerian Relations Between 1960-1966 
The years between 1960 and 1966 witnessed the first civilian 
government of Nigeria, and also the leadership years of Dwight D. 
Eisenhower (1953-61), John F. Kennedy (1961-1963) and Lyndon Johnson 
(1963-1969) in the United States. The United States interest in 
Nigeria was based on the cold war conflict at this time. Just as the 
Soviet Union was interested in building a socialist society in Nigeria 
as a part of their global ideological objective, the United States was 
equally determined to advance its ideological pursuit in making sure 
that Nigeria, and many other third world countries, remained in the 
c? 
01 ajide Aluko, Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1981), p. TÜ0. 
70 
Western bloc. The United States' commitment to this goal is reflected 
in former President Nixon's statement that: 
It is time for us proudly to declare that our ideas are 
for exDort. We need not apologize for taking this posi¬ 
tion.63 
Conversely, Nigeria's relations with the United States in her 
early years of independence was of a lukewarm attitude since Nigeria 
chose to keep a distance from the United States. Many reasons accounted 
for this attitude. Nigeria had become a member of the non-aligned 
nations. All the same, many Nigerian leaders had become familiar with 
the American Central Intelligence Agency whose covert activities in 
South America and Asia had come to be classified as notorious. Andrew 
Tully's book, The CIA: The Inside Story, had just been published and 
was widely read by Nigerian intelligensia, and with those who took 
interest in foreign policy. This book no doubt heightened hatred for 
64 the United States. Furthermore, the Soviet Union had been trying 
their propaganda through some Nigerians to undermine Nigerian pro- 
Western stance by carefully directing Nigeria's attention to the evils 
implicit in the control of the economy by foreign capital. Consequently, 
the United States anti-colonial stance which she propagated in Africa 
was tainted and considered by Nigeria as deceitful. Nigeria thus felt 
63President Richard Nixon, cited in Kegley Wittkoff, American 
Foreign Policy, Pattern and Process (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), 
p. 36. 
6401agunde Ojo, "Nigeria's Foreign Policy 1960-1966: Politics, 
Economics and the Struggle for African Leadership" (Ph.D. Dissertation, 
The University of Connecticut, 1978), p. 16. 
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that the U.S., being a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza¬ 
tion, was an accomplice in the European colonial power game. 
Phrases such as NATO domination of the Nigerian economy 
became rampant. Nigeria thus came to believe that the 
United States' greatness was based on bloated capitalism 
and its economic imperial ism in Asia and Latin America 
and was thus feared that she was also looking for a foot¬ 
hold in Africa.65 
This fear was increased when Mr. Nixon, then a vice-president, was 
quoted as saying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that 
"America must be the heir to Africa's future and must therefore not 
hesitate even to assist the departure of the colonial powers from 
Impact of Economic Hardship 
As events later proved, the era between 1960-1966 turned out 
to be the most trying period in Nigerian economic history. Once 
Nigeria got independence, she was left with a legacy of extreme 
poverty, high illiteracy and squalor. Nigeria rarely attained the 
annual per capita income of one hundred dollars level, typical of newly 
independent countries of her status, Nigeria's per capita income in 
fact was marginally $87.00*P 
Her major commodities were agricultural produce which accounted 
for 96 percent of her export earnings. The status of Nigerian agrarian 
65 Federal House of Assembly, Debates, 20 November 1961, p. 401, 
^Ibid., p. 403. 
^Michael Todaro, Economics for a Developing World: An Intro¬ 
duction to Principles, Problems, and Policies for Development (Hong 
Kong: Longman Group Publishers, 1977), p. 78. 
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economy and labor distribution have already been depicted in our table 
4.(page 14). 
Although Nigeria had an abundance of mineral resources, includ¬ 
ing items as petroleum, uranium, tin, zinc, columbite, aluminum, lead, 
coal, copper and marble, the intensive exploration of these commodities 
was negligible. Nigerian trade with the United States in both agricul¬ 
tural and mineral commodities was not as significant as that which she did 
with the United Kingdom. We have presented table 8 as a total reflection 
of the balance of trade and the trade position between the United States 
and Nigeria from 1965 through 1984. 
Nigeria Moves Towards Urbanization 
Because of the condition of economic underdevelopment and inse¬ 
curity inherited from colonialism in 1960, it became necessary to embark 
on industrialization and modernization, to transform the backward and 
traditional agrarian society into a modern twentieth century industrial 
and urban country. The first national development plan, 1962-1968, 
emphasized such developmental commitment and was seen as attractive. 
The development plan provided for modern cities such as Enugu and Port 
Harcourt, which were to be upgraded from rural to more urban cities. 
The Kaingi Dam intended to be the energy base for Nigerian industriali¬ 
zation was also in the pipeline. There were also the numerous- roads, 
68 
bridges, and other infrastructure the country acutely needed. 
68First National Development Plan 1962-68 (Lagos: Federal 
Ministry of Economic Development, 1962). 
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TABLE 8 
NIGERIA'S BALANCE OF TRADE WITH 
THE USA, 1965-1984 
Year 
Exports to 
the U. S. A. 
(NM) 
Imports From 





1965 53.2 66.2 -13.0 
1966 45.2 83.0 -37.8 
1967 38.0 55.6 -17.6 
1968 35.0 44.6 -9.6 
1969 80.2 58.6 +21.6 
1970 101.6 109.6 -8.0 
1971 223.5 151.4 +72.1 
1972 299.6 102.6 +127.0 
1973 549.7 125.7 +424.0 
1974 1414.0 213.2 +1201.0 
1975 1427.0 408.0 +1019.0 
1976 2001.5 599.1 +1402.4 
1077 3016.0 791.9 +2224.1 
1978 2667.1 864.6 +1802.5 
1979 4579.2 644.1 +3935.1 
1980 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
1981 3428.6 1346.6 +2082.0 
1892 2983.3 1111.3 +1872.0 
1983 1802.3 771.6 +1030.7 
1984 1212.9 567.4 +645.5 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Economic and Financial 
Review, various issues. 
of trade 
imported 
Notes: (1) From 1965-70, excepting 1969, Nigeria's balance 
(BOT) with the USA was unfavorable. This means that Nigeria 
more from the United States than she exported to the United 
States. 
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Accomplishing these tasks demanded heavy financial capital. 
Nigeria was in a difficult financial predicament, 
... the value of her foreign reserves then amounted to $396 
million only, and the balance of payments position had been 
one of continuous deficit from 1955 to 1960. The Nigerian 
economy was heavily dependent on the export of primary agri¬ 
cultural products whose prices in the world market had been 
declining since 1955 and on the imports of manufactured goods 
from the developed countries.69 
Consequently, Nigeria needed aid from anywhere she could get 
it. "A powerful government delegation led by Festus Okotie-Eboh went 
to Eastern Europe and China in 1961. Nigeria thus received offers of 
scholarships and forty million rubles in soft loans." 7^ Aluko pointed 
out that the Soviet Union itself promised to finance a number of agri¬ 
cultural projects and promised to train technicians for the Nigerian 
industry.71 Similarly, another Nigerian Economic Mission, led by the 
(2) From 1971-1984, the Balance of trade was favorable to 
Nigeria. The balance of trade rose from N17.1 million in 1971 to a 
peak of N3935.1 million in 1979. 
(3) There has been a continuous decline from N2082.0 million 
recorded in 1981 to only N645.5 million in 1984. This period coincides 
with the end of the Carter presidency and the inauguration of Ronald 
Reagan as the President of the United States. 
(4) Figures are in the denomination of the Nigerian Naira in 
mill ions. 
69 Ojiako James, Nigeria: Yesterday, Today and ? (Onisha: 
Africana Educational Publishers, 1982), p. 201. 
70Akinyele Caleb Ibitayo, "Anglo-American Liberalism as a 
Dominant Factor in Nigerian Foreign Policy, 1960-1966" (Ph.D. Thesis, 
University of Washington, 1969). 
71Aluko Olajide, "Nigeria and the Superpowers," Essays on 
Nigerian Foreign Policy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), p. 102. 
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Minister of Commerce and Industry, Alhaji Zanna Bukar Dipcharima visited 
many other Eastern European countries to "expand trade and presumably 
sources of aid and investments outside traditional markets so that a 
72 feeling of dependency will no longer persist." The success of this 
mission was reflected in the trade agreements initiated with Czechoslo¬ 
vakia on September 19, 1961 and with Poland also in 1961. 
Nigeria, although skeptical, realized the political and eco¬ 
nomic importance of the United States. The American imperial eagles 
were seen to be threatening enough for Nigeria to be somewhat ambiva¬ 
lent. However, Nigeria hoped that the United States would be a gene¬ 
rous donor. 
John F. Kennedy, who was the U.S. President at the time, knew 
that Nigeria would someday seek his assistance; he was also 
aware that Nigeria had started talks with the Soviet Union, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland and many other East European countries 
for bilateral trade relations. All the same, both Nigeria 
and the U.S. intelligence sources were gathering evidence 
that implicated Ghana in possible subversion, arising from the 
ideological differences between conservative Nigeria under 
Sir Abukar Tafawa Balewa and the radical Kwame Nkrumah of 
Ghana. '3 
Looking at these precarious situations facing Nigeria, the 
United States felt that the time was ripe enough to pressure Nigeria 
into a more pro-Western stance in the cold war era. In July 1961, 
President Kennedy invited Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa to Washington, 
hoping to generate a more direct and closer Nigerian-American . 
72Ajayi Adebayo, "Nigerian-Soviet Aid Relations 1960-1968," 
Nigeria: Bulletin of Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, no. 3 (January 1972) :5. 
?301atunde Ojo, "Nigeria's Foreign Policy 1960-1966: 
Politics, Economics and the Struggle for African Leadership" (Ph.D. 
Thesis, The University of Connecticut, 1973). 
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friendship. Although Nigeria reaffirmed her neutrality in the bipolar 
scuffle, the visit was instrumental in Nigeria-U.S. relations. It 
ushered in direct political and economic relations between Nigeria and 
the United States without the brokerage services of Great Britain. It 
was after this meeting that the United States' aid started pouring into 
Nigeria. Between 1962-1965, aid from the United States topped assist¬ 
ance to Nigeria from all sources. The amount of aid from the U.S. is 
presented as a comparison with other sources in our table 9 below. 
TABLE 9 
SOURCES OF AID ASSISTANCE TO NIGERIA 1962-1965 
Source Amount in Million $ 
1. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
World Bank 44.81 
International Development Association 
Association (IDA) and International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) 13.10 
U.N. Special Fund 5.0 
2. FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND PRIVATE AGENCIES 
U. . . 80.00 
.K. 30.19 
West Germany 17.40 
Netherlands 4.00 
Ita y 9.00 
London Money Market 4.25 





Source: Federal Rebublic of Nigeria, National Development 
Plan Progress Report (Lagos: Ministry of Economic Development, 1965), 
pp. 31-32. 
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Military Intervention and Its Consequent Impact 
On U.S.-Nigeria Relations 1966-1979 
The cordial relationship which was beginning to shape up between 
Nigerian leaders and the United States was short lived; it came to an end 
in 1965. On January 15, 1966, Nigeria experienced a change in leadership 
and government style. The following thirteen years of military rule 
(1966-1979) set in motion another round of pendulum characterized by 
hatred, peace and trade boom between Nigeria and the United States. 
Between 1966 and 1970, there was a reversal in U.S.-Nigerian rela¬ 
tions, especially in the political and military spheres. Aid from the 
United States, which was thought to be vital to Nigeria, was no longer 
sought. Military assistance itself was discontinued at the request of the 
Nigerian Supreme Military Government. Hostile behavior toward the United 
States was embarked upon by Nigeria in retaliation against the U.S. posi¬ 
tion on the Nigerian Civil War. The United States had proclaimed a 
neutral position by not actively supporting Nigeria and also by not per¬ 
mitting the sale of arms to Nigeria during the war. Nigeria was all the 
more angry at the United States when Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, 
74 
referred to Nigeria as a "British responsibility." Additionally, 
Nigeria was resentful of the U.S. decision to allow the activities of the 
pro-Biafran lobby in the United States which accused Nigeria of a war of 
genocide against the Ibo civilians. The relationship was also hampered by 
huge private relief shipments to Biafra from the United States, although 
it was mainly by non-governmental organizations. Nigeria felt that by 
permitting such activities, the United States was defying Nigeria's 
74 
Elaigwu Isawa, "The Nigerian Civil War and the Angolan Civil 
War," Journal of Asia and African Studies, vol. XII (1982):218. 
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sovereignty and thus adding to the prolongation of the Civil War. By 
1967, a sustained press campaign had been launched in Lagos against the 
American role in the Civil War and especially against a suspected 
American backing of Israel's action in June 1967, when Nigeria suf¬ 
fered heavy casualties at Nnewi. Israel demonstrated its support for 
the secessionist Biafra by, according it a diplomatic recognition. 
Israel did not stop there; she sent well trained mercenaries to Nigeria 
to fight on the side of Biafra. Nigeria attributed its losses at Nnewi 
to the assistance Israel gave to Biafra. Matters came to a head when 
"the Director of the United States Information Services (USIS) accused 
the Morning Post of consistently and unjustifiably attacking his coun- 
The United States was further accused by Nigeria of having 
persistently co-operated with Portugal, who wanted to cling on to the 
colonization of Angola. In 1975, the U.S. openly urged the O.A.U. 
member nations to oppose the Soviet-Cuban presence in Angola and also 
to deny official recognition of the Marxist oriented MPLA faction. 
This action was considered a defiance of Nigeria's position on the 
Angolan issue and her commitment to total liberation of the African 
continent. 
On February 13, 1976, the Nigerian Head of State, General 
Murtala Ramat Muhammed, was assassinated in a coup attempted by Lt. 
Col. B. S. Dimka. Nigeria felt that the American Central Intelligence 
. ^Roland Luckham, The Nigerian Military: A Sociological 
Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960-1967 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1971), p. 88. 
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Agency (CIA) was an accomplice in the assassination. It became yet 
another source of friction, and in retaliation the Nigerian army uni¬ 
laterally took over the United States Information Service stations in 
Lagos and Kaduna. 
Nonetheless, despite the tensions which provided loopholes 
for a continued conflict in the relations between the two countries, 
the United States was passive by not confronting the Nigerian military 
leaders. On January 12, 1970, General Yakubu Gowon in an address to 
the nation, declared that: 
Thirty months ago, we were obliged to take arms against our 
brothers who were deceived and misled into armed rebellion 
against their fatherland by the former Lt. Col. Ojukwu. Our 
objective was to crush the rebellion to maintain the terri¬ 
torial integrity of our nation, to assert the ability of the 
black man to build a strong progressive and prosperous modern 
state and to ensure respect, dignity and equality in the 
comity of nations for our prosperity. You will have heard 
the broadcast of Lt. Col. Effiong asking the remnants of the 
secessionist troops to lay down their arms. This is in 
accord with our appeal. I accept in good faith Effiong's 
declaration accepting the O.A.U. resolutions supporting the 
unity and territorial integrity of Nigeria. We reiterate 
our promise of a general amnesty for all those misled into 
the futile attempt to disintegrate the country.76 
Shortly after the above address in which Gen. Yakubu Gowon 
accepted Biafra's surrender, Mr. Nixon, then U.S. President, took 
prompt steps aimed at normalizing relations with Nigeria. He sent 
an urgent message to General Yakubu Gowon praising him for his magna¬ 
nimity towards the secessionist Biafran leaders. As early as "February 
1970, Mr. William Rogers, who was the American Secretary of State, paid 
^General Yakubu Gowon, "Broadcast to the Nation," 12 January 
1970 (Lagos: General Ministry of Information Press Release No. 31, 
1970), p. 3. 
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a diplomatic visit to Lagos. The American Ambassador in Nigeria, Mr. 
John E. Reinhardt also strove with his staff to improve relations with 
Nigeria in all areas of conflict. With appearances on Nigerian televi¬ 
sion and radio, he announced the increased quota of Nigerian students 
permitted to study in the United States per year. He vehemently urged 
strengthened educational, commercial, financial and technical ties with 
the United States. 
The Nigerian leaders too seemed to see some reasoning in the 
U.S. appeal. 
They therefore began to sense the danger of relying too 
much on the Soviets who had accumulated much influence 
for the loyalty and support to Nigeria during the Civil 
War. They thus felt it was necessary to counter-balance 
Soviet influence by establishing further links with the 
United States.'' 
Following the normalization of relations, the search for aid 
from the United States was reopened in 1972, when Nigeria sought a $3 
million loan for the construction of the police college of Jos. 
A dramatic turn in relations followed with the inauguration of 
James Earl Carter as the President of the United States in 1977. With 
the confrontational stand of his administration against the apartheid 
rule in South Africa, its willingness to view African problems beyond 
to Nigeria, his influence among Nigerian leaders, plus the fact that 
^Timothy M. Shaw, "Nigeria in World Politics: Contemporary 
Calculations and Constraints," Nigerian Foreign Policy Alternative 
Perceptions and Projections (New York: St. Martin s Press, 1983). 
the great power rivalries, coupled with Andrew Young's frequent visits 
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the U.S. continually consulted Nigeria in her African and third world 
issues, all contributed to the improved and much enhanced U.S-Nigerian 
political relations at this time. This was in contrast to Nigeria's 
views about the United States when we consider that "on three occasions 
during 1976, Nigeria refused to receive the U.S. Secretary of State, 
Henry Kissinger, to oppose his plans for a solution to the Rhodesian 
70 
Conflict." 
The growth in U.S.-Nigeria relations was further enhanced by Lt. 
Gen. Obasanjo's visit to the United States in October of 1977. His 
visit was reciprocated by President Jimmy Carter in April of 1978, and 
was again followed in 1980 when Walter Mondale paid another visit to 
Nigeria. A major outcome of these political developments was the trade 
relations between Nigeria and the United States. It also ushered in the 
influx of Nigerian students to the United States for further studies. 
We have illustrated this increase of Nigerian students to American univer¬ 
sities in our table 7. 
The Age of Oil Boom and its Influence 
on U.S.-Nigeria Trade Relations 
The year 1973-1974 was also a blessing to Nigeria; the Middle 
East countries had started an oil embargo against the United States, 
Western Europe, and Japan by hiking the oil prices in world market. Oil 
was now a booming business; Nigeria had it, the United States needed it. 
^Daniel C. Bach, "Nigerian-Araerican Relations: Converging 
Interests and Power Relations," Nigerian Foreign Policy Alternative 
Perceptions and Projections (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 
44. 
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The phenomenal growth of the Nigerian economy largely as a 
result of oil boom since the end of the Nigerian Civil War in 1970 
strengthened Nigeria's position with the United States in relation to 
trading activities. This becomes manifest when we consider that: 
During the 1970-1974 Development Plan, which was intended 
to recover from the Civil War, the average annual growth rate 
was over 10 percent as against the target of 6 percent envi¬ 
sioned under the second national development plan. The balance 
of payments position of the country moved from a deficit of $75 
million in 1970-1971 to a surplus of $5.4 billion in 1973- 
1974. Similarly, foreign exchange earnings rose from $279.6 
million in December 1969 to $8.5 billion in 1974 
With these economic gains, Nigeria's aid requirement was substan¬ 
tially reduced. For instance, under the 1970-1974 plan period about 20 
percent of the total investment in the public sector was expected to be 
made through aid as against the corresponding 50 percent estimated under 
the 1962-1968 First National Development Plan. But under the 1975-1980 
five year development plan, no provision was made for foreign capital 
aid. In light of this unexpected economic growth and Nigeria's deter¬ 
mination to be developed, the United States started courting Nigeria for 
more trade relations. Gambari Ibrahim illustrated that: 
The spectacular growth in Nigeria's oil production in 
the early 1970s resulted in a rapid increase in its 
share of American imports. During the period of the 
Arab embargo, 1974 and 1975, Nigeria was the United 
States' first crude oil supplier. After 1976, the 
high price of Nigerian oil (due to its low sulphur 
content) induced the United States to purchase cheaper 
Saudi Arabian oil; since then Nigeria has remained 
America's second supplier. Because of the importance 
of these imports, the United States is Nigeria's 
79Harold Nelson (ed.), Nigeria: A Country Study (Washington, 
D.C., The American University Press, 1981), p. 231. 
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first trading partner (accounting for 39,5 percent of 
Nigeria's external trade in 1977),80 
The growth of these trade relations is best illustrated in our 
table 10 presented below. 
The sudden economic activities of Nigeria thus made the United 
States move for a closer trade relation not only in oil but in other 
trade spheres. Through bilateral trade agreements and exchanges of 
trade commissions, the United States strove to promote her economic 
interest in Nigeria by the provision of financial and technical assist¬ 
ance to both government agencies and private corporations, aimed at 
boosting the trade relation between the U.S. and Nigeria. An example 
of such a trade agreement was seen in 1980 when: 
In July 1980, the United States and Nigeria signed a memo¬ 
randum encouraging American agribusiness in conjunction 
with the United States Department of Agriculture to increase 
investment in Nigerian agriculture. The memorandum pro- : 
vides for the opening of Nigerian trade and investment cen¬ 
ters in the United States, the development of a United States 
Department of Agriculture Trade Office in Lagos, and the 
creation of an intergovernmental working group to design and 
implement specific agricultural projects in Nigeria.81 
Through this strategy, the United States felt she could "exploit what 
they can of the huge Nigerian market to fill the vast needs of one of 
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the world's wealthiest developing countries." Thus, not only were 
Americans competing favorably in Nigerian commerce, they started 
80 Ibrahim A. Gambari, "Nigeria and the World: A Growing 
Stability, Wealth and External Influence," Journal of International 
Affairs (2) (Fall 1977):29. 
81Jonathan Barker (ed.), The Politics of Agriculture in 
Tropical Africa (London: Sage Publications. 1984), p. Ï95. 
^Nicholas Taylor, "Is Nigeria Really A Goldmine for Atlanta 
Business?" Business Atlanta (June 1983), p. 72. 
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TABLE 10 
ORIGIN OF SOME AMERICAN CRUDE OIL IMPORTS 
(IN '000 TONS) 1970-1979. 
Source 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1979 
Saudi Arabia 2,059 8,633 21,546 60,464 56,484 66,200 
% 3.1 7.8 12.6 20.3 16.4 18.9 
Nigeria 2,376 12,075 34,289 53,775 46,834 51,800 
% 3.5 10.9 20.0 18.09 13.6 14.8 
Canada 13,018 42,062 38,927 18,292 12,103 13,200 
% 49.9 38.19 22.7 6.1 3.5 3.7 
Venezuela 13,989 13,319 15,697 16,660 13,123 14,300 
% 21.1 12.09 9.1 5.6 3.8 4.09 
Total of 
Imports 66,117 110,114 171,091 297,179 343,282 349,500 
Source: OECD Statistiques Pétrolières (1971-76); Comite' 
Francai du Petrole 77 1978 and Petrole 79 (1980). 
Note: The table illustrates the volume of American oil imports 
in tonnes and percentages from major trading partners. Data shows the 
imports of Nigeria oil by the U.S. ahead of similar import from Saudi 
Arabia. This situation changed by 1976 when Nigeria dropped to a second 
position to Saudi Arabia. 
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investing in Nigeria. The American investments in Nigeria rose to about 
$250 million in 1966 and jumped to over $1,000 million by 1974. This 
represented more than a third of all U.S. investments in African outside 
South Africa, and the second largest foreign investment in Nigeria after 
- Q2 
that of Britain (amounting to about $1,250 million). A comparative 
illustration of such growth in U.S. foreign investment in Nigeria was 
done by Jean Herskovitz during the 1973-74 trade period. This illustra¬ 
tion is presented in table 11. 
According to Herskovits, 
... the best estimate of U.S. capital in 1974 are $1.2 
billion in South Africa and over $900 million in Nigeria. 
Much of the investment in Nigeria is new, whereas in 
South Africa, increases come from reinvestment. The 
rate of increase in investment since 1971 is approxi¬ 
mately four times as high for Nigeria as South Africa. 
Apart from the interest in exploration and marketing of oil, 
U.S. investment has also extended into various other sectors of the 
Nigerian economy previously dominated by Western Europe. Trade and 
investment in Nigeria could now be found in insurance, pharmaceuti¬ 
cals, telecommunications, farming and consultancy services. We have 
attached a list of some American owned businesses operating in Nigeria 
by areas of specialization (Exhibit 1). 
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Jean Herskovitz, "Nigeria: Africa's New Power," Foreign 
Affairs , vol. 52, no. 2 (January 1975):314. 
84 Ibid., p. 315. 
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TABLE 11 
COMPARISON OF U.S. INVESTMENT IN NIGERIA AND SOUTH 
AFRICA DURING THE 1973-1974 TRADE PERIOD 
1973 Nigeria South Africa 
From U.S. $150.9 mill ion $184.8 mill ion 
To U.S. 90.1 mill ion 343.3 mill ion 
-$60.8 mill ion +$158.5 mill ion 
to U.S.A. to U.S.A. 
1974 
From U.S. $1,265.7 mill ion $249.0 mill ion 
To U.S. 120.9 mill ion 530.0 mill ion 
-$1,144.8 mil 1 ion +$281.0 million 
Source: Foreign Affairs, vo l. 53, no. 2 (January 1975):314. 
Note: Data compares the U.S. total trade and investment in 
South Africa for the 1973-1974 trade period. Nigeria attracted more 
U.S. trade and investment in 1974. As we have pointed out in this 
study, the dramatic increase in investment was due to U.S. interest 
in Nigeria shortly after the oil embargo against some Western 




u.s. FIRMS AND AFFILIATES IN 








Accounting Arthur Young, 
Osindero & company 
Mandilas House, 12th Floor 
96/102 Broad St 






c/o Z. 0. Ososanya & Co. 
Western House 







P.0. Box 1419 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 26384, 26385 
Advertising Grant Advertising 
International (Nig) 
Limited 
48 Thomas Street 
Surulere 
P.0. Box 3939 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Telex: CRANTCHI 
Agriculture TMC International 
Food 
Machinery Division 
P.0. Box 790 
Kano, Nigeria 
Banking BT International 
(Nig) Ltd. (Bankers 
Trust Co. Rep. Off) 
122/124 Broad Street 
3rd Floor 




EXHIBIT 1 continued 
Type of Name of Address in 
Business/Service Company Nigeria 
Banking Chase Merchant Bank 
(Nig) Ltd. 
23 Awolowo Road, Ikoyi 
P.M.B. 12035 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 21388, 53176 
Icon Ltd. 
(A Morgan Guarantee 
Affiliate) 
13 Borad Street 
P.M.B. 12683 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 57635, 55276 
International Merchant 
Bank (Nig) Ltd. 
(First National Bank 
of Chicago Affiliate) 





Savannah Bank of 
Nig Ltd- 
(Branch Affiliate of 
Bank of America) 
138/146 Broad Street 
P.0. Box 2317 
Lagos, Nigeria 












Kirikiri, Wharf Road 
P.M.B. 180 
Apapa, Lagos, Nigeria 
Ameniger Construction 
(Nig) Co., Ltd. 





166 Clifford Street 
Yaba, Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 43270 
A & S Building Systems 
International 
Illeshall (Nig.) Ltd. 
48 Burma Road 
P.0. Box 1293 
Apapa, Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 46784 
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EXHIBIT 1 continued 
Type of Name of Address in 














Cistar (Nig.) Ltd. 
Clyde Construction 








c/o Tilley Gyado & Sons 
(Nig.) Ltd. 
35 Queen Elizabeth Way 
P.0. Box 6283 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 22128 
c/o Phin "0" Guest House 
P.0. Box 3344 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 31015 
9 Bode Thomas Street 
P.M.B. 3194, Surulere 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 47401 
Sean House (Nig. ) Ltd. 
8 Norman Williams St., SW 
Ikoyi 
P.0. Box 6423 
Lagos, Nigeria 




4 Balogun Street 
P.0. Box 2820 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 22815, 20380 
P.0. Box 149 
Benin City, Nigeria 
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EXHIBIT 1 continued 
Type of Name of Address in 







95B Wetheral Road 
Owerri, Imo State 
Nigeria 
Johnson White United 
Limited 
77/79 Apapa Road 
Ebute Metta, Lagos, 
Nigeria 
Phone: 47030 
Jones Homes Inter¬ 
national, Nigeria Ltd. 
17 Martings Street 
Lagos, Nigeria 
J.A. Jones (Nigeria) 
Limited 





70 Adetokunboh Ademola 
Street, V.I. 
P.0. Box 2468 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Levitt Industries 
c/o Galub Group of 
Companies 
126/130 Nnamdi Azikiwe 
Street 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Satt Nigeria Ltd 184 Nnamdi Azikiwe Street 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 27544, 27555 
Seaman International 
Incorporated 
c.o Chief Harold Sodipo 
P.0. Box 213, , ; , 
Yaba, Nigeria 
Phone: 43385 
Panel fab International 
Corporation 
c/o Rida Construction Co. 
Ltd, Intra House 
16 Ijora Causeway 




EXHIBIT 1 continued 
Type of Name of Address in 





of Nigeria Ltd- 
Raymond International 
of Delaware Inc. 
Renolds Construction 
Co. (Nig) Ltd. 
Sags Construction 
(Nig) Limited 




3 Louis Solomon Close 
Victoria Island 
P.0. Box 2629 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 27087, 52003 
Plot 870 
Victoria Island 
P.0. Box 5990 
Lagos, Nigeria 












P.0. Box 8536 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 21423 
Palace Ng Consortium 
Consultants Development 
Authority 
13 Norman Williams Street 
S.W. Ikoyi 
P.0. Box 7906 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 22189, 24044, 21599 
35 Kofo Abayomi Avenue, 
Apapa,P.0. Box 4277 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 44794, 46988 
41 Sura Mogaji/Cokor Road 
Ilupeju 




EXHIBIT 1 continued 




Consultants Bechtel International 
Corporation 
P.0. Box 3992 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 57915 
Chas T. Main 
Internai tonal Inc. 






25 Boyle Street 
P.O.Box 4042 
Lagos, Nigeria 






Phone: 41080, 41101, 46191 
Nigeria-Cincinnati 
Consortium 






Quade & Douglas 
International Inc. 
c/o Noyuk Consultants 
14 Adegoke Street 
Surulere, Nigeria 
P.I. Nwanu Associates 
Incorporated 
27/29 Martin Street 





4/6 Mill Street . 
Third Floor 
P.0. Box 2258 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 22210, 23781 
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EXHIBIT 1 continued 
Type of .Name of Address in 
Business/Service Company Nigeria 
Consultants Sverdrop & Parcel 
Associates Inc. 
5 Tashi Elias Close 
Victoria Island 
(Opposite King Solomon) 
P.0. Box 4073 
Lagos, Nigeria 




2/4 Adeola Odeku Street 
Second Floor 
Victoria Island 
(Pan Ocean Building) 
P.M. Box 12734 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 27073, 55841 
Telex: 21468, Panoro NG 
Fisheries Nigerian National 
Shrimping Co. Ltd. 
P.M. Box 4070 
Sapele, Bendel 




Eket Cross River State, 
Nigeria 
Insurance American International 
Insurance Company 
(Nig) Limited 
200 Broad Street 
P. 0. Box 2577 
Lagos, Nigeria 






35 Simpson Street 
P. 0. Box 2654 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 21479, 24178 
Office Equipment IBM (Nig) Ltd. Western House 
P.0. Box 1083 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 50349, 55830-1 
3M Nigeria Ltd. (See processing and 
Manufacturing) 
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EXHIBIT 1 continued 
Type of Name of Address in 
Business/Service Company Nigeria 
Office Equipment National Cash Register 
(W.A.) Ltd. 
GB Broad Street 
P.0. Box 509 
Lagos, Nigeria 












2 Obe Av. Aro Avenue 
Ilupeju 
P.0. Box 1427 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 35763, 35788 
Johnson & Johnson 
(Nig) Ltd. 
2 Commercial Road, Apapa 





21 Wharf Road 
Apapa, Nigeria 
Phone: 48858 





A. H. Robins 
International Co. 
c/o Pharco (Nigeria) 
Ltd. 
P.0. Box 493 
Yaba, Nigeria 
Phone: 44083 
Smith Khine & French 
Nig Ltd. 
P.M.B. 599, Ikeja 
Lagos, Nigeria 
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EXHIBIT 1 continued 
Type of Name of Address in 
Business/Service Company Nigeria 
Pharmaceuticals 
and Cosmetics 
Sguibb (Nig) Ltd. P.0. Box 7128 
No. 1 Kolawole Shorn'bare 






Plot A.D. and K, Ilupeju 
Industrial Estate, Mushin 
P.0. Box 3199 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 34300-4, 32750 




Wyeth Nigeria Ltd. 1 Adekunle Odunlana St. 





Black and Decker 
(Nigeria) Ltd. 













Company (Nig) Ltd. 
Taboga Road 
Ikpoba Slope 
P.0. Box 1078 
Benin City, Nigeria 
Johnson Wax (Nig) 
Limited 
Plot 5, Block H, Isolo 
Industrial Estate 
P.M. B. 1279 
Ikeja, Nigeria 
Phone: 53995, 23176 
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EXHIBIT 1 continued 




Processinq and The Crown Cork & 
Manufacturing Seal Co. (Nig) Ltd. 
Henry Carr Street, Ikeja 
Industrial Estate 
P.0. Box 142 
Ikeja, Nigeria 
Phone: 33605 
Life Flour Mill Ltd. 1 Eko Akete Close, Ikoyi 
(Corner of St. Gregory St.) 
P.0. Box 700 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 44467, 27004 
Livestock Feeds Ltd. Akanni Doherty Road 
Ikeja Industrial Estate 
P.M. B. 1097 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 34665-7 
3M Nigeria Ltd. Minnesota Mining and 
Manufacturing 
Isolo Road, Mushin 




Oregon Industrial Estate 




of Nigeria Ltd. 
59 Bode Thomas Street 
Surulere 




ing Co. Ltd., 
Singer 
269 Agege Motor Road, 
Mushin 




EXHIBIT 1 continued 
Type of Name of Address in 










USA (Nig) Ltd. 
GTE Nigeria Ltd. 
Harris International 
Telecommunications 
ITT Nigeria Ltd. 
Motorola Communica¬ 
tions Division 
New Nigeria House 
2 Odunlami Street 
P.0. Box 524 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 27095, 51326, 53475 
3C Marine Road, Apapa, 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 47010 
Plot 739B, Aeeola 
Hopewel1 Street 
Victoria Island 
P.0. Box 3912 
Lagos, Nigeria 
2 Tinubu Square 
First Floor 
P.0. Box 5454 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 25672, 28025 
(c/o RCN) 
77 Herbert Macaulay St., 
Yaba 
P.0. Box 7700 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 42089 
Ikorodu Road, Yaba 19 
P.0. Box 3197 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 46631, 47.611, 47612 
28 Creek Road 
P.0. Box 340 
Apapa, Nigeria 
Phone: 42080, 42089 
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EXHIBIT 1 continued 
Type of Name of Address in 
Business/Service Company Nigeria 
Telecommunica- 
tions and Power 
TCOM Westinghouse Inc. 75 Ademole Street, S.W. 
Ikoyi 
P.0. Box 2118 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 55884 
Telex: 22631 Welsa NG 
Teleconsult Inc. 19 Elsie Femi Pearse St. 
Victoria Island 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Page Europa '4A Randel Close, Apapa 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 48770 
Transportation Farrell Lines 
International 
(Nig) Ltd. 






c/o New Africa Dev. Co. 
Ltd., Unity House 
Twelfth Floor 
37 Manne 
P.0. Box 6299 
Lagos, Nigeria 
PHone: 23354 




Phone: 33601, 33798, 
33972 
Pan American World 
Airways Inc. 
Investment House 
21/25 Broad Street 




EXHIBIT 1 continued 






Transportation Trans World Airlines 
Agent in Nigeria 
British Caledonian Airways 
47 Marina 
P.0. Box 594 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 25975-9 
Miscellaneous The Ford Foundation 47 Marine 
Seventh Floor 
P.0. Box 2368 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Phone: 27525-9 





Primary Steel (Nig) 
Ltd. (Metals & Ores) 
10 McPherson Avenue, Ikoyi 
Lagos, Nioeria 
Phone: 21247 
Source: Courtesy of Commercial Attache, Nigeria Consulate 
Office, Nigerian Embassy (Atlanta, GA, USA, 1984). 
Due to the commonality of interest in trade relations, the 
Nigerian American Chamber of Commerce was formed. As the Nigerian Con¬ 
cord International pointed out: 
The Lagos membership grew from an active 4 to 280 in one 
year, and they were able to establish there other branches 
in Nigeria. U.S. firms have participated in the Kaduna 
International Trade Fair since its inception. At the 
first Kaduna International Trade Fair in 1979, only one 
American firm participated directly in the fair - Grumman 
International. However, more than 12 American product 
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lines were represented through their Nigerian distributors. 
Although the U.S. participation in the 1st Kaduna Inter¬ 
national Trade Fair was relatively sparse, the subsequent 
participation steadily accelerated pinnacling with the dedi¬ 
cation and contribution of a U.S. permanent pavillion.88 
U.S.-Nigerian Relations Under the 
Second Civilian Government 
The adoption of the presidential system of government and subse¬ 
quent return to another civilian administration in 1979 seemed to the 
United States a political victory. Nigeria had experienced the parlia¬ 
mentary system before trying the American model of presidential system. 
The pride derived from Nigeria's adoption of the U.S presidential model 
is made vivid by Col lis R. Lynch, who noted that: 
Interestingly, for the first time it has eschewed the 
British Westminister Parliamentary model and has adopted 
a constitution that is closely based on that of the 
United States. It is reasonable to assume that admira¬ 
tion for and evaluation of American political institutions 
are in part due to the influence of thousands of well mean¬ 
ing American educated Nigerians. They represent a large 
reservoir of goodwill for the United States.8® 
Between 1979 and 1983, many Nigerian politicians were sponsored to 
respective U.S. city halls, state legislative sessions and special 
seminars to understudy the American political process. Nevertheless, 
the Carter Administration, which had championed the healthy U.S.- 
Nigeria relations had been ousted by Ronald Reagan's election to the 
White House. As we will illustrate in chapter four, those factors 
QC 
Editor, "Nigeria Assures U.S. Investors," Nigerian Concord 
International, vol. 1, no. 3 (February 21-28, 1984)7l 
8^Collis R. Lynch, "K.O. Mbadiwe, 1939-1947: The American 
Years of a Niqerian Political Leader," Journal of African Studies 
vol. 7, no. 4 (Winter 1980-81):201. 
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which had fostered U.S.-Nigeria relations were no longer encouraged. 
The lukewarn attitude demonstrated in the political sphere was 
also extended to her trade relations. On the part of Nigeria, the 
economy which had experienced a lengthy boom suddenly started experi¬ 
encing a dramatic downward trend late in 1981. According to Goffredo 
Caccia: 
By June, reserves had already dropped to $5.45 billion. 
It dwindled to $1.8 billion by February 1982 and to 
$1.1 billion by the end of March. Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait offered Nigeria a $1 billion loan if it would 
stand firm on the OPEC oil prices.87 
Consequently, Nigeria embarked on import restriction and strin¬ 
gent foreign exchange procedures. All these, no doubt affected the 
trade relations between the U.S. and Nigeria. Lack of trust followed, 
since most Nigerian businessmen could not honor their trade obliga¬ 
tions to their American counterpart. According to Lex McGee: 
The business climate in Nigeria has gotten five, maybe 
ten times more difficult than it was a few years ago. 
There's less of a silver lining than there was even a 
year ago and the new guy on the block is going to get 
scared off. If you want to do business in Nigeria now 
you have to be serious about it and you have to know 
where you are going.88 
In response, the American business community have been impatient 
with Nigeria. They claim that: 
Nigeria's foreign exchange problems have created a credit 
crunch that in turn has caused cash flow problems for U.S, 
87Goffredo Caccia, "Nigeria: Oil Plot or Oil Glut," Journal of 
African Marxists, Issue no. 2 (January 1983):87. 
^Nicholas Taylor, "Is Nigeria Really A goldmine for Atlanta 
Business?", p. 76 
102 
exporters. Therefore, not a single supplier is 
issuing credit to Nigeria; rather, American com¬ 
panies are pulling back, looking for European 
middlemen they can bill directly for shipments 
to Nigeria.89 
The entire scenario is best described by Umaru Dembo, who commented 
that: 
The stormy years of 1979-1983, a period when civil¬ 
ians took rein without knowing from the soldiers 
publicly the economic situation, the oil position 
and foreign reserves were still a myth to most 
Nigerians, worse still, politics to most Nigerians 
only meant money making without any production. 
Economic position, discipline and security went hay¬ 
wire and by the end of 1983 there was a coup again.90 
The Buhari Administration which ousted Shehu Sharari in 1983, 
felt that revitalizing the trade relations with the United States was 
a good strategy to reviving the Nigerian economy. By 1984, he: 
... notified the Nigerian-American Chamber of Commerce 
that he was sending a delegation led by the Finance 
Minister to brief the American business community about 
the need to renew active trade and investment in Nigeria:9* 
As it turned out, Buhari1s economic policies were said to be wanting 
and thus led to yet another coup by President Ibrahim Babangida. 
President Babangida had felt that accepting a $2.4 billion loan from 
the International Monetary Fund would be the solution to Nigeria's 
economic crisis. 
Nicholas Taylor, "Is Nigeria Really A Goldmine for Atlanta 
Business?" Business Atlanta, June 1983, p. 76. 
90Umaru Dembo, Telex, vol. 1 (October 1985), p. 6. 
9*Maduka Ugwu, "Nigeria Assures U.S. Investors," in Nigerian 
Concord International, vol. 1, no. 3 (February 21-18, 1984): 1. 
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In the following chapter we shall centralize our investigations 
on U.S. trade with Nigeria in specific sectors with a view of finding 
out the volume and extent of trade in each sector. 
CHAPTER THREE 
U.S.-NIGERIA TRADE RELATIONS: ANALYSIS BY SECTOR 
The Petroleum Oil Sector 
Petroleum oil has become much more important in the world 
economy than ever before. Consequently, there has been production 
and sales for developing oil producing countries. The ability to 
utilize oil wealth as a powerful and unique asset for eventually 
reducing and eliminating the features of underdevelopment such as 
high external debts, low industrialization and capital accumulation, 
political instability, poverty and hunger, illiteracy, disease, 
qualor, and generally improving the standard of living of producing 
countries is, in our analysis, a crucial issue. 
This concern is very important when we recall that oil mineral 
is a wasting asset. Therefore, a developing country who fails to 
utilize the opportunity to generally improve the standard of living 
of its citizens, mainly has itself to blame. Moreover, the developed 
countries, who have more useful need for oil have been adversely 
affected by the oil crisis set in motion by the oil embargo and esca¬ 
lating price increases of 1973, have been spending huge amounts on 
research projects aimed at finding alternative energy sources. 
The objective of this strategy is "to encourage the use of 
a variety of alternative energy sources ranging from solar power to 
104 
105 
municipal refuse, which can introduce fuel substitutes for oil and 
92 
natural gas." 
Naturally, one would see higher budget increases from thou¬ 
sands to millions to billions on the part of Nigeria. This would be a 
very incomplete way of evaluating how much Nigeria has been able to 
cope with oil wealth. Thus, while the size of the budget and how it 
is allocated matters, it is very necessary to go beyond by looking 
into how the Nigeria oil wealth has really been spent, whose interests 
they have been serving and what pattern of crisis, conflict, or develop¬ 
ments have been generated in the Nigerian society. 
The analysis here which aims at substantiating our hypothesis, 
will begin by examining the history of oil exploration in Nigeria, its 
impact on development projects, foreign trade and investment patterns 
as well as examine the crisis it has generated in contemporary Nigeria 
as a result of American involvement in the industry. 
History of Oil Exploration in Nigeria 
The exploration of oil in Nigeria dates back to 1938 when the 
British colonial government granted prospecting license to the Shell-BP 
Company, to prospect for oil in the Delta areas of the country. However, 
active prospecting did not start until World War II was over in 1948. 
The first deep exploration well was sunk in the Niger Delta 
area in 1951. By 1953, extensive quantities of oil and gas were found 
92 
Bob Dean, "Efforts Begin to Plan Gas Energy Future," The 
Atlanta Constitution, December 6, 1985, p. 1. 
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at Akata near Calabar. More quantities were also located at Huk, Mbang 
and Ekin also in the Niger Delta areas of Nigeria. 
These discoveries: 
... gave impetus for hopes and additional expenditures 
although the Shell-BP had spent a total of over 12 
million pounds on drilling works. The first'major com¬ 
mercial field was struck in 1956 at Oloibiri near Port 
Harcourt, and at Afram in Rivers State respectively.93 
After these oil deposits had been found the colonial government 
granted an additional license to Mobile Oil Company of the United States 
as a concessionaire to prospect for oil in Nigeria. Years later, Nigeria 
started exporting petroleum. Production increased gradually just as in 
other mining industries such as tin in Jos, and coal at Enugu. Accord¬ 
ing to Lazar Duerstein, "at the beginning, export of petroleum was prin¬ 
cipally to Britain. Revenues accrued to the oil firms and the colonial 
94 
governments only." 
The table below shows the quantity of crude petroleum produced 
in Nigeria between 1960 and 1979. As production increased, revenue 
increased. As the table reveals, dramatic increases in production and 
revenue started at the end of 1966 which also marked the end of the 
first civilian administration in post colonial Nigeria. Table 13 also 
depicts the growth of oil exports as its percentage of total exports 
between 1960-1981. As can be noted in the table, the two years pre¬ 
ceding 1966 recorded a decline in total percentage export from 32.4 
93 
Mervin John, "The Search for Oil in Nigeria Promising Indica¬ 
tions in the South," African World (September 1955):6. 
94 
Lazar Duerstein, "Oil and Development Planning: Impoications 
for Nigeria," Energy Policy (December 1976):330. 
107 
TABLE 12 
NIGERIAN OIL PRODUCTION PER DAY 1960-1979 





1968 1.1 million 
1970 2.1 mi 11ion 
1973 2.3 mi 11ion 
1976 2.0 mi 11ion 
1979 2.4 mill ion 
Source: Nigerian Trade Journal, various issues (March- 
April 1980). 
Note: Table illustrates the quantity of petroleum output per 
day between 1960 and 1979. Quantities are measured in barrels. 
Figures show a progressive increase of output. Figures are not in 
chronological sequence of annual production. 
percent in 1966 to 29.9 percent.and 17.5 percent respectively. This 
is accounted for by the Nigerian Civil War during this period. In 
the ensuing analysis we shall examine how and why government control 
was gradually extended over oil production. 
Government Participation in Oil Production, Oil 
Wealth, and Development Planning in NigerTâ 
Nigeria currently stands as the seventh largest OPEC producer, 








































Change in Non- 
Oil Exports 
(%) 
Share of 011 
Exports in 
Total Exports (%) 
Share of Non-Oil 
Exports in Total 
Exports (t) 
330.4 2.9 8.8 63.0 321.2 1.8 2.7 97.3 
346.9 5.1 23.1 162.5 323.8 0.008 6.7 93.3 
334.2 -3.7 33.5 45.0 300.7 -7.1 10.0 90.0 
371.5 11.2 40.4 26.6 331.1 10.1 10:9 89.1 
429.2 15.5 64.1 58.7 365.1 10.3 14.9 85.1 
536.7 15.0 136.2 112.5 400.6 9.7 25.4 74.6 
568.2 5.8 183.9 35.0 384.3 -4.1 32.4 67.6 
483.6 -14.8 144.8 -21.3 338.8 -11.8 29.9 70.1 
422.2 -12.7 74.0 -48.9 348.2 2.8 17.5 82.5 
636.3 50.7 261.9 253.9 374.4 7.5 41.2 58.8 
885.4 39.1 510.0 94.7 375.4 0.003 57.6 42.4 
1293.3 46.1 953.0 86.4 340.3 -9.3 73.7 26.3 
1434.2 10.9 1176.2 23.4 258.0 -24.2 82.0 18.0 
2277.4 58.8 1393.5 61.0 383.9 48.8 83.1 16.9 
5794.8 154.4 5365.7 183.4 429.1 11.8 92.6 7.4 
4925.5 -15.0 4563.1 -15.0 362.4 -15.5 92.6 7.4 
6751.1 37.1 6321.6 38.5 429.5 18.5 93.6 6.4 
7976.6 18.2 7453.6 17.9 523.0 21.8 93.4 6.6 
6064.4 -16.8 5401.6 -27.5 662.8 26.7 89.1 10.9 
10836.3 -63.4 10166.8 88.2 670.0 1.1 93.8 6.2 
14077.0 29.9 13523.0 33.0 554.6 -17.0 96.1 3.9 
10470.1 -52.6 10280.3 -24.0 189.8 =65.7 98.2 1.8 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Reports, Economic and Financial Review, various issues. 
Note: Table illustrates the rise of oil as a major export commodity of Nigeria as well as the relative decline of other revenues sources 
between 1960-1981. 
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the international oil circles for high quality, low sulphur content, 
Bonny Light brand oil. This has largely contributed to the steady 
growth of the search for the Nigerian oil in the international oil 
market. 
As we saw earlier, prior to independence, control of the oil 
industry was exclusively in the hands of the British colonial govern- 
4 
ment and its concessionaires. At independence in 1960, policy goals 
were only directed at the collection of petroleum revenue taxes from 
production companies. It is also important to point out that the 
British government, on the eve of independence, passed a petroleum 
profits tax ordinance which instituted a fifty-fifty profit sharing 
arrangement with the foreign companies. This ordinance gave a lot of 
room for cheating by many companies until at the end of 1966 when the 
military government stepped into Nigerian power politics. The military 
reduced the rate at which companies were allowed to depreciate their 
capitalized investment by one-half as well as abrogated the colonial 
profit sharing ordinance. Since then, the government has continued to 
show interest and have extended its control over the oil industry. 
In 1969, a petroleum decree was passed, demanding a compulsory 
part ownership in "... commercial operations, developing new licenses 
and increased proportions of Nigerians to be employed by the foreign 
95 
companies." In 1971, Nigeria joined the OPEC and passed regulations 
stipulating that: 
... for all offshore rights issued by the government, the 
foreign investor must accept 50% state participation. 
95 
R. A. Joseph, "Affluence and Underdevelopment: The Nigerian 
Experience," Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. XVI,no. 2 (1978). 
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Later that year, the terms of co-operation was increased 
from 4% to 51% in favor of the Nigerian government. To 
ensure the proper management and supervision of oil pro¬ 
duction and sale, the Nigerian National Oil Company was 
created and entrusted with the Nigerian interest in the 
oil business.96 
In 1972, the Nigerian government declared a no new concessions 
policy for the remaining offshore rights not included in the 1971 
agreements. This strategy allowed the Nigerian National Oil Company 
to take control of all areas not covered and to exercise more control 
t 
on "on shore" prospecting. Thtls, in 1973, the name Nigerian National 
Oil Company (NNOC) - was changed to Nigerian National Petroleum Corpo¬ 
ration (NNPC) and vested with the "overall control of the oil in- 
97 
dustry." In May of 1974, Nigeria, encouraged by the accruing profits 
since the 1973 oil boom, increased its share in the oil industry from 
98 
51 percent to 55 percent. 
Wealth from oil has since been on the increase and has thus 
enabled Nigeria to take on much larger and more complex development 
projects. The impact of oil on development planning was seen from the 
very rapid rise in the expenditure in the various national development 
plans with very little expected from external sources; for example, 
the first development plan after independence (1962-68) involved a 
96 Lazar Duerstien, "Oil and Development Planning: Implications 
for Nigeria," p. 334. 
97 Wright Stephen, "Africa's Emergent Superpower: The Resource 
Dimension of Nigerian Foreign Policy," paper presented at the British 
International Studies Associations Conference, University of Keele, 
December 1979, p. 4. 
^Wright Stephen, "Nigeria Boosts Participation to 55%" World 
Oil, vol. 179 (August 15, 1974)/. 
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capital expenditure of 2.2 million with a projected growth rate of 4 
percent in real terms. The contribution of oil to this amount was very 
minimal because Nigeria was still heavily dependent on foreign aid and 
revenues from donor countries, export of cash crops like cocoa, peanuts, 
cotton, palm produce (palm oil, palm kernels and rubber) were prevalent 
at this time. 
The capital expenditure however showed a dramatic increase in 
the second national development plan (1970-74) with a projected expendi¬ 
ture of $3 billion and a growth rate of 6.6 percent in real terms. At 
this time oil had started making some major contribution to the revenue 
of the Nigerian government. Under the 1970-74 plan, the government 
paid more attention to petroleum which in no time took the lead in 
Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings, and by 1976, oil had become the 
largest component of the National Gross Domestic Product (GDP). As the 
economic indices (table 14) below depict , the oil, which contributed 
only 25.9 percent to the gross revenue in 1970-71, progressively con¬ 
tributed 67.3 percent in 1974 and 80.80 percent by 1975. 
To ensure even economic development, the government decided to 
organize agencies which experts regarded as more important foundation 
stones in developing the Nigerian economy. Some of these agencies and the 
intended functions are listed below. 
1. Nigeria Agricultural Bank (1973) 
The long term objective of the Nigeria Agricultural Bank, 
which was set up in 1973, according to Gen. Yakubu Gowon, was: 
... to provide credit and loans for development and 
thereby enhance the level and quality of agricultural 
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TABLE 14 
SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICES OF NIGERIA SHOWING 




Revenue (N Million) 
Oil 
Reserve 
Oil Revenue As 
% Total Revenue 
1970-71 758.1 755.80 196.4 25.9 
1971-72 1,410.9 1,084.33 740.1 52.5 
1972-73 1,309.9 1,067.56 576.2 41.5 
1973-74 2,171.3 1,733.84 1,461.6 67.3 
1974-75 5,177.1 4,076.98 4,183.8 80.80 
1975-76 5,861.6 4,026.15 4,611.7 73.7 
1976-77 7,070.3 5,050.80 5,548.5 78.5 
1977-78 8,251.2 5,574.12 5,821.48 70.6 
1978-79 6,815.3 4,443.46 4,249.23 62.3 
1979-80 8,805.3 6,271.12 7,350.3 — 
Source: Federal Ministry of Finance, Statistics Division, 
Lagos: 1980). 
Note: Table indicates the growth of oil as a heavy foreign 
revenue earner for Nigeria. Figures show oil revenue as a percentage 
total of Nigerian revenues for the years shown. Figures are in 
millions of Naira. 
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production including the following: horticulture, 
poultry, farming, pig breeding, fisheries, forestry 
and timber production. The aim of the bank is to 
improve rural life and the agricultural economy of 
the country by boosting income and purchasing power 
to the rural population.99 
2. Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry (1973) 
The principal function of the NBCI included the provision of 
equity capital and funds by way of loans to indigenous persons, 
institutions and organizations for medium- and long-term invest¬ 
ments in industry and commerce of Nigeria. 
3. The Nigerian Standard Organization (1971) 
This was established under Decree No. 56 of 1971 and its func^ 
tions were to standardize methods and products in industries in 
Nigeria and to ensure federal-state government compliance with 
national policy on standardization. 
4. Industrial Research Council of Nigeria 
This council was established in 1971 and affiliated to the 
Federal Ministry of Industries. The principal functions of the 
council, among other things, were to carry out research activities 
in Nigeria and to develop and apply such industrial research results 
to the nation's needs. 
5. Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board (1972) 
This Board was designed to govern the Nigerian indigenization 
decree program. Its main functions as specified under Section 4(2) 
99 Panther Brick, Soldiers and Oil: The Transformation of Nigeria 
(London: Frank, Cass and Co., 1979), p. 25. 
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of Decree No. 4 of February 1972 were to advance and develop the 
promotion of enterprises in which citizens of Nigeria should parti¬ 
cipate fully and play a dominant rule. See our Appendix A, 
Schedules 1 and 2. 
The Murtala/Obasanjo Government improved on the program by 
adding in 1977 that: 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees are to advance 
and promote enterprises in which citizens of Nigeria shall 
participate fully anjd play a dominant role as well as ensur¬ 
ing the assumption of the control of the Nigerian economy 
by Nigerians in the shortest possible time.100 
See our Appendix B, Shedules 1, 2, and 3. 
However, it was not until the Third National Development Plan 
(1975-80) that the impact of oil was really demonstrated. Capital expend¬ 
iture increased to $30 billion with a growth rate in real terms of 9 
percent with great emphasis placed on: 
Those sectors which directly affect the welfare of the 
ordinary citizen; these included housinq, health facili¬ 
ties, water supplies, rural electrification and com¬ 
munity development. The aim is that by tne end of the 
plan period every Nigerian should experience a definite 
improvement in overall welfare.101 
James Ojiako stated that: 
With the unprecedented figure of $30 billion, ten 
times the level of investment for the second plan, com¬ 
mitted over the next five years, the new plan clearly 
sets out to change the face of the nation and to create 
equal opportunities for Nigerians to fulfill themselves.102. 
lOOFederal Ministry of Information, Federal Government Gazette 
(June 1977, p. A19; The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree, 1977 
101Ministry of Information, The Third National Development Plan 
1975-1980 (Lagos: Government Printers, 1975), p. 12. 
102James Ojiako, 13 Years of Military Rule (Lagos: Daily Times 
Press, 1980), p. 163. 
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In every sector of the nation's economy, everything was provided 
for as never before. This was highlighted by some of the major sec¬ 
toral allocations, some of which were transport - $7 billion; education 
- $2.5 billion; agriculture - $2.2 billion; urban development - $1.8 
billion; communications - $1.3 billion, and health $700 million. Ojiako 
further stressed that: 
This high investment has been made possible by the enormous 
revenue available to the government from both the oil and 
traditional resources, and that the government was deter¬ 
mined to use 'the Third National Development Plan to lay the 
foundation for our industrial revolution which would hasten 
the process of eliminating want in the midst of plenty.'103 
However, as of September 30, 1979, the last day of the thirteen 
years of military administration, the overall financial position of the 
federal government showed a deficit of about $1.4 billion. The state 
governments were also in similar plights. The Nigerian economy had 
started showing a downward trend and new realignment was urgently sought. 
In the industrial sector, emphasis was shifted to the establish¬ 
ment of small scale and medium size industries for which financial support 
was sought from the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank and the Nigerian 
Bank for Commerce and Industry. 
U.S.-Nigeria Oil Trade Relations: 
An Investigative Analysis 
As we pointed out earlier in this study, the spectacular growth 
in Nigeria's oil production in the early 1970s resulted in a rapid in¬ 
crease in its share of American imports. During the period of the Arab 
oil embargo in 1974-75, Nigeria became the first choice of the United 
States to discuss oil trades with. But after 1976, the high price of 
103 Ibid., p. 165. 
116 
Nigerian oil (due to its low sulphur content) induced the U.S. to pur¬ 
chase cheaper Saudi Arabian oil. Since then Nigeria has remained the 
United States' second oil supplier. 
In the following analysis we have extended our studies to iden¬ 
tifying those factors which prompted and fostered this sudden trade 
relation. We have also examined other areas in the oil industry where 
the United States is very active. Our analysis will be incomplete with¬ 
out an examination of the exploration, drilling and marketing aspects 
of the industry. 
The shift in economic emphasis from the traditional sources 
of agricultural produce to oil at the demise of the first civilian 
administration in 1966 was more a reflection of the political dilemma 
which faced Nigeria in the second half of the 1960s rather than of choice. 
The series of constitutional crises which plagued Nigeria since 1962 cul¬ 
minated in the military seizure of government on January 15, 1966, which 
was followed by an outbreak of civil hostilities in 1967. The prolonged 
military action to suppress the Biafran secessionist forces and preserve 
the country as one political and economic entity provided a severe test 
for Nigerian nationhood. In retrospect, it also forced a better under¬ 
standing of the economic potentialities of the country as well as pro¬ 
vided ideas as to what developmental efforts Nigeria needed to continue 
as one nation. 
It is on this basis that we choose to lay emphasis on the post- 
civil war national reconstruction and development efforts as the general 
background in studying Nigeria-U.S trade relations. 
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The war helped to generate greater confidence in the basic 
strength and resilence of the Nigerian economy and enhanced its poten¬ 
tial credit worthiness abroad. The origin of this confidence cannot 
however, be ascribed to oil as the main determinant of growth. It was 
based on the overall natural endowments of the country in the fields of 
agriculture, livestock, forestry, fishing, water resources, mineral 
oil, solid minerals, fuel and energy. 
With General Yakubu Gowon's determination to heal the nation's 
wounds encountered during the civil war, 
The second National Development Plan (1970-74) was launched 
as a means of reconstructing the facilities dam , and 
to promote economic and social development throughout the 
country.104 
As the situation turned out, the Gowon's administration was plan¬ 
ning on post war recovery and also upon attempting to launch Nigeria as 
a modern state, only to find out that the country needed a substantial 
financial capital to meet its goals. It was then that Nigeria intensi¬ 
fied efforts in producing more oil for sale, as well as prospect for a 
stable buyer. The increases in production are revealed in our table 15 
on Nigeria's crude oil production statistics. The United States was 
ready to fill that vacuum. Consequently, by the 1973-/4 trading period, 
a few years after the civil war, 
The value of oil exports stood at $2,278 billion which was . 
almost double the figure of $1,248 billion projected in the 
Plan Period. This improvement was due almost entirely to 
the increase in both the price and output of crude oil.105 
^James Ojiakor, "The War Economy," 13 Years of Military Rule, 
1966-1979 (Lagos: Daily Times Press, 1980), p. 69. 
^^Jean Herskovits, "Nigeria: Africa's New Power," Foreign 
Affairs, vol. 53, no. 2 (January 1975):325. 
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TABLE 15 












1958 1,876 5 1,820 1.8 
1959 4,096 11 3,957 5.2 
1960 6,367 17 6,244 8.4 
1961 16,802 46 16,505 22.6 
1962 24,624 68 24,680 34.4 
1963 27,913 76 27,701 40.4 
1964 43,997 120 43,432 64.0 
1965 99,354 270 96,985 136.2 
1966 152,428 418 139,550 184.0 
1967 116,553 319 109,275 142.0 
1968 51,907 142 52,130 77.6 
1969 197,204 540 197,246 301.2 
1970 395,836 1,084 383,455 507.6 
1971 558,679 1,531 542,545 1,053.0 
1972 643,207 1,757 650,980 1,176.2 
1973 750,593 2,056 723,314 1,893.5 
1974 838,318 2,256 795,710 5,365.7 
1975 651,507 1,785 627,839 4,565.1 
1976 758,058 2,071 736,823 6,321.7 
1977 766,054 2,099 744,413 7,072.8 
1978 667,609 1,829 667,387 5,401.6 
1979 842,474 2,308 812,727 10,166.8 
1980 752,498 2,056 701,260 13,523.0 
1981 525,598 1,436 458,162 10,280.3 
1982 470,639 1,289 366,400 8,003.2 
1983 450,923 1,235 341,400 7,201.2 
1984 507,998 1,388 401,002 8,840.6 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report (various 
issues); Economie and Financial Review (various issues); G. 0. Nwanko, 
Nigeria and OPEC (Ibadan: African Universities Press, 1983). 
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The world oil business changed drastically in favor of Nigeria 
in 1974. OPEC's new prices hurt industrialized nations, including the 
United States. Cries of greater anguish also came from the poor coun¬ 
tries who were forced to scrap their budgets, their development plans 
and their modest hopes, if any at all. Many of these countries are in 
Africa. Nigeria thus became one of the few OPEC countries for whom all 
was good. Though a member of OPEC, Nigeria did not belong to the Arab 
subgroup Organization of Arab Petrolem Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and 
therefore did not take part in the 1973-74 boycott nor did Nigeria cut 
its production. It was on this ground that Nigeria became prominent as 
an alternative source of oil to the United States. 
According to the State Department, 
Traditional sources of U.S. petroleum imports shifted 
markedly during the first seven months of 1974. The 
most dramatic change was Nigeria's leap to second 
place behind Canada. Nigeria exchanged places with 
Venezuela which fell to fourth position.106 
This point is corroborated by the Federal Energy Administration 
who provides table 16. 
As the United States became a stable market, Nigeria was encou¬ 
raged to step up her oil production to take advantage of the ready 
market. We present table 17 below which depicts the steady rise in pro¬ 
duction and export of the Nigerian crude oil between 1971 and 1981. 
Examining the implications of this sudden trade in oil between 
the United States and Nigeria, Daniel Bach highlighted that: 
Nigerian oil supplies to the U.S. have featured as 
a factor either of strength or of weakness in the bi¬ 
lateral relationship, depending on the state of the 
106 Ibid., p. 327. 
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TABLE 16 
SOURCES OF U.S. PETROLEUM IMPORTS FOR THE JANURAY- 
AUGUST 1974 PERIOD (THOUSANDS OF BARRELS PER DAY) 
Country Average Per Day 7o of Total 
Canada 896.4 24.7 
Nigeria 663.8 17.5 
Iran 561.9 15.5 
Venezuela 405.1 11.2 
Saudi Arabia 301.0 8.3 
Indonesia 283.7 7.8 
Source: Jean Herskovits, "Nigeria: Africa's Mew Power," 
Foreign Affairs, vol. 53, no. 2 (January 1975):325. 
TABLE 1I 
VALUE OF NIGERIA'S EXPORTS OF MAJOR COMMODITIES (Million Naira) 
Comnodity 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Major Agricultural Products 242.8 172.0 239.8 276.0 230.6 274.1 375.7 412.8 468.0 340.1 113.2 
Cocoa 143.8 101.1 112.4 159.0 181.0 218.9 311.1 377.9 432.2 311.8 84.5 
Cotton (Raw) 11.0 0.6 4.7 . - - - 10.1 4.2 
Groundnuts 24.4 19.1 45.5 6.8 - 0.2 - - - - - 
Groundnuts Oil 12.6 10.9 23.6 11.4 0.2 - - - - - - 
Hides and Skins 4.8 6.8 12.5 10.6 8.8 6.8 5.7 3.8 2.6 2.4 - 
Palm Oil 25.8 0.2 ★ ★ 1.2 0.5 - 1.0 - - - 
Palm Kernels 3.4 15.7 18.9 43.7 18.5 27.0 32.6 12.7 11.8 11.5 10.0 
Rubber (Natural) 12.4 7.4 19.4 33.2 15.1 14.4 11.1 12.6 13.0 11.8 18.7 
Timber (Log and Sawn) 5.2 8.1 1.5 11.2 4.6 0.9 0.5 0.1 - - - 
Coffee 2.1 1.3 0.1 1.1 5.4 4.6 0.5 0.6 - - 
Mineral Products 954.0 1177.3 1894.8 5367.1 4565.3 6324.7 7079.2 5402.5 10167.8 13524.0 10281.3 
Col unt) i te 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.5 6.3 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Petroleum (Crude) 953.0 1176.2 1893.5 5365.7 4563.1 6321.7 7072.8 5401.6 10166.8 13523.0 10280.3 
Others n.a. n.a. 63.9 n.a. 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Manufactures & Semi Manfts. 48.2 37.3 68.9 67.0 53.8 58.9 84.8 48.6 42.6 39.0 39.1 
Agricultural 18.4 18.1 38.6 31.7 25.5 22.8 62.0 31.4 27.6 25.4 10.9 
Cocoa Butter 8.2 10.1 15.0 21.0 20.4 14.5 38.5 17.6 20.8 19.8 14.9 
Cocoa Cake 2.0 2.1 5.4 5.1 4.2 3.1 18.4 4.5 5.5 4.5 5.1 
Cocoa Powder 1.4 - 0.2 0.8 . 0.3 1.8 4.1 9.3 1.3 1.1 1.1 
Groundnut Cake 6.8 5.9 18.0 4.8 0.6 3.4 1.0 - - - - 
Tin Metal 24.2 19.1 15.5 26.4 20.4 15.5 13.3 9.4 10.8 9.8 10.4 
Others 5.6 0.1 9.8 8.9 7.9 20.6 8.8 2.0 4.2 3.8 7.8 
Other Exports 35.8 35.2 70.9 73.8 70.5 86.0 82.7 187.7 147.2 147.0 15.6 
Total Domestic Exports 1280.8 1421.8 2269.4 5783.9 4920.2 6743.7 7621.7 6051.8 1020.1 10450.1 10449.2 
Re-Exports 12.6 12.4 9.0 10.9 5.3 7.4 9.0 12.6 16.2 26.9 20.9 
Total txports 1293.4 1434.2 2278.4 5794.8 4925.5 6751.1 7630.7 6064.4 10836.8 14077.0 10470.1 
Source: Michael Obadan, "Prospect for Diversification in Nigeria's Export Trade" (Unpublished.) 
Note: Table demonstrates sources of revenues and the value in Nigeria export trade for 1971-81 trade period. Note the rise of the export 
of petroleum products compared to other minerals. 
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international oil market. Thus the 1976 conflict between 
Nigeria and the U.S. over Angola did not affect oil sup¬ 
plies from Nigeria. In the world market at that time an 
excess of supply over demand resulted in prices falling 
and OPEC had to order a cutback in production; as a result 
Nigeria was in a weak position vis-a-vis the United States, 
although the latter purchased as much as 36% of Nigerian 
oil exports in 1976. By contrast, during the 1973-74 and 
1979-80 periods, sharp increases in world prices enabled 
Nigeria to consider its oil exports to western European 
countries as a way of influencing their policies towards 
Southern Africa. However, a Nigerian oil embargo would 
also jeopardize the economic strategy of the federal govern¬ 
ment. Indeed, the oil crisis had enabled Nigeria to impose 
a redefinition of the modalities of the country's incorpora¬ 
tion into the international economic system on foreign com- 
panies--as can be seen in the case of U.S.-Nigerian rela¬ 
tions, for Nigeria oil was a factor of might but not of 
power. 
In spite of the importation of Nigerian crude oil, the United 
States, through her multinational corporations, has substantial trade 
relations with Nigeria in other areas. However, American interest is 
more in the oil industry. 
Extent of American Involvement 
in Nigerian Oil Industry 
There are five important areas of activities in the oil industry: 
exploration, crude oil production, oil transportation, refining and petro¬ 
leum products marketing. There are seven major multinational corporations 
conducting these activities in the world and are as follows: Exxon (USA), 
formerly Esso); Texaco (USA), Gulf (USA), Mobil (USA), Standard Oil of 
California (SOCAL, USA); Royal Dutch, Shell (Holland); and British Petro¬ 
leum (Britain). There is a group of international minors. The companies 
107Daniel C. Bach, "Nigerian-American Relations: Converging 
Interests and Power Relations," Nigerian Foreign Policy Alternative 
Perceptions and Projections (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 44. 
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in this group have international operations but are of relatively much 
smaller scale and have smaller control of the market. These firms 
include: the Phillips Petroleum (USA), the Standard Oil of Indiana (USA), 
and Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC). The Nigerian National Oil 
Corporation is important in the Nigerian oil business. Nevertheless, it 
is important for us to state that there are collectively about fifteen 
companies in the industry, including the French Petroleum Company (Compa- 
inuie Française de Petroles) which in oil circles, is sometimes referred 
to as the eighth of the international majors. These figures do not in¬ 
clude companies listed below which are providing auxiliary services to 
major oil companies which extend their operations to Nigeria. 
Specialization Among American Oil Companies 
The major technical processes in the production of petroleum 
products in Nigeria is also in line with those enumerated above, which 
are petroleum prospecting and exploration, production, transportation, 
refining and petroleum products marketing. The first line of specilai- 
zation involves the major companies which are Shell-BP, Gulf, Mobil, 
Exxon, Pan Ocean and Texaco. These companies acquire the relevant 
leases and licenses for all other processes from the Nigerian government. 
« 
Next are the auxiliary service companies which are awarded 
contracts by the mother companies to execute specific assignments like 
exploration, prospecting, production or pipelining for transportation. 
These companies manufacture and also import their own equipment such as 
drilling rigs, barites, bentonite treatment plants, safety valves, pipes 
and boots. This area is dominated by American companies, some being 
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Dresser Marcoba, Dowell Schlumberger, Cameo, Otis Baker and Nisco (Nig) 
Ltd. which istheonly significant Nigerian service company. 
The third most important area of specialization in the oil 
industry is marketing. The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) 
is authorized to produce crude oil in addition to its marketing and super¬ 
visory functions of the export of the federal government's share of crude 
oil produced by the major corporations. The introduction of "third party 
buyers" in 1978 led to the inclusion of American crude oil marketing com¬ 
panies which now include Pan Ocean (USA), Phillips Oil Company (Nig) Ltd., 
and J. J. Brandler Company. Since 1977 the top aggregate export shows 
that over 50 percent of Nigerian oil is exported to the United States. 
This is well reflected in our table 18 below. 
The fourth line of specialization is the refining of crude petro¬ 
leum oil. This is handled in Nigeria, Europe and the United States. 
There are three petroleum refineries in Nigeria, located at Port Harcourt, 
Warri, and Kaduna, respectively. Despite these refineries, less than 40 
percent of Nigeria's crude oil is refined within the country, the bulk 
being refined and re-exported to Nigeria from Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, 
and France. 
Petroleum products available for domestic distribution include 
kerosene, petrol, diesel, engine oil, lubricants and butimen. The dis¬ 
tribution was also largely handled by Shell-BP, Mobil, Texaco, Esso 
(Exxon) and assorted companies such as Khaliland Dibbo. Since indepen- 
ization, this area has been dominated by Nigerians. British petroleum 
was taken over by the Nigerian government in 1978 for its support of 
apartheid in South Africa, and is now operated by the Nigerian National 
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TABLE 18 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CRUDE OIL EXPORT BY 
MAJOR DESTINATIONS, 1977 AND 1979 PERIOD 
Country June 1979 September 1977 
U.S.A. 42.4 46.0 
Netherlands 12.3 8.2 
W. Germany 10.9 6.7 
United Kingdom 10.3 7.9 
Bahamas 4.9 3.3 
Italy 4.0 7.1 (Caracao) 
France 2.8 5.6 
Holland 7.2 (Dutch 
Antilles) 
Source: The Nigerian Trade Journal (April 1980):30 
Oil Corporation under the name of African Petroleum (AP). 
The accompanying tables reveal in detail the extent of American 
involvement in the Nigerian oil industry. • 
The Agricultural Sector 
The Character of Nigerian Agricultural 
Products in International Trade 
Right from colonial times when foreign trade flourished in 
Nigeria import and export activities, agriculture provided the major 
stimulus for domestic economic growth in the country. When Nigeria 
became independent in 1960, about eleven major commodities were on the 
export list. At the top of the chart were agricultural products, namely 
cocoa,ground nuts (peanuts), palm kernels, rubber and palm oil. These 
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TABLE 19 
SOME U.S. ASSOCIATED COMPANIES IN THE 
NIGERIAN OIL INDUSTRY 





tries Group Inc.) 
117 Calco Blvd. 
P.0. Box 51499 
Lafayette, LA 70501 







Bayou Vista, LA 
Deep sea diving,pipeline 
installation, oceano¬ 
graphic survey services, 
pipeline locating services 
Drilling Tools Inc. Broussard Hwy. 
Lafayette, LA 70518 
Tel. (318) 234-5241 
Oilfield tools- 
(rental and services), 
pipe straightening 
services. 
Caterpillar Morgan City, LA 
Tel. (504) 631-0561 
Sales, service and parts 




P.0. Box 51809 




Brown and Root, 
Inc. 
P.0. Box 2348 
Morgan City, LA 70380 
Tel. (504) 631-2521 
Oilfield-,services; inshore 
construction, rig loca¬ 






Complete well testing, 
hydrocarbon laboratory 




Highway 90 East 
Drawer 638 
General oil tools, 
sales and services 
Broussard, LA 70510 
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TABLE 19 continued 




401 Dulles Blyd. 
Lafayetta, LA 70501 
Tel 981-2826 
General offshore ser¬ 
vices 
Otis Corporation Bldg. 36, Oil Center 
Box 51801 
Lafayette, LA 70501 




Bldg. 37, Oil Center 
Box 51126 
Gulf Coast, LA 70501 





Tulsa, OK 74101 
Tel: (918) 747-1361 
Worldwide drilling 
services, inland and 
offshore self-contained 
platform rigs 
Statco, Inc. 2650 West Main 
P.0. Box 763 
Houma, LA 
Tel: (504) 876-5308 
Internal pipe testing 
Hydraulic tubing tongs 
Wood Services, Inc. P.0. Box 52305 
Lafayette, LA 70501 
Tel: (318) 232-3865 
Cementing, acidizing 
pump truck services 
Penrod Drilling 
Company 
3333 First National 
Bank Building 
Dallas, TX 75202 
Tel. 651-0181 




102 Jomela Street 
Box 51287 
Lafayette, LA 70501 
Tel. (318) 234-5258 
Baroid treating chemi¬ 
cals, Baroid equipment 
rental and services, 
well logging services 
Source: Lafayette Oil Directory, The Desk and Derrick Club 
of Lafayette, Louisiana 70501. 
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TABLE 20 
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INVESTMENT IN MAJOR OIL COMPANIES 
OPERATING IN NIGERIA AND THEIR OUTPUT PER DAY 
Company Barrels Per Day 
Shell-BP (British) Headquarters 1,250,783 
Gulf (USA) 289,123 
Mobil (USA) 221,930 
Agip/Phillips (Italian/USA) 182,692 
Elf (French) 75,532 
Texaco (USA) 35,873 
Ashland (USA) 11,471 
Source: Terisa Turner, "Notes on the Nigerian Oil Industry," 
(Mimeo), 1975-76. 
Note: Table shows list of major concessionaires and producing 
companies in Nigeria and the home countries. Figures also show their 
output per day for the 1975-76 trade period. 
TABLE 21 















Source: E. T. Penrose, The Large International Firm in Develop- 
ing Countries: The International Petroleum Industry (London: 1968), p. 
103. 
Note: Table illustrates the ownership of Shell-BP Development 
Corporation, the largest oil concessionaire in Nigeria. Contrary to 
belief that the company is owned by the United Kingdom, and the Nether¬ 
lands, these figures reveal other^arties and their shareholding. It 
therefore shows that with 19 percent shareholding in She!1-BP, along with 
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products accounted for 69.4 percent of total exports as well as over 
50 percent of her labor force. By the 1970s, these agricultural 
commodities drastically declined in relative importance to foreign 
exchange earnings to about 24.5 percent when petroleum assumed the 
dominant export position. Cocoa was edged to second place, having 
a total percentage share of 2.2 percent, while petroleum exports 
accounted for about 96.1 percent of Nigerian total foreign exchange 
earnings. All of the major agricultural exports together accounted 
for only 2.4 percent. Similar fate befell commodities processed 
from agricultural produce; ground nut oil and cake were gradually 
dropped from the export list. Timber and plywood also gradually 
faded from the list as major export commodities. 
Similarly, the exports of processed and semi-processed agri¬ 
cultural products such as cocoa butter, cocoa powder, ground nut cake 
also showed continued decline in relative importance from an aggregate 
share of 3.7 percent of total exports in 1971 to 0.3 percent in 1980. 
By 1980 the items exported had a total value of only $39.0 million. 
We have presented tables 22 and 23 depicting Nigeria's export 
position of major commodities from 1960 to 1970 and from 1970 to 1980, 
which helps explain this trade position. 
In the same manner, Nigerian livestock include cattle, .sheep, 
goat, poultry and pigs. Nigerian climatic and vegetional conditions 
provide for sufficient breeding of these livestock. Despite these 
advantages, 
the wholly owned corporations exclude Gulf Oil Corporation, Texaco, 
Exxon S0CAL, etc., the United States has fewer concessions in the 
Nigerian oil industry than Britain. 
TABLE 22 
NIGERIA'S EXPORTS OF MAJOR COMMODITIES (PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPORT VALUE) 
Commodity 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Cocoa 22.7 20.9 19.8 17.1 15.9 15.9 9.9 22.5 24.2 16.5 15.0 
Groundnuts 13.8 20.0 19.2 19.4 18.7 14.2 14.4 14.7 18.0 11.1 4.9 
Groundnut Oil 3.2 3.1 3.7 3.4 3.8 3.6 3.4 2.4 4.4 3.3 2.6 
Groundnut Cake - 1.2 1.5 1.4 2.2 2.0 1.7 1.7 2.3 1.6 1.2 
Palm Kernel 15.8 12.3 10.0 11.0 9.8 9.9 7.9 3.2 4.8 3.1 2.5 
Palm Oil 8.5 8.2 5.3 5.0 5.0 5.2 3.9 .6 .03 0.1 0.1 
Cotton (Raw) 3.7 6.9 3.5 5.0 2.8 1.2 1.2 1.7 1.6 1.0 1.5 
Rubber (Natural) 8.6 6.8 6.7 6.2 5.6 4.1 4.0 2.6 3.0 3.0 2.0 
Hides and Skins 2.1 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.2 1.7 2.0 1.8 1.9 1.3 0.6 
Timber (Logs and Sawn) 4.9 4.2 3.4 3.5 3.6 2.3 2.0 1.4 1.7 1.3 0.7 
Petroleum (Crude) 2.7 7.2 10.2 10.7 14.9 25.4 32.4 29.9 17.5 41.2 57.6 
Tin Metal 3.7 4.1 3.9 4.7 5.8 5.5 5.4 5.0 6.5 3.8 3.9 
Total Major Conmodlties , 98.7 93.7 89.5 89.6 90.3 90.9 88.1 87.3 86.1 87.5 92.6 
Other Commodities 10.3 6.3 10.6 10.4 9.7 9.5 11.9 12.7 13.9 12.5 7.4 
Grant Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
.Source: Michael Obaban, "Prospects for Diversification of Nigeria's Export Trade," paper presented 
to the Nigerian Trade Journal, 1982. 
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TABLE 23 
NIGERIA'S EXPORTS OF MAJOR COMMODITIES (PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPORT VALUE) 
Commodity 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1079 1980 
Major Agricultural Products 18.8 12.0 10.5 4.5 4.7 4.1 4.9 6.8 4.3 2.4 
Cocoa 11.1 7.0 4.9 2.6 3.7 3.3 4.1 6.2 4.1 2.2 
Cotton (Raw) 0.9 0.1 0.2 - - - 0.1 0.1 - ★ 
Groundnuts 1.9 1.3 2.0 0.1 - - ★ - - - 
Groundnuts Oil 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.2 * - - - - - 
Hides and Skins 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 - ★ 
Palm Oil 0.3 * ★ - ★ - - - - ★ 
Palm Kernels 1.9 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Rubber (Natural) 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Timber (Log and Sawn) 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.1 ★ * * ★ * 
Coffee - 0.1 0.1 * * 0.1 0.1 - - - 
Mineral Products 73.8 82.1 83.2 92.4 92.7 93.7 92.8 89.1 93.8 96.1 
Columbite 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 •* - 0.1 - - - 
Petroleum 73.7 8.2 83.1 92.3 92.7 93.7 92.7 89.1 93.8 96.1 
Others 7- - - - ★ * » * - - - 
Manufactures & Semi Mnfcts, 3.7 2.5 2.8 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.3 
Agriculture 1.4 1.2 1.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.2 
Cocoa Butter 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.14 
Cocoa Powder 0.1 - * ★ 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.03 
Cocoa Cake 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 * - 0.1 0.2 - * 
Groundnut Cake 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.1 * 0.1 * - - - 
Tin Metal 1.9 1.3 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Others 0.4 * 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 ★ ★ * 
Other Exports 2.8 2.5 3.1 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.1 3.2 1.3 1.1 
Total Domestic Exports 99.1 99.1 99.6 99.8 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.8 99.8 99.8 
Re-Exports 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Total Exports 100.0 100.0 100.0 ‘00.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Michael Obadan, "Prospects for Diversification of Nigeria's Export Trade," paper presented to the 
Nigeria Trade Journal, 1982. 
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... only about 15% of the country's protein diet need 
was being supplied from domestic sources in 1974, with 
about $97.1 million annual import of meat. The status 
of fishery development also reveal a tale of woe, with 
an annual demand of about one million metric tons in 
1970, of which the domestic supply was 170,500 metric 
tons, while imported stockfish was 50 000 tons, leaving 
an unsatisfied demand of roughly 73%. 108 
Thus, when one considers these facts, he aptly concludes that 
the national agricultural situation reveals a stark reality of 
Nigeria's food and nutrition problems. Food requirements have in¬ 
creased faster than production. The domestic deficits in food supply 
have resulted in high and rising food prices, massive food importation 
with unwarranted adverse effect on the foreign exchange reserves of 
the country as well as unprecedented deterioration in the nutritional 
status of a vast majority of the Nigerian population. We have attached 
tables 24 and 25 to explain the food deficit and surplus situation as 
well as her food import position. 
Many reasons have been davanced as to the poor performance of 
the Nigerian agricultural sector. Some of the reasons include inade¬ 
quate funding of agriculture^in public sector programs,^ technolo- 
111 
gical stagnation, lack of appropriate economic incentives to encou¬ 
rage farmers to increase marketable surplus, slow development of 
108 
Michael Obadan, "Prospects for Diversification in Nigerian 
Export Trade." Unpublished paper presented to the Nigerian Trade 
Journal (1982) :7 
109 
S.O. Olayide, "The Food Problem: Tractable or the Mere Chase 
of the Mirage." Unpublished (Inaugural Lecture, University of Ibadan, 
1974). 
110 Q.B.0. Antonio, "The Stagnant Sector of the Nigerian Economy," 
Bulletin of Rural Economics and Sociology, vol. 11:324-39. 
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NIGERIA: ESTIMATED FOOD DEFICITS AND SURPLUS 
THOUSANDS FOR SELECTED PERIODS 
Commodity 1975 1980 1985 
Maize -170.890 -299.978 -524.499 
Millet -552.626 -1,050.674 -1,789.904 
Sorghum -1,018,412 -1,912.695 -3,184.886 
Rice +199.255 +383.026 +821.942 
Wheat -143.152 -190.720 -273.354 
Yams -2,402.988 -4,260.937 -6,716.327 
Cassava -995.720 -1,716.889 -2,908.528 
Potatoes (Sweet) -20.988 -31.024 -52.582 
Potatoes (Irish) -2.812 -4.201 -6.555 
Cocoyams -34.592 -97.626 -206.293 
Plantains -165.570 -286.496 -288.588 
Ground Nuts +52.333 +3.448 +64.240 
Cow Peas +6.979 +59.921 +106.087 
Soyabeans +16.237 +25.931 +37.699 
Source: Federal Ministry of Statistics, Agricultural Division, 
(Lagos, Nigeria: 1985). 




NIGERIAN FOOD IMPORTS IN RELATION TO 
ALL IMPORTS, 1970-1977 




Food Imports As % 
of Total Imports 
1970 57.694 752.580 7.67 
1971 87.910 1,075.066 8.18 
1972 95.104 986.224 9.64 
1973 126.260 1,220.946 10.34 
1974 155.708 1,737.326 8.96 
1975 297.863 3,717.380 8.01 
1976 438.927 5,132.512 8.55 
1977 736.420 7,093.694 10.38 
Source: Federal Ministry of Statistics: Lagos, Nigeria; 
various copies. 
Note: Table illustrates the volume and percentage of food 
import in.relation to total imports for the 1970-1977 period. 
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rural institutions, and lack of a comprehensive food policy in pre- 
113 
vious national development plans. Similarly, in his study, Mike 
Obadan attributes the rapid population growth in Nigeria as well as the 
rapid advances in domestic manufacturing as another reason. Obadan 
argues that Nigerian materials are now being used by the local proces¬ 
sing plants. 
Nigerian Agriculture: Structure 
and Directions of Trade 
The general agricultural stagnation since the political imbrogio 
in 1965 generated acute food shortage and inflation which started in 
1974, the high rate of inflation, with retail food prices jumped from 
164.4 in 1970 to 591.5 in 1977. This was as a result of many factors. 
The oil boom, and its associated demand for unskilled and semi-skilled 
labor, the 1973 drought which hit the majority of the northern states, 
government decision to urbanize the country which drew many people 
from the rural to the urban cities as well as excessive importation of 
foreign-made consumer goods. All these were manifested in aggravating 
the food crisis in Nigeria. It particularly became a sinister pheno¬ 
menon for one to notice that Nigeria which had been a predominant 
agricultural country with arable land and a huge unemployed labor 
force, had to import food from all over the world to supplement her 
fast declining agricultural output. 
112C.A. Osuntogun, "Cooperatives and Agricultural Development 
in Nigeria." (Mimeo.) 
113 F.A.Idachaba, "Colonial, Neocolonial Macroeconomic Planning 
and the Neglect of Food Policy in Africa: The Nigerian Experience." 
(Unpublished mimeo, Department of Agricultural Economics, University 
of Ibadan.) 
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Colonial history, more than anything else, explains the direc¬ 
tion Nigeria's agricultural trade. Western Europe has been the dom¬ 
inant market for Nigeria's agricultural exports accounting for import 
between 66 percent and 78 percent from 1971-1981. The major indivi¬ 
dual country markets are: Netherlands, Germany, France, Italy, and 
the United Kingdom, which is the greatest importer of Nigeria's agri¬ 
cultural produce. The United States' share of Nigeria's agricultural 
exports is minimal but stable--about 11 percent. This is represented 
in table 26 on the direction of oil and non-oil exports for the 1971- 
80 trade period. 
The Role of Government in Agricultural 
Trade Between the U.S. and Nigeria 
Consequent upon the general agricultural stagnation confronting 
Nigeria highlighted above, the respective Nigerian governments were 
drawn into having interest in agricultural activities. Five main 
reformist solutions have been launched in each occasion. These 
include the introduction of farm settlements, capitalist co-operatives, 
agricultural incentive schemes,114 the Land Use Decree, the Operation 
Feed the Nation Scheme, and currently, large-scale mechanized farming 
115 typified by the Green Revolution Scheme. 
Farm settlement schemes date back to 1960 and were among the 
innovations of the Abubakar Tafawa Balewa government to revive 
ÎÏ4 
First National Development Plan, 1962-68 (Lagos: Federal 
Ministry of Information, 1962). 
115 
Third National Development Plan 1975-80 (Lagos: Central 
Planning Office, Federal Ministry of Economic Development, 1975; 
Land Use Decree No. 6, Government Printers, 1978). 
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TABLE 26 
DIRECTION OF OIL AND NON-OIL EXPORTS, 1971-80 
% OF TOTAL 
Country/Region Oil Export Non-Oil Export 
1971 1975 1980 1971 1975 1980 
Africa 1.8 1.9 2.8 3.4 3.5 3.4 
West Africa 1.8 1.9 2.8 3.4 1.7 3.4 
North Africa - - - 0.1 0.2 - 
Other - - - 0.2 1.9 - 
Asia 1.0 3.5 0.4 4.2 5.8 1.5 
America 29.0 45.8 59.5 12.2 13.2 12.7 
Canada 1.9 0.7 - 1.2 0.2 - 
USA 20.0 30.3 44.3 11.2 12.4 11.7 
Others 71.0 14.8 15.2 - 0.6 1.0 
Eastern Europe - - - 13.2 21.8 3.8 
Western Europe 68.2 48.8 37.3 66.6 54.3 78.4 
Belgium/Luxemburg 0.3 0.8 0.3 1.1 1.2 1.3 
Netherlands 13.3 22.8 12.1 14.6 10.2 17.6 
Germany 4.5 6.7 6.6 8.2 7.6 17.0 
France 18.6 11.7 11.2 3.9 0.9 7.3 
Italy 4.2 1.0 2.8 2.8 3.2 3.6 
Norway 1.6 0.9 1.1 - - - 
Sweden 1.8 1.3 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.2 
Denmark 2.1 1.2 0.2 0.9 0.3 0.5 
Austria - 0.2 - 0.3 - - 
Ireland - - - 0.3 1.0 0.2 
Spain 3.4 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.4 .1.6 
U.K. 18.4 13.0 1.4 30.6 28.4 18.8 
Greece - - - - 0.5 - 





Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial 
Note: Table shows the 
and non-oil exports. 
direction of Nigerian trade in both 
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agriculture in Nigerian development objectives. The schemes were 
designed as training and demonstration centers for young school 
leavers who were supposed to graduate after two to three years and 
then become small-scale farmers or extension workers. It was thought 
that graduates of these schemes would eventually become large-scale 
farmers. 
This strategy failed by the early 1970s because the innova¬ 
tions being taught called for inputs such as fertilizers, plowers, 
tractor equipments and large financial capital which were not avail¬ 
able to the rural farmers. The strategy was thus considered to be 
elitist by the rural farmers and their supporters since the strate¬ 
gies were in conflict with the approach to farming in the rural locali¬ 
ties. Contrary to government beliefs, the Nigerian urban elites 
who are businessmen, teachers, and top government officials are the 
few Nigerians able to attract large government agricultural loans and 
incentives. Invariably, they fail to invest the loans and incentive 
program into the agricultural sector. Alhaj Balarabe Musa, the former 
Governor of Kaduna State, in direct contradiction of the Federal 
Ministry of Agriculture voiced his support for rural peasant farmers 
when he stated that the government projects: 
... merely serve a handful of large-scale farmers 
who are basically urban dwellers but who have taken 
most of the benefits at the expense of the small 
peasant farmers in the villages.116 
116 
Michael Watts and Paul Lubeck, "The Popular Classes and the 
Oil Boom: A Political Economy of Rural and Urban Poverty," The Poli- 
tical Economy of Nigeria (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 130. 
139 
The inappropriateness of the strategy was also voiced out at 
the Lagos Plan of Action, and the World Bank, when the conference 
noted that: 
African agriculture is still predominantly in peasant 
hands and any plan to develop African agriculture must 
address itself to the peasant question. The peasant ques¬ 
tion being the fact that poverty and agricultural activi¬ 
ties are largely a rural phenomenon.il/ 
Another government effort to boost agriculture in Nigeria was 
capital ist co-operative schemes. This conception was based on the 
establishment of rural institutions which included farmers coopera¬ 
tive societies. These farmers co-operative societies were supposed 
to develop co-operative type farming by each participating farmer 
bringing their plots of land together, buying or renting tractors and 
practicing tractor services in a mechanized form. They were also to 
institute joint marketing of agricultural products as well as securing 
public loans for member farmers. Just like the former, this rural 
based strategy failed because of the competing brighter attractions 
of the urban white collar jobs. It became worse in the mid-1970s 
when oil revenues turned the minds of rural dwellers to looking for 
118 
jobs with the oil companies. 
By 1978 another agricultural reform had been instituted. This 
was the Land Use Decree No. 6 of 1978. This decree was aimed at 
relaxing the land constraints and also costly land litigation arising 
117Thandika Mkandawire, "The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and 
The World Bank on Food and Agriculture in Africa: A Comparison" 
(Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA), p. 173. 
118 
Michael Watts and Robert Shenton, "State and Agrarian Trans- 
fromation in Nigeria," The Politics of Agriculture in Tropical Africa 
(London: Sage Publications, 1984), p. 192. 
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from mixed land tenure most common in the southern states of Nigeria. 
The Land Use Decree vested all land in the government, made distinc¬ 
tion between urban and rural land with the government imposing on 
itself the power to allocate land freely for agricultural purposes. 
Nevertheless, the Land Use Decree was a prelude to the Opera¬ 
tion Feed the Nation (OFN) also instituted by the Obasanjo Regime in 
1978 and the Green Revolution of Shehu Shagari (1979-1983). Under 
the latter, a large-scale mechanized mixed farming was being encouraged. 
National agencies such as the National Grains Board and the National 
Livestock Company were set up to laise, and operate joint venture 
farms between federal and state governments as well as with foreign 
partners. 
It was due to the desire to successfully implement these pro¬ 
grams that Nigeria got actively involved in agricultural discussions 
with the United States. 
The Nigerian government thus engaged in large financial allo¬ 
cations to large-scale irrigation, importation of fertilizers, build¬ 
ing of fertilizer plants and storage facilities, importation of agri¬ 
cultural equipment, as well as massive acquisition of agricultural 
technologies. This is reflected in our table 27 below. 
On a short-term basis, massive food import was embarked upon. 
Incidentally, Nigeria also found the United States a source for 
ready-made and prepacked food items for Nigerian market. The food 
import from the United States became so pervasive that Robert Shenton 
asserted that "... through the massive importation of food, 
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TABLE 11 
NIGERIAN EXPENDITURE ON AGRICULTURE, BY 
MAJOR EXPENDITURE CATEGORY 
1977-78 Estimate 3rd Plan, 1975-80 
Item (Recurrent & Capital) (Capital Expenditure) 
Federal States Total H Mill ion % Total % 
Extension Service 
& Import Supply 34 89.1 123.1 (16.0) 305.6 (10.0) 
Fertil izer Purchases 43.0 43.0 (5.6) 313.3 (10.2) 
Mechanization 0.9 33.7 34.6 (4.5) 71.5 (2.3) 
Direct Production 
Schemes 11.1 47.2 58.3 (7.6) 432.6 (14.1) 
Seed 
Multipiication 2.8 18.9 21.7 (2.8) 62.9 (2.1) 
Credit 16.0 11.2 27.2 (3.5) 194.9 (6.4) 
Irrigation 182.4 45.2 227.6 (30.0) 701.5 (22.9) 
T rain i ng 1.2 15.9 17.1 (2.2) 47.3 (1.5) 
Marketing & Storage 15.4 15.5 30.9 (4.0) 73.1 (2.4) 
Miscellaneous 5.1 13.7 18.8 (2.4) 132.8 (4.3) 
Total Crops 268.9 333.3 602.3 (78.8) 2335.8 (76.4) 
Livestock 20.3 77.4 97.7 (12.7) 487.7 (15.9) 
Forestry 7.6 35.1 42.7 (5.5) 135.7 (4.4) 
Fisheries 8.5 15.2 23.7 (3.1) 99.4 (3.3) 
Total Agriculture 305.3 461.1 766.4 (100.0) 3058.3 (100.0) 
Less Federal 
Grants to State 12.6 
Net Total 753.8 
Source: The Green Revolution, vol. 2 (Lagos: Federal Ministry 
of Agriculture. 
Note: Table illustrates the investment in the Nigerian agricul¬ 
ture by categories between the federal and state governments, respect¬ 
ively. Amuonts are in million Naira. 
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underpriced North American rice and wheat imports have further undercut 
119 
domestic production." 
To further expand the United States participation in the Nigerian 
agricultural sector, 
In July 1980, the United States and Nigeria signed a memo¬ 
randum encouraging American agribusiness, in conjunction 
with the United States Department of Agriculture to in¬ 
crease investment in Nigerian agriculture. The memorandum 
provides for the opening of Nigerian trade and investment 
centers in the United States and development of a United 
States Department of Agriculture Trade Office in Lagos and 
the Creation of an international working group to design 
and implement specific agricultural projects in Nigeria. 
The United States' members of the committee represented giant 
farm equipment manufacturers, financial concerns and agri¬ 
businesses such as the Ford Motor Corporation, Allis- 
Chalmers Corporation, Pfizer Corporation, Occidental Petro¬ 
leum (fertilizer, pesticides and seed producers), and Car¬ 
nation Corporation (food processing and canning companies) 
as well as The First National Bank of Chicago and the Chase 
Manhattan Bank (financial institutions).120 
While Nigeria sought the expertise of the United States to 
develop its agricultural shortcomings, the United States interest was 
to use Nigeria's agricultural problems as an avenue of abridging the 
deficit position with Nigeria. United States position is best illus¬ 
trated by Stephen Wright, who pointed out in his analysis that: 
In 1977 the US had $1500 million invested in Nigeria, 
mostly in oil. Imports of oil stood at around one-eighth 
of total American imported oil and with doubts always hang¬ 
ing over the Middle East supplies, Nigeria was a very 
important supplier. Nigeria was also the country with which 
the largest trade debt existed, and so the US helped to push 
119 
Michael Watts and Robert Shenton, The Politics of Agricul¬ 
ture in Tropical Africa (London: Sage Publications, 1984), p. 192. 
120Ibid., p. 196. 
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for qreater exports there particularly in agricultural 
machinery.121 
This trade policy was vigorously pursued up to 1979 when 
After several meetings of experts from the two countries, 
Andrew Young flew to Lagos in September 1979 as the head 
of a twenty-four member commercial delegation which in¬ 
cluded the Chairman of the Export-Import Bank and his 
counterpart from the Overseas Private Investment Corpora¬ 
tion. One year later, important cooperation agreements 
were signed which were designed to associate the U.S. 
administration and private companies with the implementa¬ 
tion of the "green revolution" now an urgent necessity 
for Nigeria. According to various studies, a continuation 
for the next decade of Nigeria's slow 1 percent growth 
rate in agriculture would compel it to import 40 percent of 
its food requirements by 1990.^2 
Therefore, although Nigerian drive for a state-of-the-art 
agricultural development has facilitated greater involvement of the 
United States in the agribusiness and policies, 
Agricultural products also make up the largest percentage 
of U.S. exports to Nigeria with wheat exports alone 
accounting for over 40% of total U.S. exports to Nigeria 
in 1984. Licensing of corn imports which ceased in 1983 
began again in 1984, helping U.S. exports of this com¬ 
modity .123 
Commerce and Industry 
The predominance of the Western market in Nigerian interna¬ 
tional trade reflects her colonial status as a former British colony. 
However, the dominance of the United States as Nigerian leading trading 
121 
Stephen Wright, "Nigerian Foreign Policy: A Case of Domin¬ 
ance or Dependency?" Nigerian Foreign Policy Alternative Perceptions 
and Projections (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 112. 
122 
Daniel C. Bach, "Nigerian-American Relations: Converging 
Interests and Power Relations," Nigerian Foreign Policy Alternative 
Perceptions and Projections (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 
112. 
p. 5. 
123U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Overseas Market Report, 1984, 
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partner is recent and largely due to the U.S. huge purchase of Nigerian 
oil in the post 1970 period. 
A direct Nigerian trade relation with the United States became 
evident soon after she got out of colonialism in 1960, when the Nigerian 
government realized the political and economic importance of the United 
States. Nigeria's establishment of trade with the United States in her 
early years of independence was not done without caution. Many Nigerians 
who were familiar with United States activities in South America felt the 
United States could not be trusted. The basis of such distrust was con¬ 
firmed when a Nigerian Economic Mission to the United States in 1962 
discovered that American aid was tied to the purchase of American-made 
goods, which in the Nigerian view, meant that they could not buy what¬ 
ever they wanted from the cheapest markets. This is reflected in the 
following table (table 36) which shows that Nigeria essentially had more 
trade with the Western European countries than the United States in her 
early years of independence. 
However, there was a dramatic turn in the post 1966 era. This 
was attributed to the domestic policies of the Nigerian government. 
The military leaders created a twelve-state structure out of the origi¬ 
nal four regional structure. Nonetheless, this policy of creating 
additional states did not pay in high volume of trade until 1970. 
Another factor which brought about interest in commercial activities 
with the United States was the end of the Nigerian Civil War in 1970. 
The war being over, the Gowon administration pledged to recon¬ 
cile, rehabilitate and reconstruct the war damaged areas. This meant 
that roads, bridges, houses, clothing, etc. had to be provided. It 
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TABLE 28 
THE DOMINANCE OF WESTERN EUROPE 
IN NIGERIAN TRADE BY 1966 
1966 1974 
Western Europe 
Imports 328.8 1,119.1 
Exports 442.8 3,056.2 
United States 
Imports 83.0 213.2 
Exports 44.6 1,589.9 
Eastern Europe 
Imports 11.6 47.9 
Exports 6.6 77.4 
China 
Imports 10.0 30.4 
Exports - 3.6 
Source: United Nations, African Statistical Yearbook, 1975. 
Note: Table compares Nigeria's trade position with Western 
Europe and the United States for two periods, and reveals an improve¬ 
ment on the trading relations between Nigeria and the United States, 
especially on the export category. 
also became clear that the headquarters of the newly created states 
had to be upgraded from their traditional settings to more contemporary 
urban cities. The modernization programs also called for additional 
universities, colleges of education, polytechnics and colleges of tech¬ 
nology, hospitals and health care facilities. 
Backed by a 3.192 billion Naira budget from the 1970-74 Second 
National Development Plan, Nigeria was set to import construction and 
building materials, machineries and equipments, technology, textiles, 
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and other necessary needs, both for desiring Nigerians and for expat¬ 
riates employed to work in Nigeria. 
Within this period, Nigeria maintained a very high upward 
movement of imports of goods and services from the United States, all 
directed towards facilitating the development pace being set by 
General Yakubu Gowon. Given these circumstances, considerable competi¬ 
tion developed in the international business community among multinational 
corporations as well as businesses wishing to have a share of the 
Nigerian business opportunities. The Americans were not left out in 
this scramble for the Nigerian business. Through a series of bilateral 
trade missions, individual business contacts, as well as through diplo¬ 
matic processes, the commerce and industry position between Nigeria 
and the United States was expanded. The American Embassy in Lagos pro¬ 
vided much of the studies for American businesses who became well 
informed about doing business in Nigeria. This knowledge helped their 
penetration of the Nigerian market. For instance, George Griffin, the 
U.S. Commerce Department representative.in Nigeria listed: 
- Plantation agriculture and agri-based industries; 
- Building materials industries; 
- Scientific instrument; 
- Engineering and transport industries ; 
- Household equipment and furniture; 
- Hotels and tourism124 
as Nigeria's main needs. 
As an illustration of the high importation done by Nigera, we 
have attached table 29 which depicts the total amount of money spent 
124 Nicholas Taylor, "Is Nigeria Really a Goldmine for Atlanta 
Business?" Business Atlanta (June 1983). 
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TABLE 29 




1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Food and Live 
Animals 155.2 232.0 441.8 790.3 1108.6 669.0 
Drink and 
Tobacco 9.1 19.6 63.7 146.8 57.7 5.0 
Crude Materials 63.4 67.0 79.3 70.7 113.6 92.5 
Mineral.'- 
Fields, etc. 50.9 92.0 181.2 136.8 181.2 111.6 
Oils and Fats 3.6 6.8 24.7 46.8 81.8 60.2 
Manufactured 
Goods 512.1 888.0 1135.7 3581.9 1970.2 973.6 
Machinery and 
Transport 
Equipment 608.3 1306.0 2447.4 3528.8 3759.4 1720.6 
Miscellaneous 
Manufactures 113.4 208.0 351.4 516.8 668.2 197.8 
Chemicals 118.7 ■184.0 398.4 464.9 680.4 392.0 
Others 10.7 8.2 8.5 13.0 13.8 12.0 
Total NM 1715.0 3717.0 5140.0 7100.0 6524.0 4264.0 
Source: Jonathan Barker (ed.), The Politics of Agriculture in 
Tropical Africa (London: Sage Publications, 1984), p. 190. 
Note: Table represents value of major import by category of 
commercial merchandise for the 1974-1979 trade period. Figures are 
represented in the Nigerian Nairain millions. 
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on selected commodities for the 1974-79 year period. Our listing of 
American firms and affiliates (see page 87) will represent the level 
of participation of American business in Nigeria. 
U.S-Nigeria Commerce Position, 1979-1984 
The decline of Nigerian total imports is also reflected in the 
1979 column of our table presented above (table 29). The period between 
1979 and 1984 saw an unpalatable experience in Nigerian commerce posi¬ 
tion. In the 1970s, Nigeria emphasized on the sale of oil as the major 
commodity for her foreign exchange earnings.with the United States 
being the major buyer. The dramatic fall in export earnings of oil and 
the heavy debt service payments set in motion a reduction in the over¬ 
all commercial activities of Nigerians. 
By 1981 Ronald Reagan was ushered in as the President of the 
United States. His economic policies sought to balance the United 
States budget and deficit position with trading partners, and thus 
became detrimental to the overall economic position of Nigeria. These 
economic policies were summarized by Floyd Hayes III, who noted that: 
In a nutshell the tenets of Reagan's new federalism have been 
to: 
1. Reduce the size of the federal government by cutting 
deficit spending, balancing the budget, constricting 
government employment and terminating numerous social 
programs; 
2. Provide tax breaks for big business to stimulate invest¬ 
ment; 
3. Retard the growth of money and credit in order to stabi¬ 
lize the American dollar; 
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4. Increase military expenditure. 
These policies were also extended to the African scene. Accord¬ 
ing to Vice President George Bush: 
The present state of the global economy is not of 
Africa's making. In the world economic system, the 
United States has a special responsibility not only to 
put its own house in order but to help rekindle growth 
in other lands. We are deeply committed to that task, 
and to achieve it the American people are making real 
sactifices. We are confident that when we are successful 
Africa will benefit quickly and significantly.126 
Consequently, as our table on Nigeria's balance of trade with 
the Unites States 1965-1984 (page IS) illustrates, the Nigerian balance 
of trade which recorded a peak of +3935.1 in 1979, declined to +2082.0 
by the end of 1981. It was further reduced to +1872.0 in 1982, 
+1030.7 in 1983, and down to +645.5 by 1984. 
And unlike the position in the previous three years, the 
merchandise account was in deficit by N342.6 million, mainly 
because exports decline by 25.6% from N14,077 million in 
1980 to N10,470 million in 1981. Also in 1981 the items that 
constituted huge foreign exchange drains in the services 
account include shipping services, travel expenditures, manage¬ 
ment, technical and consultancy charges, investment income, 
Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) joint venture 
expenses and non-merchandise insurance. Further problems 
obtaining overseas lines of credit and Nigeria's own austerity 
program caused the imports to fall from N13.0 billion in 1983 
to N10.2 billion in 1984, a drop of 22%. The United States 
experienced a 33% decline in exports to Nigeria which was one 
of the largest falls with total U.S. exports dropping to $575 
mi11 ion.12/ 
1 OR 
Floyd W. Hayes III, "Reagan and Reaganomics, Policy Choices 
in Changing Society" (Unpublished paper presented at the National Con¬ 
ference of Black Political Scientists, Houston, Texas 1982). 
1 Pf) 
Vice President George Bush, "A New Partnership with Africa," 
Current Policy No. 438 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 
Bureau of Public Affairs, November 19, 1982), p. 3. 
1 PI 
Michael I. Obadan, "Factors Affecting Nigeria's Balance of 
Payments" (Unpublished paper presented at the Seminar on Balance of 
Payments, Policies and Strategies for Nigeria (Lagos: March 1982), p. 9. 
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Since 1983, most U.S. exporters and export credit agencies have not 
extended cover to projects in Nigeria on items being shipped to 
Nigeria except on a highly selective basis. Adding to these problems 
was the reluctance of many commercial banks to increase their exposure 
in Nigeria which has made it very difficult to attract financing for 
Nigerian imports. 
The ongoing problem in the trade relations with Nigeria has 
caused the American Embassy in Nigeria to: 
... recommend that exporters, especially those who have 
not had experience in exporting to Nigeria should not 
ship until they receive an irrevocable letter of credit 
confirmed by a U.S. bank.^8 
Tourism and Travels as an Aspect 
of U.S-Nigeria Trade Relations 
International trade has been a major source of government 
revenue through import and export duties, marketing board surpluses, 
multiple exchange rate Practices, corporate taxes, royalty and rental 
payments. Imports account for an equally large share of aggregate 
national expenditures while other areas such as tourism are neglected 
by both Nigeria and the United States. In this part of our analysis, 
we will examine tourism as an aspect of trade in U.S.-Nigeria relations. 
We need to state here that international tourism is a big 
economic activity and one of the fastest growing sectors in the world 
economy. As an item which occupies a prominent place in the balance 
of payments of many countries such as Britain, Kenya, Egypt, France, 
128u.s. Department of Commerce, "Nigerian Business Outlook," 
1984, p. 8. 
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Jamaica and Mexico, the volume of travels between nations serves as a 
source of analyzing the pattern of relations they have. This role of 
tourism in global peace and trade advancement is well respected by the 
United Nations whose General Assembly declared 1967 International 
Tourist Year, with the maxim "Tourism, Passport to Peace." 
In 1963, a United Nations Conference on Travel and Tourism was 
held in Rome, Italy. It was here that the concept of tourist was first 
defined. According to the Conference: 
An international tourist is a non-resident visitor to a 
country other than that in which he has his usual place 
of residence, for any reason other than the following - 
an occupation - remunerated from within the country such 
visits of less than one year duration for purposes of 
business, medical care, holiday, religious observance, 
family affairs, participation in international conferences, 
meetings or study tours.*29 
According to the Federal Ministry of Trades illustration, 
"expenditures abroad by Nigerian travellers have been consistently sig¬ 
nificant and high relative to similar trade in Nigeria-" Reasons account¬ 
ing for this range from the lack of organization of the Nigerian 
Tourist Industry, to the neo-colonial status of Nigeria which makes her 
always look at what happens to the United States and Western Europe 
as the best. 
Nevertheless, detailed information and data about Nigeria's 
tourist position are not available, talk less of the tourist position 
with the United States. Vital aspects of tourism information such as 
numbers of tourists to Nigeria, types of tourists, time of arrival and 
129Michael I. Obadan, "The Role of International Tourism in the 
Economic Development of Nigeria," Nigerian Trade Journal, vol. 29, no. 
1 (1982):2. 
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departure, expenditure pattern* length of stay and kinds of accommoda¬ 
tion as well as other vital statistics are not recorded. However, the 
United Nations account shows that there has been a progressive growth 
of tourist arrivals to Nigeria. The United Nations also maintains that 
"the main source of tourists to Nigeria are the United Kingdom and the 
130 
United States which account for about 40% and 14%, respectively." 
Conversely, these countries receive by far large receipts from Nigeria 
in terms of tourist travels, education and business trips. 
We have presented table 30 (Per Capita Tourist Expenditure in 
Nigeria(l961-75) to illustrate the trend of tourist expenditures in 
Nigeria. 
Distributive Sector 
In the distributive sector, America has not been found to have 
any significant impact, although this sector was the first to be 
assaulted by foreign multinational corporations. British multinational 
corporations, especially those who accompanied colonialism to Nigeria, 
seem to have overwhelming control. They dominate the import trade in 
cars, trucks, electrical appliances, textile and various consumer goods 
as well as plants and equipment. Most prominent in this sector are the 
United African Trading Company, John Holt, Union Trading Company (UTC), 
CFAO, R. T. Briscoe and A. G;. Leventis. These holding companies control 
wholesale distribution of commodities through a network of subsidiaries 
130 
Michael I. Obadan, "An Econometric Analysis of Nigeria's 
Foreign Travel Spending 1960-73." (Unpublished, 1977). 
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TABLE 30 















1961 4,130 4.8 1,162 
1962 6,120 5.0 817 
1963 12,158 6.6 543 
1964 18,197 2.6 143 
1965 22,088 3.2 149 
1966 16,878 3.0 178 
1967 21,800 2.6 119 
1968 23,400 2.0 86 
1969 13,800 2.0 145 
1970 13,094 4.6 351 
1971 20,491 5.4 263 
1972 47,403 6.6 134 
1973 52,000 7.6 146.2 
1974 55,000 8.0 145.2 
1975 60,000 18.4 306.7 
Source: Michael Obadan, "The Role of International Tourism 
in the Economic Development of Nigeria," Nigeria Trade Journal, vol. 29, 
no. 1 (1982). 
Notes: A careful study of the figures in our table reveal a 
sharp decline on the number of international tourist arrivals to Nigeria 
between 1966 and 1970. The reason accounting for this drop is attri¬ 
buted to the Nigerian Civil War 1966-1970 
The table also reveals dramatic increases in the tourist expen¬ 
ditures beginning in 1970, with N4.6 million 1970 to N18.4 million in 
1975. 
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and warehouses all over Nigeria. They have also been able to consoli¬ 
date the domestic distribution of the products of many local manufactur¬ 
ing subsidiaries and affiliates such as the Nigerian Tobacco Company 
(NTC), Nigerian cement companies, breweries and textile factories into 
their operations. Of these companies, UAC, Lonrho and Unilever activi¬ 
ties cut across various sectors of the Nigerian economy. We have 
attached tables 31 and 32 as reflections of some of their subsidiaries 
and their areas of interest. 
Financial Sector 
The United States supplies much of Nigerian needed finances 
because, for the past one decade, she has been Nigeria's most reliable 
and stable partner in the oil trade which is Nigeria's main source of 
financial capital. 
The United States position in other areas of finance such as 
banking and insurance, is still at introductory stages. British banks 
and insurance firms dominate the Nigerian financial industry, with the 
numerous indigenous state-owned banks that have proliferated in recent 
years. Major European-owned banks dominating the Nigerian economy are 
the Standard Bank, Barclay's Bank and the United Bank for Africa (UBA), 
a subsidiary of Banque Nationale de Paris, the Citicorp Bank, Chase 
These years were those of Nigerian oil boom and the Second 
National Development Plan period which featured massive developmental 
expenditures. 
In light of these circumstances, it becomes a safe argument to 
state that the earnings from Nigerian tourism more reflect the American 
interest in the commercial and industrial opportunities of Nigeria than 
its attraction as a tourist center. 
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TABLE 31 
UNITED AFRICAN COMPANY (NIG.) LTD.: UNILEVER 
SUBSIDIARIES AND ASSOCIATES IN NIGERIA AND 
THEIR BUSINESS ACTIVITIES 
Name of Year of Type of 
Company Incorporation Business 
African Timber and 
Plywood (Nig.) Ltd. 1952 
Felling, woodwork, local 
and international wood 
sal es 
Niger Motors Ltd. 1931 Automobile sales and 
services 
G. Gottsharlk and 
Co (W.A.) Ltd. 1937 
Building materials 
G.B. Ollivant 
(Nig.) Ltd. 1954 
Retail and wholesale 
merchandise 
Kingsway Stores 
(Nig.) Ltd. 1959 
Retail and wholesale 
merchandise 
A.J. Seward (Nig.) Ltd. 1961 Manufacturing and sales 
of cosmetics and 
allied products 
Borkpark Ltd. 1962 Industrial packaging 
Kingsway Chemist 
(Nig.) Ltd. 1962 
Pharmaceutical industries 
(mixing and sales) 
Premier Packaging Ltd. 1965 Industrial packaging 
Guiness (Nig.) Ltd. - Brewing and sales of beer 
Lever Brothers (Nig.) Ltd. Manufacturing, processing 
and marketing of assorted 
household items, deter¬ 
gents, margarines, etc. 
Lipton of (Nig.) Ltd. - Tea production 
Nigerian Brenerice - Beer brewing and sales 
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TABLE 31 continued 
Name of Year of Type of 





of assorted merchandise, 
plant, and machinery 
across Nigeria 
Source: Elimimian Johathan, Multinational Retailing in 
Nigeria (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1985), p. 132. 
TABLE 32 















John Holt Properties (Nig.) Ltd. 
John Hold Ltd. 
J. Allen and Company Ltd. 
Holt Engineering Ltd. 
Haco Ltd. 
Had Plastics Ltd. 
John Holt Shipping Services Ltd. 
West African Shipping Services Ltd. 
Holt Transport 
Maiduguri Oil Mills Ltd. 
Nigerian Securities Ltd. 
Nigerian Enamelware Company Ltd. 
Kaduna Textile Mills Ltd 
Nigerian Net and Trust Company Ltd. 
Source: Jonathan Elimimian, Multinational Retailing in Nigeria 
(Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1985), p. 132. 
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Manhattan Bank and the Nigerian American Merchant Bank Limited; Ameri¬ 
can banks have representative offices in Nigeria. 
Michael Simmons and 'Ad' Obe Obe, in their account, illus¬ 
trated that: 
... these banks contribute more to exploiting Nigeria and 
using the money to finance major businesses in their coun¬ 
tries than they lend to Nigerians. They institute a con¬ 
siderable number of stringent guidelines on their lending 
parameters which, combined with rapid expansion,has led 
Nigerians to complain about the usefulness of these foreign 
banks in Nigeria.131 
According to the authors, 
... guidelines on lending are set at an overall annual 
growth ceiling of 30%-40% for merchant banks. In the 
same manner, stringent standards are set which disquali¬ 
fies Nigerians from being able to qualify for bank loans.132 
We have presented table 33 which depicts the levels of deposit and loans 
of Nigerian commercial banks as of December 31, 1975. 
Since independence, Nigerian citizens lack opportunities to 
acquire bank loans to start or expand their businesses, foreigners 
dominate the capital intensive industries such as construction, manu¬ 
facturing and areas such as catering, entertainment enterprises, and 
assembly plants. America is less active in the assembly plants category 
which is dominated by West Germany, France and Britain, with the parti¬ 
cipation ownership of Volkswagen, Peugeot and Lyland Assembly plants, 
respectively. 
131 Michael Simmons and Ade Obe Obe, Nigerian Handbook, 1982- 
83 (London: William Collins Company, 1982), p. 67. 
132 0 Ibid., p. 68. 
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TABLE 33 
DEPOSITS AND LOANS OF NIGERIAN COMMERCIAL BANKS 













Deposits 1,266,819 863,230 403,589 68.14 
Savings A/C 
Deposit 521,306 376,836 144,470 72.28 
Time Deposits 1,051,050 713,415 337,635 67.87 
Total Deposits 2,839,175 1 ,953,481 885,694 68.80 
Loan and 
Advances 1,475,613 1 ,049,159 71.09 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (Lagos: 1975). 
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Summary of Chapter Three 
The focus of this chapter was on the analysis of the oil industry, 
agricultural sector, and the commercial activities between Nigeria and 
the United States. 
Our findings reveal that Nigeria expanded her trade relations 
with the United States to meet its post civil war national development 
demands. In regards to the oil industry, the chapter unveils that the 
major United States oil companies, which include Exxon/Chevron, Gulf, 
Mobil, Texaco, Tenneco as well as Phillips, are active participants in 
the exploration, production and marketing of the Nigerian petroleum oil. 
In the time past, intellectuals saw Shell-BP, which is the largest oil 
concessioner in Nigeria, as a British firm, and thus attribute Nigerian 
exploitation to Britain. This assertion was disproved by this chapter, 
by establishing that the ownership is the United Kingdom, France, 
Netherlands, and Switzerland, with the United States being the second 
largest shareholder. The analysis in the chapter illustrated that 
through the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, the Nigerian govern¬ 
ment is able to have some measurable control on the activities of the 
oil industry. However, the NNPC is easily manipulated by the major U.S. 
oil companies who award service and supply contracts to other American 
» 
companies, and even their subsidiaries without enlisting the services 
of Nigerian companies. Thus, although the oil business has been in 
Nigeria for a long time, Nigerians have not been sufficiently exposed 
to its different facets to be able to make aspects of the industry 
their professional careers. Consequently, apart from the NNPC, only two 
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indigenous private companies are noticeable: Henry Stephens, and NISCCO 
Yet they are managed by American expatriats. We saw that the area domi¬ 
nated by Nigerians is the domestic distribution of kerosene, diesel, 
petrol, lubricant and butimen. 
Similarly, the chapter examined the relations between Nigeria 
and the United States in the field of agriculture. We found that agri¬ 
culture, which provided the major stimulus for domestic economic growth 
in the country at independence, was neglected by the government who paid 
lip service to the sector in the 1970s in favor of the oil revenues, and 
the rural dwellers who deserted their farming activities for wage and 
salaried income in the urban industralizing cities. We thus noted that 
the involvement of the United States in Nigerian agricultural activities 
is as a result of the general stagnation of the sector, an opportunity 
the United States sought to take advantage of, with massive food exports 
to reduce its trade deficits with Nigeria. 
Another aspect of our analysis in the chapter was the commerce 
position. Our findings revealed that the availability of funds in 
Nigeria for developmental purposes generated during the oil boom of the 
1970s contributed to the United States' interest in trading with Nigeria 
Hence, the direction of trade shows that the United States exported 
machineries and equipment, services, and general merchandise to Nigeria. 
Unfortunately, our findings did not show a corresponding import of 
semi- or finished goods from Nigeria to the U.S.A. Similarly, our 
analysis of tourism and travels pointed out a direction of traffic flow 
which shows that Nigerians spend a lot of money travelling to the United 
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States for various reasons such as holidays, education, business and 
conferences, while the United States account for only about 14 percent 
of total travellers to Nigeria and mainly for business. In the distri¬ 
butive sector, the role of American businesses is not significant. Our 
study shows that the merchandising aspect of Nigerian commerce is domi¬ 
nated by British retail chains such as Kingsway Stores, Union Trading 
Company (UTC), to name a few. Similarly, the British multinational com¬ 
panies control both the banking and insurance services. This is not to 
suggest that American companies are excluded from these services. They 
are beginning to show some significant presence. 
In the following chapter, our attention will be directed to 
examining the impact of Nigeria's trade relations with the United States 
on Nigerians. Our conclusion will be derived from examining U.S. macro- 
economic policies, the role of U.S. multinational companies and their 
activities in Nigeria, policies of the United States, the creation of 
socio-economic imbalance among Nigerian ethnic races and cities, exploita¬ 
tion of Nigerian economic resources through the use of foreign capital, as 
well as defiance of Nigerian trade laws and regulations. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
SUMMARY EFFECT OF U.S.-NIGERIA TRADE 
RELATIONS ON NIGERIA 
Introduction 
This chapter investigates the trade between the United States 
and Nigeria in a developing nation versus developed nation variation. 
In our analysis, we have eschewed the use of micro-economic issues 
such as trade tariffs, and quotas to largely use macro-economic policies 
to explain how the trade relations with the United States have served to 
undermine Nigerian development, especially in the 1979-1984 trading 
period. 
Against this background is our recognition of the United States 
as a large macro-economic environment whose policies have direct and 
indirect effect in the economic destiny of trading partners of develop¬ 
ing nations, especially those of trading partners such as Nigeria. 
In light of the framework above, we have in the following 
section examined the changes of American foreign trade policies with the 
third world in favor of domestic macro-economic policies and thus ex¬ 
plained how it has affected Nigeria. Beyond this analysis, we have 
also examined the role of American multinational corporations operating 
in Nigeria to substantiate our assumption. In this regard, issues such 
as lack of technology transfer, the creation of urban and socio-economic 
imbalance as well as the defiance of Nigerian trade laws are examined. 
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Changes in U.S. Foreign Policies and Its Impact 
on Nigeria in the Post 1979 Period 
Since World War II, discussions of the North-South economic 
relations and of the role of the United States in world economic develop¬ 
ment have focused on issues of aid, and sometimes trade quotas, tariffs 
and market entry restrictions. From 1979, the situation shifted on the 
part of the United States from the use of micro-economic trade tools 
named above to the use of macro-economic policy strategies, such as the 
133 use of fiscal and monetary policies. 
The study of international macro-economic linkages, which we 
are using to substantiate our hypothesis, is by no means a new field. In 
fact, a section of it was the subject of our discussion in chapter one, 
under contending theories of international trade. Nevertheless, it is 
important that we provide a brief background from trade interdependence 
point of view, for easy understanding. 
The great depression of the 1930s led to the demand for analysis 
that could help explain why macro-economic policies in one country could 
influence the economies of another country. Through Keynesian economics 
that soon developed, a mechanism was soon found that explained the 
phenomenon of coordinated world wide booms and slumps. This has been 
1 ■l'i 
Samuel Brittan, "A Very Painful World Adjustment," Foreign 
Affairs, vol. 61, no. 3 (Fall 1983):541-568; John Lewis, "Overview: The 
U.S. and the 3rd World 1983," in U.S. Foreign Policy and the Third World 
Agenda 1933-(Washinqton, D.C.: Overseas Development Counci 1, 1983), pp. 
16-19; Robert B. Carson, "Crisis in International Trade: Rising Deficits 
and Shrinking Dollars," Economic Issues Today Alternative Approaches (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), pp. 278-282; Robert B. Carson, "America 
and the World 1982," Foreign Affairs, vol. 61, no. 3 (Fall 1983):489-541. 
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referred to as foreign trade multiplier. The operation of the foreign 
trade multiplier is simple, and it is best explained by Paul Krugman, 
who, in his study of "Economics of Interdependence," stated that: 
Suppose that the United States shifts its monetary or 
fiscal policy in a contractionary direction, raising 
interest rates or increasing taxes. This contraction 
will reduce the demand for U.S. products, leading to a 
fall in income and employment. With this drop in income 
Americans will cut back their spending, producing a 
further round of contraction, and so on. As people of 
the United States spend less, part of the reduction in 
demand will be a reduction in demand for foreign pro¬ 
ducts, 1 eading to a decline in imports. This will set 
in motion a parallel process of contraction abroad. 
Furthermore, these multiplier processes will interact: 
As foreign economies contract, their demand for U.S. 
exports will fall, reinforcing the U.S. contraction; 
as the U.S. economy contracts the demand for imports 
will fall thus reinforcing the foreign slump.134 
The Rediscovery of U.S. Economic Power 
to Shape World Economic Trend 
The world economic boom of the early and mid 1970s saw the 
emergence of international economic actors such as Japan, Taiwan, 
Korea, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Brazil and Singapore contributing sig¬ 
nificantly towards a healthy world economic interdependence. The 
emergence of these new actors also resulted in a corresponding weak¬ 
ness for the United States, leading to chronic deficits in U.S. balance 
of payment position. 
The factors responsible for the worsening U.S. payment-position 
were due to a prolonged overseas military and economic spending by the 
134paul R. Krugman, "The Economics of Interdependence," U.S. 
Foreign Policy and the Third World Agenda 1985-86 (Washington, D.C.: 
Overseas Development Council, 1985), p. 34. 
165 
U.S. government, especially during the Vietnam War, a continued move¬ 
ment of Ü.S. private capital to overseas investments especially to 
countries like Taiwan, South Korea, Mexico, and the Phillippines 
where the U.S.'multinational corporations find cheap labor. Other 
reasons were due to the greatly increased productivity of foreign 
labor and capital, especially in Japan and Western Europe, the rising 
prices of U.S. goods relative to foreign imported goods especially 
from Japan and Taiwan as well as the incredible increases in the cost 
of oil imports after the 1973 OPEC price hikes. 
On the political front, U.S. influence and sometimes domination 
of the third world declined as wars of National Liberation and the 
emergence of new regimes in the third world committed their agenda to 
independent political course. The failure of the United States in an 
attempt to stem the tide of nationalism in Vietnam, the removal of the 
Shah of Iran and the subsequent turmoil which led to the American hostage 
crisis in 1979, as well as the continued harrassment of U.S. citizens 
through hijackings in the Mediterranean region, all indicated to the 
United States that a self reappraisal needed to be made, especially in 
relation to the third world countries. 
The impact of these experiences led to a mounting domestic pres¬ 
sure on the U.S. government. The effect was the Carter's administra¬ 
tion desire for economic realignment as well as the search for an alter 
native strategy in U.S. relations with the rest of the world. The 
implementation of the administration's repositioning led to the appoint 
ment of Paul A. Vocker, a shrewd implementor of monetary economics, to 
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the Federal Reserve Board. His appointment marked the beginning of a 
shift from the more liberal economics of interdependence backed by the 
"regionalists" to a stern money supply targeting strategy backed by 
the "globalists." It is very important to understand the concepts of 
regionalists and globalists and their role in reshaping the U.S. agenda 
in relation with special countries around the world. 
Under the Carter administration, two faction of policy makers 
were noticeable, the Regionalists and the Globalists. The regionalists, 
for example, included Andrew Young,U.S. Mission Representative to the 
United Nations; Richard Moose, Assistant Secretary of State, African 
Affairs; while Zbigniew Brzezinski (National Security Adviser) as well 
as Chester Crocker were examples of the globalist perspective. The 
regionalists, for example, believed in developing regional powers to 
be used as U.S. surrogates in each sub-region. Countries like Nigeria, 
Saudi Arabia and Iran readily served their purpose. The regionalists 
refrained from the use of military assistance and covert actions as a 
tool for American foreign policy. On the contrary, the globalist 
viewed the world from a strategic point of the cold war. They cared 
only about American security and economic interests. Hence, while the 
regionalists analyze their policy choices by first defining U.S. 
interest in a particular region, the globalists start by asking about 
the behavior of Soviet and other powers in the region, thetr motivation 
and possible threats. Above all, the globalists argue that the 
regional economic and political actors such as Nigeria, Saudi Arabia 
and Iran "were their own powers whose feet of clay and commitments to 
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the United States policies were uncertain and changeable. 
With the resignation of Andrew Young as the U.S. Representative 
to the United Nations in the second half of the Carter Presidency, as 
well as the reasons enumerated earlier, the globalists came to dominate 
the latter part of Carter's term. Similarly, the globalists have domi¬ 
nated and continue to be at the helm of affairs since the Reagan Presi¬ 
dency. In the following section, the policies of Reagan and their 
consequent impact on Nigeria are illustrated. 
U.S. Domestic Economic Policies 
and Its Impact on Nigeria 
The discussion so far has led us to establish the United States 
past ability to influence changes in the economic situation of its 
trading partners, and the world. What we have not discussed are some 
of the U.S. macro-economic policies in its efforts to regain lost 
leadership and how they have impacted on Nigeria. This is the subject 
of our discussion in the succeeding section. 
The Budgetary Block and Interest Rates 
The main source of deterioration in U.S.-Nigerian trade relations 
which led to the detriment of Nigeria in the late Carter and Reagan 
Presidency has been American domestic policies and the interplay between 
it and the economy of Nigeria, a subject we have extensively discussed 
in chapter three. 
135 
Henry Biennen, "The United States and Sub-Sahara Africa," 
U.S. Foreign Policy and the Third World Agenda 1983 (Washington, D.C.: 
Overseas Development Council, 1983), p. 68. 
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The economic policies under President Reagan have largely 
focused on domestic restructuring and thus failed to consider its 
immediate impact on foreign countries, especially on trading partners. 
This is correct, particularly when Vice President George Bush admitted 
that: 
The present state of the global economy is not of 
Africa's making. In the world economic system, the 
United States has a special responsibility not only to 
put its own house in order but to help rekindle growth 
in other lands. We are deeply committed to that task, 
and to achieve it the American people are making real 
sacrifices. We are confident that when we are success¬ 
ful Africa will benefit quickly and significantly.136 
The Reagan economic policies which were three-cornered, 
featured in the areas of staunch adherence to anti-inflationary mone¬ 
tarism, strategic foreign policy and revised anti-Carter defense 
initiatives. These policies are explained by Floyd Hayes III who noted 
that: 
The tenets of Reagan's New Federalism have been to: 
1. Reduce the size of the American federal government by 
cutting deficit spending, balancing the budget, con¬ 
stricting government employment and terminating 
numerous social programs; 
2. Provide tax breaks for big business in order to stimu¬ 
late domestic investment; 
3. Retard the growth of money and credit in order to 
stabilize the American dollar as well as, 
4. Increase military expenditure.137 
The primary factors in the worsening of the U.S. economy when 
Reagan assumed office were: 
136vice President George Bush, "A New Partnership with Africa, 
Current Policy No. 438 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 
Bureau of Public Affairs, November 19, 1982), p. 3. 
137Floyd Hayes III, "Reagan and Reagonomics, Policy Choices in 
Changing Society" (Unpublished paper presented at the National Confer¬ 
ence of Black Political Scientists, Houston, Texas 1982.) 
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Overseas military and economic spending,continued move¬ 
ment of U.S. private capital to overseas investments, the 
greatly increased productivity of foreign labor and capital, 
the rising prices of U.S. goods relative to foreign goods 
as well as the incredible increase in the cost of oil 
imports after OPEC's 1973 price hike.138 
Similarly, the country was saddled with stagflation (a situation of high 
level inflation and unemployment). A national unemployment rate of 8.2 
percent was recorded in 1981 with that of blacks alone being 17 percent. 
In addition to high inflation and unemployment, the United States was 
also in serious deficit with major trading partners, including Japan 
and Nigeria, and also in debt due to the Spanish-American War, the 
First and Second World Wars, and the Vietnam War, respectively. Apart 
from the serious indebtedness of the U.S. government, she was also owed 
by various agencies and individuals. The New York Times noted that: 
Americans owe U.S. $33 billion in bad debts, retirees 
owe refunds on social security overpayments and grants, cor¬ 
porations owe overdue taxes that they have withheld from 
their employees pay, former students have walked away from 
loans that put them through college. Railroad corporations 
have fallen behind on loans for capital improvements and 
farmers are delinquent on payments for loans they took to 
buy livestock and feed.139 
Table35 below illustrates the amount owed to the U.S government. 
* , 
Readdressing the national agenda thus became a priority to 
the Reagan administration. Reagan then sought solution from macro- 
economic policies and supply side economics. Supply side economics, 
which Reagan adopted, holds that when there is an increase in produc¬ 
tion, unemployment would be eliminated thereby stimulating the economy 
138 
Robert B. Carson, Economic Issues Today, Alternative Ap¬ 
proaches (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), p. 280. 
l 
The New York Times, February 14, 1982, p. C2. 
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TABLE 34 
DEBTS TO THE Ü.S. GOVERNMENT BY AGENCIES 
Agency 
Loans Outstanding 
($ bill ions) 
Delinquent 
($ billion) 
Agriculture $94.2 $2.2 
Education 13.6 3.0 
Health and Human 
Services 3.0 1.8 
Housing and 
Urban Development 13.9 1.7 
Small Business 




Treasury 33.2 20.8 
Other 4.3 7.1* 
Source: The New York Times, February 14, 1982, Office of 
Management and Budget, 1982. 
Note: Table 
government by agencies 
shows the status of loans 
. Amounts are in billion 
owed to the federal 
dollars. The sign 
represents overdue taxes. 
to boom. To set the strategy in motion, the Reagan administration 
decided to cut spending, and eliminate some programs in areas of wel¬ 
fare as well as provided tax breaks to businesses. These are well 
represented in our tables below. 
The underlisted programs show the categories of programs either 
abolished or shifted to the states and local administrations. 
1. Social Health and Nutrition Services 
Child nutrition, child welfare, adoption assistance, foster 
care, runaway youths, child abuse, social service block grants, 
material and child health block grant, legal services, community 
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TABLE 35 
AMOUNT PROPOSED TO BE CUT FROM FEDERAL PROGRAMS 
Program Earmarked Amount Proposed 
Food Stamp $11.8 bill ion 19.1% 
AFDC 6.6 17.5% 
Medicaid 19.0 10.4% 
Child Nutrition 3.0 9.4% 
Low Income 
Energy Assistance 1.8 25.8% 
Social Service 
Block Grant 2.4 17.8% 
Source: Newsweek, April 5, 1982, p. 17. 
services, drug abuse grants, primary care research, unemployment, black 
lung clinic, migrant clinics, family planning, women, infants and 
children (WIC). 
2. Transportation 
Grants in aids for airports, highways, interstate transfer, 
Appalachian highway's urban mass transit construction, urban mass 
transit operating. 
3. Community Development and Facilities 
Water and sewer grants, water and sewer loans, community facil¬ 
ities, loans, community development block grant, urban development 
action grant, waste water treatment grant. 
4. Education and Training 
Vocational rehabilitation, vocational and educational state 
block grants, Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). 
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5. Revenue Sharing and Technical Assistance 
State grants, general revenue sharing. 
6. Income Assistance 
140 
Low income home energy assistance. 
Contrary to projected results, the Reagan strategy failed to 
spur economic growth as intended. Many U.S. companies could not create 
more jobs since their sources of business loans, especially the Small 
Business Administration, had less to lend. Most people whose salva¬ 
tion was on welfare checks, lost their purchasing power as well as 
suffered structural unemployment. These combined forced many companies 
to seek merger, acquisition or outright bankruptcy. Therefore, instead 
of Reaganomics spurring economic development, economic recession ensued, 
forcing consumers to contract their expenses and to buying very cheap 
import commodities from Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. By 1984, the 
Reagan administration had recorded more deficit than the Carter admin¬ 
istration. 
How did these policies affect Nigeria? As we pointed out 
earlier in our explanation of the concept of foreign trade multiplier, 
the contraction of the economic activities of a major economy by way 
of reduced spending and stringent fiscal policies will lead to inci¬ 
dences such as reduction in demand of products and services, drop in 
income and employment which will also set in motion a parallel con¬ 
traction process for foreign trade partners. The contraction poli¬ 
cies enunciated by President Carter in 1979 and accentuated by Reagan 
l^Tom Morganthau and Jerry Buckley, "Reagan's Polarized 
America," Newsweek, April 5, 1982. 
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led to the unparalleled economic downturn that affected Nigeria's being 
a major trading partner of the United States. This is further illus¬ 
trated with the chart presented below. 
Note on Chart 
Chart illustrates the real stock of money in the world com¬ 
munity and its sudden decline between 1979 and 1981. The economic con¬ 
traction in the United States, which we stated earlier as being 
Nigeria's major trading partner, led to sudden glut of the Nigerian oil. 
This situation is also illustrated in our table on Nigerian Balance of 
Trade with the United States (page 73) for the 1965-84 trading period. 
Nigeria which recorded a surplus balance of trade at a peak of +3935.1 
in 1979, declined to +2082.0 by the end of 1981. It further declined 
to +1872.0 in 1982, +1037.7 in 1983 and to only +654.5 by the end of 
the 1984 fiscal year. The decline in the balance of trade position 
above was a result of many factors such as a decrease in U.S. imports 
from Nigeria, which was also accompanied by decrease in Nigerian 
imports from the United States. We have presented tables showing 
international trade position for the periods 1979-84 to ascertain these 
reductions of trading activities. Table 35 demonstrates a steady 
decline of exports to the United States from 1979-84, while our table 
on direction of oil exports (table 36) depicts a continued reduction 
of oil purchases by the United States. Thus as our table shows, the 
United States, which purchased 129,826.4 thousand barrels of oil from 
Nigeria in 1982, reduced its purchase to 76,345.4 thousand barrels in 
1984. This also contributed to the decline of revenues from the United 
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FIGURE 1 
CHANGE IN THE REAL STOCK OF MONEY 
Percent 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economie 
Outlook, 1982. 
TABLE 36 
IMPORTS BY REGIONAL GROUPINGS 
(N Million) 







Kingdom U.S.A. ECOWAS 
Western 
Europe Others Total 
1979 210.0 130.6 669.6 1,073.4 644.1 22.6 2,867.2 6,169.2 
1980 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1981 716.5 228.5 1,684.3 2,334.3 1,346.6 36.5 5,134.4 1,118.0 12,599.1 
1982 489.4 355.7 1,133.9 1,877.1 1,111.3 31.0 4,290.2 811.5 10,100.1 
1983 293.5 308.6 613.9 1,080.1 771.6 34.1 2,752.6 253.2 6,101.6 
19841 236.8 165.6 368.0 829.5 567.4 57.5 1,931.6 380.3 4,536.5 
1982 
1st Quarter 116.1 85.4 395.2 580.7 321.5 8.7 1,368.9 215.6* 3,092.1* 
2nd Quarter 202.0 53.2 291.5 524.4 335.4 8.1 1,167.6 174.4* 2,756.6* 
3rd Quarter 88.5 127.8 188.2 316.8 238.8 5.9 806.7 175.4* 1,948.1* 
4th Quarter 82.8 89.3 259.0 455.2 215.6 8.3 947.0 242.1* 2,299.3* 
1983 
1st Quarter 100.2 103.5 221.7 299.5 160.2 6.9 738.7 210.1 1,840.8 
2nd Quarter 65.1 75.8 141.8 254.9 156.3 8.8 584.5 133.2 1,420.4 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review, vol. 23, no. 2 (June 1985):65. 
Provisional; n.a. = not available; ‘figures do not add up to total. 
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TABLE 37 
EXPORTS AND RE-EXPORTS BY REGIONAL GROUPINGS 
(N Mi 1 lion) 







Kingdom U.S.A. ECOWAS 
Western 
Europe Others Total 
1979 740.5 19.8 11.9 632.0 4,579.2 174.3 3,724.5 . 436.1 10,318.3 
1980 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1981 872.6 198.8 160.2 135.8 3,428.6 299.5 4,235.3 1,203.0 11,033.8 
1982 414.9 51.7 4.9 211.5 2,983.3 230.4 3,369.4 1,930.3 9,196.4 
1983 133.9 47.4 5.9 319.8 1,802.3 144.3 3,232.6 1,797.1 7,483.3 
19841 577.8 37.9 6.1 422.9 1,212.9 300.0 6,116.1 451.0 9,124.7 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Economie and Financial Review, vol. 23, no. 2 (June 1985):65 




DIRECTION OF OIL EXPORTS 
Quanti ty (thousand barrels) Value (N million) Percentage of rota! value 
P.egi on/Country 1982
1 19831 1984
2 19821 19331 
1 9 
19S44 19821 L9831 19S42 
Africa 9,127.3 6,759.9 15,661.2 204.7 160.7 346.5 2.6 2.2 3.9 
West Africa 9,127.3 6,413.3 13,942.7 204.7 153.4 308.0 2.6 2.1 3.5 
ECOWAS 9,127.3 6,413.3 13,942.7 204.7 153.4 308.0 2.6 2.1 3.5 
Ghana (4,671.6) (1,989.2) (6,248.9) (111.9) (43.6) (140.2 (1.4) (0.6) (1.6) 
Ivory Coast (2,250.2) (2,312.6) (4,979.3) (40.2) (63.3) (106.8) (0.5) (0.9) (1.2) 
Senegal (1,202.6) (956.7) (1,071.1) (28.9) (23.8) (23.8 (0.4) (0.3) (0.3) 
Si erre-Leone (1,002.9) (1,172.8) (1,642.8) (23.7) (25.7) (37.2 .(0.3) (0.4) (0.4) 
Ni ger - - - - - - - - - 
Other ECOWAS - - - - - - - - - 
Other W. Africa - - - - - - - - - 
N. Africa . - - - - - - - - 
Other Africa - (328.6) (1,719.1) - (7.3) (38.5) - (0.1) (0.4) 
Asia - . - - - - - - - 
China 
(Mainland) - - - - - - - - - 
Hong Kong - - - - - - - - - 
India - - - - - - - - - 
Japan - - - - - - - - - 
Others - - - - - - - - 
Americas 179,911.0 ; 108,398.8 95,528.2 3,919.2 . 2,317.4 2,073.0 49.0 32.2 23.4 
Canada 1,915.1 1,477.8 7,098.1 45.4 30.8 153.6 0.6 0.4 1.7 
U.S.A. 129,826.4 76,345.4 56,149.1 2,831,4 1,645.9 1,210.9 35.4 22.9 13.7 
Others 48,169.5 30,575.6 32,281.0 1,042.4 640.7 708.5 13.0 8.9 8.0 
E. Europe 2,139.9 - - 50.3 - - 0.6 - - 
Hungary - - - - - - - - - 
Yougoslavia 600.3 - - 13.9 - - 0.2 - - 
Czechoslovakia - - - - - - - - - 
Poland - - - - - - - - - 
U.S.S.R. - - - - - - - - - 
Others 1,539.6 - - 36.4 - - 0.4 - - 
W. Europe 175,232.0 226,202.3 I '89,812.9 3,829.0 4,723.1 6,421.1 47.8 65.6 72.7 
Belguim/ 
Luzembourg 5,235.0 2,428.8 - 115.2 49.2 - 1.4 0.7 - 
Netherlands 26,296.0 28,669.2 51,885.7 519.2 637.2 1,135.6 6.5 8.8 12.8 
Germany (West) 27,956.8 40,505.8 42,274.6 631.8 888.4 915.1 7.9 12.3 10.4 
France 58,823.1 71,143.3 87,013.3 1,308.2 1,507.2 1 ,924.2 16.3 20.9 21.8 
Italy 32,003.0 43,184.3 61,806.7 690.3 836.4 1,457.1 8.6 11.5 16.5 
Norway 1,052.7 - - 24.3 - - 0.3 - - 
Sweden 9,116.6 6,533.1 3,978.4 20310 144.2 84.9 2.5 2.0 0.9 
Denmark 1,009.9 1,708.0 2,303.4 22.7 36.1 51.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 
Austria 600.0 540.0 2,114.8 14.6 11.4 46.1 0.2 0.2 0.5 
Switzerland 632.4 - - 15.3 - - 0.2 - - 
Ireland - - - - - - - - - 
Spain 903.5 9,051.2 15,890.6 21.6 188.4 342.4 0.3 2.6 3.9 
U.K. 5,636.4 10,399.5 13,644.5 134.2 197.4 198.8 1.7 2.7 3.4 
Greece _ - - - - - - - - 
Others 5,966.6 12,019.1 8,900.9 128.6 237.0 165.6 1.6 3.3 1.9 
Oceania - - - - - - ■ - - 
Others - - - - - - - - - 




States from 2,831.4 million Naira in 1982 to 1645.9 in 1983, and 
1,210.9 million Naira only by 1984. 
Since Nigeria was not forewarned, she suffered untold hardship 
within this period with high unemployment, massive labor retrenchment 
in both private and public sectors, abandonment of major infrastruc¬ 
tures under construction across the country, as well as suffered the 
inability of paying students school fees at home and abroad. Escalated 
social malaise such as armed robbery and prostitution soon followed. 
Apart from the impact of economic contraction, the tax break 
policies for the American big businesses were intended to surge an 
output in productivity and then raise investments. Secondly, it was 
intended that by scaling down government's expenditure on welfare and 
social programs, more people would go to the work force and thus con¬ 
tribute to the envisaged high economic output. On the contrary, this 
assumption did not materialize. The combination of high interest 
rate, cut in non-defense spending, with corresponding increase in mili¬ 
tary spending retarded revenues, resistance from the congress and 
bureaucracy, as well as the large tax cut all contributed to putting 
the United States into an unexpected recession. The activities in a 
recessionary period also affected the American corporations doing busi¬ 
ness in Nigeria. Many of the corporations were the oil affiliates in 
Texas, Louisiana and Oklahoma states who have largely been responsible 
for investing and producing the Nigerian oil. With serious financial 
and credit problems facing American companies, massive job layoffs, cut 
down in operation and outright unemployment were also extended to 
Nigeria. The reason accounting for this is that most American 
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companies operating overseas, especially in the oil industries, are 
able to operate largely due to the financial assistance from U.S. 
banks, the Import-Export Bank, the Small Business Administration, as 
well as with numerous financial institutions in the United States. The 
banking crisis that resulted from President Reagan's induced recession 
also affected the contraction of the services of the financial insti¬ 
tutions. 
The seriousness of the banking crisis was once demon¬ 
strated by four major shocks. On May 17, 1972, the small 
New York firm of Drysdale Government Securities became 
insolvent and Chase Manhattan Bank, to whom it owed money, 
showed a loss in the second quarter of the year. Then the 
Italian Banco Ambrosiano went down with its affairs in an 
impenetrable tangle and unpaid debts owed by its foreign 
subsidiaries. On July 5, a very small Oklahoma City bank, 
Penn State Square, was closed by the U.S. Comptroller of 
the Currency. It had raised considerable sums for oil and 
gas projects from larger banks and this time a main victim 
was Chicago's Continental Illinois Bank.141 
Similarly, the policy of Reagan to retard the growth of money 
and credit in order to stabilize the American dollar in effect contri¬ 
buted to Nigerian dependency on U.S. monetary and fiscal policies. 
This can be measured against several features. One, the dollar being 
used in setting the price of oil. Secondly, the dollar is used in 
denominating international lending. Three, the role of the International 
Monetary Fund as a soft lender to developing countries. 
The important difference between public and private lending 
from the point of view of international interdependency is that private 
lenders are more serious to protect themselves against risk. In the 
141 
Samuel Brittan, 
Affairs, vol. 61, no. 3 
"A Very Powerful World Adjustment," Foreign 
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mid 1970s, Nigerian (federal and state governments respectively) 
borrowed from the private sources. At that time debts were arranged 
on floating rates and tied to Eurocurrency rates. Since the United 
States induced recession in world economy financial lenders required 
reassurance of debt repayment. For a developing country like Nigeria, 
this meant trying to reach agreement with the IMF lending parameter 
before loan approval, which is often required. 
Unable to attract private loans, Nigeria had to fulfill some 
commitments such as devaluing the Nigerian currency to indulge in 
raising interest rates, eliminate price control, further cut public 
sector employment and wages as well as set limits on government expen¬ 
diture. Although Nigeria was forced out of the loan by public outcry, 
she was able to attract guaranteed financial support to embark on a 
second-tier economic restructuring program but not until the Nigerian 
Naira was technically devalued. Thus, the dollar which stood at seventy- 
five kobo against the Naira in 1979 appreciated with the Nigerian Naira 
standing at thirty-six cents against the dollar by 1986. It is import¬ 
ant for us to understand how this process has worked and its impact on 
Nigeria. With our description of the channels through which the United 
States macro-economic policy has been restructured through a shift 
toward tighter monetary policy, the multiplier effect was set in motion. 
For example, the initial effect of U.S. tight money supply lead to a 
very high interest rate (21 percent by 1980), then a recession which 
led to the emergence of a very strong dollar. In the effort for other 
« 
industrial nations such as Japan, Britain, France and West Germany to 
stabilize their currencies and limit the rise of the dollar, they also 
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tightened their monetary policies. What the scenario created was a 
combination of higher interest rates and recession, which affected 
balance of payments of developing nations due to escalated debt service 
and the burden of paying for imports of commodities such as oil. The 
group most affected by this cyclical relationship was those carrying 
heavy floating rate debts (Nigeria being one). In no time Nigeria 
lost confidence with its banking lenders. In times of recession lenders 
lose confidence in their borrowers, especially in a monoculture situa¬ 
tion. When this situation happens the borrower seeks alternative 
sources of loans. Often third world countries seek loan from the Inter¬ 
national Monetary Fund. But contrary to the beliefs of third world 
countries^ the IMF is a financial clearing house which adopts the lend¬ 
ing parameters of the industrialized Western nations. It is on this 
ground that the recommendations mentioned earlier were requested of 
Nigeria. The adoption of the IMF recommendations led to a continued cut 
back on employment, and a further retrenchment of those already employed. 
All contribute to low morale, frustration, low productivity and outright 
hopelessness among Nigerians. The strong dollar, and low Naira pheno¬ 
menon without a corresponding high productivity within Nigeria also 
contributed to high cost of living and outpriced consumer and luxury 
iterns. 
Another effect of the very highly devalued Naira has béen a 
rocket increase in debt service payments to existing loans. Nigerian 
share of world debts is represented in our table below. 
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TABLE 39 
EXTERNAL DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS FOR 1982 FISCAL YEAR 
Country Total Interest Principal 
Argentina 179 44 235 
Mexico 129 37 92 
Ecuador 122 30 92 
Brazil 122 45 77 
Chile 116 40 76 
Venezuela 95 14 81 
Colombia 94 25 69 
Phil 1ippines 91 18 74 
Peru 90 21 69 
Turkey 68 13 55 
Korea 53 11 43 
Thailand 48 10 38 
Egypt 48 7 41 
Yugoslavia 46 14 32 
Algeria 39 12 32 
Indonesia 27 8 19 
Taiwan 21 5 16 
*Nigeria 20 7 13 




Morgan Guaranty Trust Compnay, "World 
1982, p. 5. 
(1) All debts are in billions of U.S. 
Financial 
do!1ars. 
(2) All debts were due within the year including amor¬ 
tization of medium- and long-term debts which were outstanding at the 
beginning of the year. 
(3) Figures do not show service charges which also 
ballooned at the time of payment. 
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The Political and Strategic 
Minerals Question 
An area worthy of our analysis is the focal point Nigeria occu¬ 
pied in the minds of the United States policy makers between 1974 and 
1980 when Nigeria was influential with the United States, and between 
1980-1984 when there was a reversal of such influence. 
We demonstrated earlier that by the end of 1980 Nigeria remained 
the second largest oil exporter to the United States after Saudi Arabia. 
Despite the strategic mineral importance of Nigeria to the United States, 
there has been a lessened political embrace of Nigeria in the post 1980 
trading period. Many reasons account for this situation. Principal is 
the change in policy strategies as to the best way to accomplish U.S. 
strategic interest in the African sub-region. Under Carter, the U.S. 
policy towards Africa "was to coordinate African policy with Nigeria as 
a regional influential." But under President Reagan that policy posi¬ 
tion changed. 
Reagan's African policies since 1981 have focused less on 
coordinating with Nigeria and have not attempted to work 
through Nigeria especially on South African issues.142 
Besides this shift in policy position, 
... the Reagan administration has also indicated that in 
the current period of soft oil prices no strategic 
importance will be attached to Nigeria especially when 
new U.S.refining capacity can now improve the quality of 
low grade crude oil.143 
All the same, the United States also expressed the idea of 
142 John Lewis and Valeriana Kallabled, U.S, Foreign Policy and 
the Third World Aqenda (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 
1983), p. 112. 
143Ibid., p. 113. 
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encouraging Mexico, a closer and more secured producer of oil, to expand 
their productivity for the United States market. 
Lack of Technological Transfer to Nigerians In 
the Sectors Dominated by the United 
States Multinational Corporations" 
Multinational corporations are large companies which have their 
headquarters in one foreign country often referred to as home country and 
establish subsidiaries or branches in another country. The parent com¬ 
pany often serves as the headquarters and is usually based in the home 
country, while its subsidiaries, branches or affiliates operate in peri¬ 
pheral countries, usually referred to as the host country. In single 
structured corporations (where there is no franchise rights) the parent 
companies monopolize key decisions, especially in areas of technology 
transfer, research and development, use of profit, and social corporate 
responsibilities. 
The emergence of multinational corporations is attributable to 
various factors. To extract raw materials such as minerals (oil, gold 
and silver), agricultural produce (as Britain did in Nigeria), or the 
exploitation of cheap labor as currently in the case of countries such 
as Mexico, Korea, Taiwan and the Phillippines. Yet another reason is 
the pursuit of lucrative markets for higher margin of profit. The latter 
explains the reason behind higher initial export of capital from the 
advanced countries which leads to the net export of capital from the 
host country to the home country of the multinational corporation. 
Many arguments have been made in favor of multinational corpora¬ 
tions. Some of these include the notion that multinational corporations 
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enhance the economic capabilities of developing nations where they are 
located and thus contribute to their overall economic development. 
Furthermore, they are said to be agents of change since they alter tradi¬ 
tional value systems, modify behavior and thus are able to expedite 
political development as well as stability. Most recently, multina¬ 
tional corporations are praised for their efforts in trying to bring 
about a global community. 
We consider the role of the multinational corporation to be 
central to Nigerian dependency status. Since we have already established 
a case for U.S. dominance of the Nigerian oil sector, our analysis here 
will further examine the impact of the multinational corporations in 
the sector. 
The major functions in oil production involve the processes 
of exploration, production and refining, as well as transportation, 
marketing and distribution. Activities in these operations include run¬ 
ning of pressure surveys, drilling of wells, site testing, cementing, 
construction of flow stations, pipeline construction, as well as drilling 
rig operation. All of these activities are performed by Americans 
recruited in the United States. This statement is not to suggest that 
Nigerians are not employed in the industry, rather Nigerians are hired 
to do the less intricate jobs such as cooks, stewards, electricians, 
welding and radio operation. Apart from the employment situation, the 
entire machines and equipments used in the oil industry are imported 
either directly by the major oil companies or by the auxilliary service 
companies which we discussed earlier under "Specialization among American 
Oil Companies." The entire process impacts negatively on Nigeria in two 
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ways: double payment and technology stagnation. Double payment results 
when the major oil contracting companies secure payment for their ser¬ 
vices, and in turn charge Nigeria for technology transfer when equip¬ 
ments are used. Technology stagnation results due to the refusal to 
award independent contracts to Nigerian technicians, welders and mach¬ 
inists, a phenomenon which has led to reduced indigenous capabilities 
in the sector, since the use of foreign made tools and machines does not 
encourage any linkage between Nigeria input such as steel, mental input 
to the oil production process, a phenomen which could set off a chain 
of machine design and production in Nigeria. The lack of transfer of 
technology to the Nigerians in the oil sector is pervasive. Bade Onimode 
noted that: 
The extent of local participation in these technology transfer 
arrangements is almost zero. Even with the three Nigerian 
companies, their participation in production and refining does 
not imply real participation in technology development because 
they all import their technology and rely on foreign expertise 
for the installation and maintenance of their machinery. It 
is only the Nigerian refining companies that produce some of 
its spare parts in its own workship, but it relies on foreign 
expertise for delicate overhauling of its equipment. The only 
real difference between these Nigerian companies and the oil 
multinational is that the indigenous companies employ more 
Nigerians in senior technical posts and engage in manpower 
training locally and overseas.*44 
The refusal of U.S. oil companies to transfer technology to 
Nigerians is tied to various factors. Principal is the fact that the 
oil multinational companies concentrate their research and development 
units in the home country (USA). The effect is that Nigerians do not 
144 
Bade Onimode, "Multinationals in the Mining Sectors," 
Multinational Corporations in Nigeria (Ibadan: Les Shyraden, 1983), 
p. 33. 
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have access to participate in the act of process design, drawings 
(process information), and personal contacts with the idea initiatives 
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of the various products. Similarly, there is the desire on the part 
of the multinational corporations to retain monopoly over their own 
technology. 
Another mitigating factor hindering U.S. multinational corpora- 
t 
tions from transferring technology is attributable to their being subject 
to U.S. domestic regulatory and export control laws. Most nations 
desire to view technological capability as a basis of power, whether in 
terms of industrial competitiveness, defense preparedness, or interna¬ 
tional prestige. The United States government stimulation of science and 
technology has waxed and waned during the past twenty-five years. This 
is reflected in the amount of federal research and development funding 
in strategic military, energy and space programs. Since the oil embargo 
in the early 1970s, the United States has been concerned over its 
deteriorating trade balance, falling rate of productivity, technology 
polarization to many developing countries, and the rising level of unem¬ 
ployment among scientists and engineers have all contributed to the 
White House plan to launch a new effort to promote and protect techno- 
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logical advancement. The various control mechanisms are implemented 
through various agencies including U.S. firms. For example, the Export 
Control Act of February 26, 1949, the U.S. Congress declared that 
^Thomas J. Biersteker, Distortion or Development? Contending 
Perspectives on the Multinational Corporation (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981), 
pp. 49-68. 
I nr 
Vern Terpstra, The Cultural Environment of International 
Business (Cincinnati: South Western Publishers, 1978), pp. 191-217. 
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It is the policy of the united States to use export controls 
to the extent necessary: 
(a) to protect the domestic economy from the excessive drain 
of scarce materials and to reduce the inflationary 
impact of abnormal foreign demand; 
(b) to further the foreign policy of the United States and 
to aid in fulfilling its international responsibilities, 
and 
(c) to exercise the necessary vigilance over exports from the 
standpoint of their significance to the national secu¬ 
rity. 147 
The authority to enforce this act is vested in the President. Section 
2405 of the Export Control Act states that: 
The President may prohibit or curtail the exportation 
of any goods, technology or other information subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States or exported by any 
person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, 
to the extent necessary to further significantly the foreign 
policy of the United States or to fulfill its declared 
international obligations.1^ 
The U.S. desire to further control U.S. firms and various public 
agencies to strictly protect U.S. technology is not ending and there is 
no reason for Nigeria to think she could be an exception to the control 
measures. The seriousness of the U.S. government over control of the 
U.S. technology is best demonstrated by Irving Louis Horowitz's study. 
According to him: 
Universities are being asked to keep foreign students out 
of classes and laboratories where advanced research is 
discussed. In the Department of Commerce, draft language 
for new export control rules would extend the definition 
of export to all of the following: 
a) research work in the United States involving 
foreign national ; 
147 
"Export Control Act," U.S. Code Annotated, Sec. 2022, 
February 1949, p. 296. 
^"Export Control Act," U.S. Code Annotated , Sec. 2405, 
1985, p. 354. . 
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b) teaching in a classroom laboratory involving 
foreign national ; 
c) Presentation of papers at United States con¬ 
ferences with foreign nationals attending or 
at conferences abroad; 
d) Submission of manuscripts to foreign journals; 
e) Formal foreign exchanges and cooperative research; 
f) Postdoctoral exchange programs; 
g) Research work in a foreign country; 
v 149 h) Teaching abroad. 
The implication of our finding here is that the U.S. multina¬ 
tional corporations operating in Nigeria have never tried to transfer 
technology to Nigeria and there is no hope they will. This leaves Ni¬ 
geria with two policy choices,: to develop its local technological 
talents or devise other trade strategies to extract technology from 
U.S. companies. Our suggestions as to how these could be achieved are 
the subject of our discussion in chapter five which discusses our over¬ 
all findings and recommendations. 
Creation of Urban Problems and Socio-Economic 
Imbalance Among Nigerian Ethnic Races and 
Cities Due to Location Strategies 
The profit motive of multinational corporations serves as the 
underlying reason behind their location pattern in host countries. In 
Nigeria this experience has also proved real. It further expiains the 
reasons behind the commercial/industrial clusterization of the country 
into various axes, such as Ibadan-Lagos, Kano-Kaduna, Port Harcourt- 
149Irving Louis Horowitz, "Social Science and the Citizens," 
Society, vol. XXII, no. 2 (January/February 1985):6. 
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Aba-Enugu, and Port Harcourt-Warri-Lagos axis (typical of U.S. oil 
corporations). 
The industrial clusterization of Nigeria certainly has had 
negative impact on the overall development of the country. One of such 
impacts is that the urban economic centers continue to remain economi¬ 
cally isolated from the larger rural and semi-urban part of Nigeria. 
The presence of more modern means of communication further ensures an 
economic linkage with the host country of the multinational corpora¬ 
tions doing business in Nigeria. A further impact is that these centers 
being commercial and industrial centers are able to exert a pull of 
unskilled and semi-skilled labor from the rural and semi-urban areas 
to the economic centers. This pattern of rural push and urban pull 
phenomenon as well as other factors already discussed earlier has 
largely accounted for low agricultural productivity in Nigeria, since 
the rural dwellers who were farmers dropped their farming tools to seek 
wage employment in these economic centers. 
A second impact is the consequence of national cohesiveness in 
behavior, and interdependence. For example, the behavior of people in 
Warri and Port Harcourt axis is different from the behavior of people 
in Lagos and Ibadan axis. The behavior of people in the former is 
largely influenced by American companies who incidentally hire large 
number of the inhabitants to the oil industry. Similarly, behavioral 
pattern of the latter is influenced by trading activities, and the 
hunt for government contracts, an experience acquired from the close¬ 
ness to British companies. However, since this point has high socio¬ 
logical undertone, we have decided to leave it for a more comprehensive 
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analysis from Nigerian sociologists. The relevance of this point to 
our study of political analysis however, is that the non-coherence of 
Nigerian economic segment does have serious impact politically and 
economically in national unity, since, 
... any economic segment can break up to form a separate 
entity without actually being affected by the other eco¬ 
nomic groupings. An example of this happened during the 
Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970. 
Another consequence is the creation of socio-economic imbalance 
among various ethnic groups and villages of Nigeria, especially in the 
oil producing towns and vill ages as a result of ecological distortion. As 
we noted elsewhere, the petroleum production process entails explora¬ 
tion, drilling and pipe 1ining in regards to onshore drilling. Some of 
these processes require the use and transportation of heavy equipments on 
the footpaths and paved roads in oil producing towns and villages. 
Since these roads are not meant for these activities, much damage is 
done which hampers the smooth locomotion of residents of the towns and 
villages. Besides, these impact both the farmlands and fishing ponds 
of local inhabitants are often destroyed. Our analysis, therefore, 
points to a lack of corporate social responsibilities on the part of 
the oil producing multinational companies. In the United States, cor¬ 
porations are largely responsible for social program formations and 
implementations towards the overall developments of American cities. 
Since corporate social responsibility is an integral part of corporate 
147H. Kirk-Green, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documen- 
tary Source Book, vol. II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 
p. 124. 
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existence in the United States, the question of waiting for specific 
laws on social responsibilities should not be awaited in the host 
country before they are implemented. 
Impact of American Capital on Nigerian 
Agriculture: A Pre-emptive Analysis 
The dwindling supply of food to meet the national needs has 
already been accounted for by our explanation on how rural dwellers who 
constitute the productive workforce in the agricultural sector continue 
to relocate to the commercial/industrial centers for wage and salary 
employments. The resultant effect was that both the federal and state 
governments' attention was drawn to the sector as never before. The 
rationale being that agriculture for food and export was too serious a 
matter that could no longer be left to peasants alone. Consequently, 
the federal government of Nigeria decided to enlist the involvement of 
the United States into Nigerian agriculture. Nigeria thus signed a memo¬ 
randum to encourage American agribusiness, in conjunction with the United 
States Department of Agriculture, to increase investment in Nigerian 
agriculture. The memorandum encouraged giant institutions such as the 
Ford Motor Company, the First National Bank of Chicago, Pfizer, Allis- 
Chalmers and Chase Manhattan Bank full participation. Our concern here 
is no longer the rationality of such policies, but its consequential 
impact on Nigeria. 
Involvement of the United States companies will lead to the 
infusion of foreign capital into the mechanization of agriculture in 
Nigeria in the short run. In the long run, the negative impact will be 
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enormous. For example, since the American companies have more capital, 
high technology and equipment, they will be able to buy off the proper¬ 
ties of numerous peasant farmers through a process of properties acqui¬ 
sition. 
The completion of this process serves to deepen Nigerian depen¬ 
dency in four areas: 
1. Peasant Farmers Displacement.-Displacement of food crop 
farmers. These are farmers whose production is limited to family con¬ 
sumption rather than production for sale. They usually farm on family 
or community properties and sometimes live on the farms. Investment of 
large foreign capital not only displaces them but robs them of inherited 
family properties. 
2. Farm Displacement.-This is the displacement of indigenous 
farming companies. The outright elimination, buy out and closing of 
indigenous farms due to capital infusion. Signs of this phenomenon have 
begun to appear with the purchase of Ogbemudia Farms in Bendel State by 
John Holt Company. 
3. Market Pisplacement.-This means the displacement of the 
position of the indigenous farms in the domestic market. Large foreign 
capital will enable American companies to acquire substantial market 
share for their farm produce and consequently retard the development of 
large indigenous farms and support services. 
4. Pre-Emptive Displacement.-In the long run, the ability of 
Nigerians to enter the agriculture industry will be greatly inhibited 
and sometimes prevented. How will this happen? As we saw earlier in 
our sectoral analysis, the Americans have dominated the oil sector. The 
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reason has been the ability of foreign companies to block entry to an 
industry they largely dominate and control. Although the Nigerian poli¬ 
cies will encourage local companies to enter, constraints such as large 
advertising capital, better product name recognition, and control of 
commercial sources of credits will combine to limit indigenous com¬ 
panies from entering. 
Defiance of Nigerian Trade Laws and Regulations 
One of the most outrageous things done to Nigeria in her trade 
relations with the United States is the utter disrespect for Nigerian 
commercial law regulations. 
In contract awards, for example, the government of Nigeria estab¬ 
lishes procedures for any award. To qualify for contract, the contract¬ 
ing firm must provide its local incorporation documents, tax clear¬ 
ance certificates for the previous three years and a list of similar 
projects executed in Nigeria or in other third world countries, accom¬ 
panied by registration fee of between $50-$2,000. 
Upon completion of this documentation process and contracts 
awarded,the government has a policy of giving mobilization payments to 
companies to cover start-up costs of the project. This rule designed 
to assist contractors, have often been abused. Gillian Gunn found in 
her study that "in the mid-1970s, some U.S. companies pocketed the 
money and disappeared, leading the military government to ban such 
. „148 payments. 
^GiIlian Gunn, "Contracts," . Nigerian Handbook 1982-83 
(London: William Collins Company, 1982),' pT"145. 
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As a control measure against smuggling of Nigerian oil through 
bunkering, the Nigerian National Oil Corporation entered into an agree¬ 
ment with the major oil companies: 
Under the agreement, the oil companies were to give 
accounts of their sales for every month by fourteen 
days after the month. By this process, Nigeria felt 
she could estimate what to realize as foreign exchange.149 
The purpose of this exercise was to obtain records of: 
Oil lifted on NNPC permission; 
How ships which buy oil used them; and 
their foreign exchange payments to the 
federal government. 
As it turned out, the oil marketing companies which were U.S. Mobil Oil 
Corporation, Texaco Oil Corporation, and chemical marketing companies 
were the companies who refused to comply with the agreement. 
The allegation that the United States oil companies, along with 
international syndicates, have defrauded the Nigerian government by oil 
bunkering (selling oil on the high seas without legal approval and docu¬ 
mentation) has long been a controversy. However, the allegations were 
proved correct by March 1985 when a U.S. citizen named "Marie McBroom 
151 
admitted and was found guilty of bunkering and currency trafficking." 
A similar experience has also faced Nigeria on the Nigerian 
Enterprises Promotion Decree 1972 and 1977 (the indigenization decree 




^Editor, "Oil Companies in Nigeria Accused of Smuggling," 
Nigerian ncord International (February 21, 1984):8. 
Ibid. - 
151 
Editor, "Nigeria Frees U.S. Woman," Amsterdam News, vol. 76, 
no. 9, Saturday, March 2, 1985. 
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by the federal military government immediately after the civil war, after 
the government had experienced the consequences of excessive reliance on 
foreign governments and on transnational corporations. The central 
objective was to obtain Nigerian control over her economy in general and 
over strategic enterprises in particular. 
Many American companies refused to admit Nigerians to the Board 
of Directorship of their companies. "Colgate Palmolive, for example, 
packed up her soap manufacturing and toothpaste company from Nigeria and 
152 returned to the United States rather than comply." 
Also, in a study conducted by the Federal Ministry of Trade and 
Industry to determine the extent of implementation of the Nigerian 
indigenization program it was discovered that: 
a) Many American investors were using Nigerians as "fronts" in 
the directorship of their operation in Nigeria even in businesses solely 
set aside for Nigerians. 
b) That some of these companies are still able to maintain 
control over the Nigerian economic operations by entering into tech¬ 
nical service agreement with Nigerian "directors" or "partners" that 
they be vested with the responsibility of providing technology, main¬ 
tenance and any such technical agreement. 
G) By negotiating exemptions from the indigenization decree 
with the Ministry of Trade Industry and Cooperatives. 
d) By bribing the government officials who are expected to 
152 
Okime Okafaor, Business Times (Lagos: Daily Times Press, 
July 12, 1978). 
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implement the indigenization program; and 
e) By appointing people of different tribes as board of direc¬ 
tors with a view of playing Hausas and Yorubas against each other with 
the hope that disruption between them will distract them (Nigerian board 
members) from trying to manage the company. 
Summary of Chapter 
Factors discussed in this chapter have been the impact of 
American trade relations on Nigeria. Since the objective was to estab¬ 
lish Nigerian dependency status on the United States during the trading 
period, we examined macro economic policy issues, technological transfer 
issues, socio-economic imbalance, impact of foreign capital infusion 
into Nigeriah agriculture, as well as defiances of Nigerian trade laws 
and regulations by American companies. 
Our findings illustrate that the shift from the use of micro- 
economic trade barriers such as tariffs and preferences to macro- 
economic policies adopted by the United States in the latter part of 
the Carter presidency and accentuated by President Reagan in 1980,largely 
contributed to the contraction of the American economy, contributing to 
a global recession, which ultimately led to the collapse of the 
Nigerian economy. The chapter demonstrated that, although technological 
transfer from the United States to Nigeria has been Nigeria's aspiration, 
in the trade process, the United States has refused to transfer techno¬ 
logy to Nigeria. This has been well demonstrated in the oil industry 
where the United States regards the oil minerals as strategic minerals 
and transfer of technology by American companies prohibited under the 
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1949 Export Control Act. The regulation of the employment of Nigerians 
mainly to the menial job category by the major oil production companies 
and their affiliated service companies, coupled with the lack of con¬ 
tracts to Nigerian welding and machinist companies further contribute 
to inhibit Nigerian technological development in this area. 
Similarly, we established the point that American companies 
are largely responsible for ecological imbalance and environmental 
deterioration without corresponding corporate social responsibilities 
to address the problems of respective localities. 
We also examined the American current involvement in Nigerian 
agriculture and concluded that, although no direct negative impact 
against Nigeria has been established, that the current infusion of 
American capital into Nigerian agriculture will create a pre-emptive 
displacement of Nigerian agriculture companies as now exists inthe oil 
industry. 
Another fact we established was that American businesses are 
often guilty of disregard for Nigerian business laws and regulations. 
This was evident in our examples showing American participation in the 
malpractices of oil bunkering,, mobilization fee, fronting, and manip¬ 
ulation of Nigerian Indigenization Decree provisions. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Our entire analysis in the preceding chapter has led us to 
conclude that there has been a web of interests linking Nigeria with the 
United States. The linkages have both political and economic ramifica¬ 
tions for both the United States and Nigeria. The United States, for 
example, believes that Nigeria, as the largest African country, is a 
significant potential market for exports as well as a country whose 
large population, desire to modernize, and whose colonial history with 
the west, favors her (USA) in the great power rivalry. Consequently, 
the United States continues to aggressively encourage capitalism in 
Nigeria. 
At the same time, Nigeria truly wishes to be independent of 
the United States, especially when such action could serve as a source 
of national pride. But Nigeria runs into policy choices because of the 
dilemma posed by two factors—the desire to solve acute national prob¬ 
lems which often exceed its system capabilities for which outside 
assistance is required, and the desire to maintain systems autonomy 
even when it is clear that the system which is a colonial legacy can no 
longer hold sway to the modern realities of Nigeria. 
This dilemma has continued to be manifested in a manner which 
suggests a lack of definite foreign policy toward the United States, 
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with respective Nigerian governments shifting the relationship as a 
pendulum. The relationship with the United States, as we noted 
earlier, shifted from a position of nonchalance under Prime Minister 
Tafawa Balewa to political and economic embrace under General Yakubu 
Gowon, back again to conflict under General Murtala Mohammed and to a 
renewed friendship under General Obasanjo, depending on the economic 
needs of Nigeria. 
Thus our study has revealed that Nigeria depended on the trade 
with the United States for her economic survival during the period 
studied. This is further validated by the fact that Nigeria gradually 
neglected her diversified economy to concentrate on the export of crude 
oil to the United States, which largely accounted for Nigeria's sensi¬ 
tive oil export market by 1979. At this time, oil sales accounted for 
about 80 percent of total national export, with the entire national 
economic activities revolving around expected revenues from it. Moreso, 
we found that the entire process of oil exploration, production and 
marketing was in the hands of American corporations. 
Although Nigeria has not yet faced any situation of dependency 
on the United States with respect to the agricultural sector and food 
sufficiency, the overt encouragement being given to the American big 
corporations to invest in Nigerian agriculture will, in the opinion of 
this study, subsequently make Nigeria depend on the American firms. 
This is a phenomenon which will not only affect local farmers but will 
constitute yet another social and economic malady in Nigeria. 
210 
In the process of commercial transactions between Nigeria and 
American businesses, problems ensue which hinder the development of 
smooth trade relations, and sometimes outright neglect. We feel it is 
important to mention some of these areas of conflict and misunderstand¬ 
ing in our study. Some of these problems are as follows: 
1. After Sale and Service Contract.-Many Nigerians who purchase 
machinery and equipment from the United States, complain that as soon 
as the equipment are shipped, no further effort is made to follow up 
the maintenance and servicing of the goods nor are Nigerians given 
adequate information and training on how to procure spare parts when the 
equipment are in need of service. 
2. The distance between the United States and Nigeria is a 
major inhibiting factor in the trade process. Distance not only in¬ 
crease freight, insurance and cost, it also causes delay in time of 
arrivals of shipped merchandise. Many Nigerian businessmen do not have 
the patience to wait for a prolonged arrival of goods when comparable 
commodities could be obtained from Western Germany, France or Britain 
in less time and cost. 
3. Apart from problems posed by distance, there are inhibi¬ 
tions such as the traditional trade linkage between Nigeria-United 
Kingdom and the rest of Western Europe, especially France, West Germany 
and Italy. American businesses have not been able to break this tradi¬ 
tion. A major reason is that European countries such as England, West 
Germany, Italy and France tend to understand the needs of Nigeria more 
than the United States does. 
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4. The United States businesses tend to concentrate their 
attention on the markets of the developed countries to the neglect of 
Nigeria and other West African countries. There is relevant indication 
that efforts are mostly geared towards European, Japanese and Latin 
American markets, while they rely on their European marketing operations 
to help penetrate the Nigerian market. 
5. American companies are more likely to have tight managerial 
control of their operations in Nigeria. This attitude affects the 
morale of Nigerian workers in American-owned companies since excessive 
control tends to deprive them the use of their managerial skills. It 
is important to recount here one of our examples in chapter four where 
where we saw the American Colgate Palmolive folding up their operation 
in Nigeria rather than give up some level of managerial positions to 
Nigerians. 
Recommendations 
Successful problem solving requires the right diagnosis so that 
the right solutions could be provided. Political and economic policies 
in Nigeria have failed more often, not because of policies, but because 
most times the policies have been applied to problems that have not 
been properly diagnosed. Consequently, the battle for economic survival 
of Nigeria since independence has been a battle between economic emo¬ 
tion demonstrated by foreign based policies and economic reality that 
could forge a united and progressive Nigeria. Usually in the battle 
between emotion and reality, emotion has often won. But where reality 
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wins, it proves to be a continuous success because reality wins on 
facts which emotion does not consider. 
In our entire analysis, we have identified one characteristic 
about the Nigerian economy-~its wavering ties to stronger economies of 
other countries, such as the closer tie with the United Kingdom during 
the era of agricultural commodities of the early 1960s, to the develop¬ 
ment of heavier economic ties with the United States during the oil boom 
period of the 1970s. This is particularly sinister when we consider 
the fact that Nigeria is naturally endowed with rich human, mineral and 
geographical capabilities. Our recommendation will therefore stem from 
the totality of Nigerian economic experience as a junior participant 
in a world of economic interdependence. 
What is this experience? Itisthe reality that Nigerian develop¬ 
ment over the twenty-seven years of independence has come to be under¬ 
stood as a pursuit of the replication of Western industrial structure, 
physical, and institutional, without developing the concept of Nigerian 
economic and political interest which will transcend tribe, ethnic 
affinity, organizational loyalty or personality. 
Three-Phase Strategy for Nigerian Economic 
Growth and Global Dominance 
Phase One 
The first phase of our strategy will be known as the age of 
self-preservation. The activities of the government at this time will 
be to pursue an insulative foreign policy which will seek to disallow 
inflow of foreign values while encouraging Nigerians to face the 
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challenges of the nation; in doing this Nigeria must set a mythical 
goal in which every Nigerian will be made to believe in. This goal 
must be inspirational and directed towards Nigerian future economic 
dominance. 
The major areas of changes in this phase will be in government 
restructuring, economic repositioning and a re-orientation of the 
Nigerian educational system. 
Government Restructuring 
Under our arrangement, the existing government structure of 
federal, state and local governments should be restructured to become a 
five-tier system. These will entâil the federal, state, zonal commis¬ 
sion, local and city/town council governments. 
The powers of the federal government will be curtailed when its 
economic activities are transferred to the states and entrepreneurs. 
The function of the federal government will be relegated to national 
defense and economic planning through regulatory mechanisms, thus 
ensuring that the country is progressively in line with its stated objec¬ 
tives . 
Economic Repositioning 
By insulating its doors to the external economic influences, 
Nigeria will seek to maximize her productivity capability and inge¬ 
nuity to meet with the needs of Nigerians. In this way, an effective 
internal market will be developed, our authentic technological inge¬ 
nuity will bloom to meet the expanded needs. Above all, national unity 
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will ensure on the al ter of economic pursuit since Nigerians will travel 
freely and communicate freely in the name of Naira, backed with the 
aspiration of someday dominating the world. 
Educational Re-orientation 
The dementalization of the existing Western mentality of profes¬ 
sors and teachers and businessmen in the Nigerian institutions is a 
pivot to the accomplishment of our first phase. Approach to teaching 
in schools should emphasize the Nigerian experience, its strength and 
aspirations. 
# The current educational system will be restructured into a three- 
tier educational system. The first tier will be the primary level, the 
second tier being the secondary level, while the third tier will be the 
university level of education. Thus programs such as higher school, 
teacher training colleges, polytechnics and colleges of technologies 
will be scrapped from the system. Both the primary and secondary 
school level will be used as institutions for academic awareness as 
well as agency for political socialization. The university will 
emphasize theories and research, and must be an integral part of the 
societies they exist in and the nation in general. During this phase, 
courses such as European history, literature and religion should all 
be eliminated, and replaced with courses such as Nigerian geography, 
political economy, science, and courses in entrepreneurship. 
Since this stage will still involve trade relations with the 
rest of the world, more strategic policies will need to be adopted in 
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the following areas: 
1. Emphases will be directed from trade with the advanced 
Western countries like the United States to developing countries, as 
well as with countries of Eastern Europe. The advantages that will 
accrue to Nigerian under this strategy will be expanded markets to sell 
Nigerian goods and the opportunity to trade with countries of equal 
status. 
2. Technology Transfer.-The hope that technology can be 
transferred to Nigerians is a mythical belief at best. The foundation 
for Nigerian preparation for technological lift-off has already been 
established. This is manifested by the number of repair shops, ability 
to duplicate "Onitsha made goods" and the various local inventions 
across the country. 
What Nigeria needs to do is to establish a well articulated 
technology policy which will seek to recognize and fund these Nigerian 
latent technology. In the interim, Nigeria should also acquire foreign 
technology through direct purchase, industrial espionage and duplica¬ 
tion. 
Phase Two 
This phase will be called the age of perfection. Nigeria will 
advance to this stage when she has understood the new system which will 
have been accompanied by surplus and mastering of its way of life and 
way of doing things. During the age of perfection, Nigeria should 
loosen up its tight insulative foreign policy doors to neighboring 
African countries, political rhetorics at this time should be on 
APPENDIX A 
SCHEDULES 1 & 2 OF NIGERIAN ENTERPRISES 
PROMOTION DECREE, 1972 
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assisting African countries in their economic development. Hence, the 
true strategy will be to tie the economies of African countries to that 
of Nigeria. The strategy will be to expand the productive capacity of 
Nigerian entrepreneurs who will have bigger markets to sell Nigerian 
made goods. Exporting Nigerian made goods to African markets will 
facilitate the perfection of Nigerian technology, enable Nigeria to 
develop interest in those countries whose leadership is amenable to 
Nigeria. Above all Nigeria will have a true regional power backed by 
a sound economy at this time. During this phase, military coups, which 
are common, will have been completely eliminated in Nigeria since the 
army will be better utilized in advancing Nigerian political and econo¬ 
mic interest in various African countries. 
Phase Three 
In our view, Nigerian trade with the advanced capitalist coun¬ 
tries should start at this stage. Trade at this stage will be based on 
mutual respect, and economic interdependence. At this phase, too, 
Nigerian competitiveness will have been enhanced since she will have 




Enterprises Exclusively Reserved for Nigerians: 
1. Advertising agencies and pub!ic relations business. 
2. All aspects of pool betting business and lotteries. 
3. Assembly of radios, radiograms, record changers, television sets, 
tape recorders and other electrical domestic appliances not 
combined with manufacture of components. 
4. Blending and bottling of alcoholic drinks. 
5. Blocks, bricks and ordinary tiles manufacture for building and 
construction works. 
6. Bread and cake making, 
7. Candle manufacture. 
8. Casinos and gaming centres. 
9. Cinemas and other places of entertainment. 
10. Clearing and forwarding agencies. 
11. Hairdressing. 
12. Haulage of goods by road. 
13. Laundry and dry-cleaning. 
14. Manufacture of jewelry and related articles. 
15. Newspaper publishing and printing. 
16. Ordinary garment manufacture not combined with production of 
textile materials. 
17. Municipal bus services and taxis. 
18. Radio and television broadcasting. 
19. Retail trade (except by or within the department stores and 
supermarkets). 
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20. Rice milling. 
21. Singlet manufacture. 
22. Tire retreading. 
Schedule 2 
Enterprises Barred to Aliens Under Certain Conditions.- 
1. Beer Brewing. 
2. Boat building. 
3. Bicycle and motorcycle tire manufacture. 
4. Bottling of soft drinks. 
5. Coastal and inland waterways shipping. 
6. Construction industries. 
7. Cosmetics and perfumery manufacture. 
8. Departmental stores and supermarkets. 
9. Distribution and servicing of motor vehicles, tractors and spare 
parts thereof or other similar objects. 
10. Distribution agencies for machines and technical equipment. 
11. Estate agency. 
12. Fish and shrimp trawling and processing. 
13. Furniture making. 
14. Insecticides, pesticides and fungicides. 
15. Internal air transport (scheduled and charter services). 
16. Manufacture of bicycles. 
17. Manufacture of cement. 
18. Manufacture of matches. 
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19. Manufacture of metal containers. 
20. Manufacture of paints, varnishes or other similar articles. 
21. Manufacture of soaps and detergents. 
22. Manufacture of suitcases, briefcases, handbags, purses, wallets, 
portfolios and shopping bags. 
23. Manufacture of wire, nails, washers, bolts, nuts, rivets and other 
similar articles. 
24. Paper conversion industries. 
25. Passenger bus services (inter-state). 
26. Poultry farming. 
27. Printing of books. 
28. Production of sawn timber, plywood, veneers and other wood 
conversion industries. 
29. Screen printing on cloth; dyeing. 
30. Slaughtering, storage, distribution and processing of meat. 
31. Shipping. 
32. Travel agencies. 
Wholesale distribution. 33. 
APPENDIX B 
SCHEDULES 1, 2 AND 3 OF NIGERIAN ENTERPRISES 
PROMOTION DECREE, 1977 
Schedule 1 
Enterprises Exclusively Reserved for Nigerians; 
1. Advertising and public relations business. 
2. All aspects of pool betting business and lotteries. 
3. Assembly of radios, radiograms, record changers, television sets, 
tape recorders and other electric domestic appliances not combined 
with manufacture of components. 
4. Blending and bottling of alcoholic drinks. 
5. Blocks and ordinary tile manufacture for building and construction 
works. 
6. Bread and cake making. 
7. Candle manufacture. 
8. Casinos and gaming centres. 
9. Cinemas and other places of entertainment. 
10. Commercial transportation (wet and dry cargo and fuel). 
11. Commission agents. 
12. Departmental stores and supermarkets having an annual turnover 
of less than N2,000.00 
13. Distribution agencies excluding motor vehicles, machinery and 
equipment and spare parts. 
14. Electrical repair shops other than repair shops associated with 
distribution of electrical goods. 
15. Establishments specializing in the repair of watches, clocks and 
jewelry, including imitation jewelry for the general public. 
16. Estate agency. 
17. Film distribution (including cinema films). 
18. Garment manufacture. 
Hairdressing. 19. 
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20. Ice cream making when not associated with the manufacture of 
other dairy products. 
21. Indenting and confirming. 
22. Laundry and dry-cleaning. 
23. Manufacturers' representatives. 
24. Manufacture of suitcases, briefcases, hand-bags, purses, wallets, 
portfolios and shopping bags. 
25. Manufacture of jewelry and related articles, including imitation 
jewelry. 
26. Municipal bus services and taxis. 
27. Newspaper publishing and printing. 
28. Office cleaning. 
29. Passenger bus services of any kind. 
30. Poultry farming. 
31. Printing of stationery (when not associated with printing of 
books). 
32. Protective agencies. 
33. Radio and television broadcasting. 
34. Retail trade (except by or within departmental stores and 
supermarkets). 
35. Rice milling. 
36. Singlet manufacture. 
37. Stevedoring and shorehandling. 
38. Tire retreading. 
39. Travel agencies. 




Enterprises in Respect of Which Nigerians Must Have Majority Interest: 
1. Banking-commercial, merchant and development banking. 
2. Basic iron and steel manufacture. 
3. Beer brewing. 
4. Boat building. 
5. Bottling of soft drinks. 
6. Business services (other than machinery and equipment rental and 
leasing) such as business management and consulting services; 
fashion designing. 
7. Clearing and forwarding agencies. 
8. Canning and preserving of fruits and vegetables. 
9. Coastal and inland waterways shipping. 
10. Construction industry. 
11. Departmental stores and supermarkets having annual turnover of 
not less than N2,000,000.00. 
12. Distribution agencies for machines and technical equipment. 
13. Distribution and servicing of motor vehicles, tractors and spare 
parts thereof or similar objects. 
14. Fish and shrimp trawling and processing. 
15. Fertilizer production. 
16. Grain mill products except rice milling. 
17. Industrial cleaning. 
18. Insecticides, pesticides and fungicides. 
19. Internal air transport (schedule and charter services). 
20. Insurance - all classes. 
Lighterage. 21. 
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22. Manufacture of bicycles. 
23. Manufacture of biscuits and similar dry bakery products. 
24. Manufacture of cement. 
25. Manufacture of cosmetics and perfumery. 
26. Manufacture of cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery. 
27. Manufacture of dairy products, butter, cheese, milk and other 
milk products. 
28. Manufacture of food products like yeast, starch, baking powder, 
coffee roasting; processing of tea leaves into black tea. 
29. Manufacture of furniture and interior decoration. Manufacture 
of metal fixtures for household, office and public buildings. 
30. Manufacture of leather footwear. 
31. Manufacture of matches. 
32. Manufacture of metal containers. 
33. Manufacture of plastic products such as plastic dinnerware, table¬ 
ware, kitchenware, plastic mats, plastic machinery parts, bottles, 
tubes, and cabinets. 
34. Manufacture of paints varnishes or other similar articles. 
35. Manufacture of rubber products, rubber footware, industrial and 
mechanical rubber specialties such as gloves, mats, sponges and 
foam. 
36. Manufacture of tires and tubes for bicycles and motorcycles or 
tire and tubes for motor vehicles. 
37. Manufacture of soap and detergents. 
38. Manufacture of wire, nails, washer, bolts, nuts, rivets and other 
similar articles. 
39. Other manufacturing industries such as non-rubber and non-plastic 
toys, pens, pencils, umbrellas, canes, buttons, broom and brushes, 
lampshades, tobacco pipes and cigarette holders. 
40. Mining and quarrying. 
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41. Oil milling, cotton ginning and crushing industries. 
42. Paper conversion industries. 
43. Plantation sugar and processing. 
44. Plantation agriculture for tree crops, grains and other cash crops. 
45. Pinting of books. 
46. Production of sawn timber, plywood, veneers and other wood conversion 
industries. 
47. Petro-chemical feedstock industries. 
48. Publishing of books, periodicals and such like. 
49. Pulp and paper mills. 
50. Restaurants, cafes and other eating and drinking places. 
51. Salt refinery and packaging. 
52. Screen printing on cloth, dyeing. 
53. Inland and coastal shipping. 
54. Slaughtering, storage associated with industrial processing and 
distribution of meat. 
55. Tanneries and leather finishing. 
56. Wholesale distribution of imported goods. 
57. Photographic studies, including commercial and aerial photography. 
Schedule 3 
Enterprises in Which Foreign Investors May Have Majority Interest: 
1. Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits such as ethyl 
alcohol, whisky, brandy, gin and the like. 
2. Tobacco manufacture. 
3. Manufacture of basic industrial chemicals (organic and inorganic) 
except fertilizers. 
4. Manufacture of synthetic resins, plastic materials and man-made 
fibres except glass. 
5. Manufacture of drugs and medicines. 
6. Manufacture of pottery, china and earthenware. 
7. Manufacture of glass and glass products. 
8. Manufacture of burnt bricks and structural clay products. 
9. Manufacture of miscellaneous non-metalic mineral products such 
as concrete, gypsum and plastering products, including ready-mixed 
concrete, mineral, wool, abrasive, asbestos products, graphite 
products. 
10. Manufacture of primary non-ferrous metal products such as ingots, 
bars and billets; sheets, strips, cirales, cecrous, rods, tubes, 
pipes and wire roads; casting and extrusions. 
11. Manufacture of (fabricated metal) cutlery, hard tools and general 
hardware. 
12. Manufacture of structural metal products-components of bridges, 
tanks, metal doors and screen, window frames. 
13. Manufacture of miscellaneous fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment, such as safes and vaults; steel springs, 
furnaces; stoves, and the like. 
14. Manufacture of engines and turbines. 
15. Manufacture.of agricultural machinery and equipment. 
16. Manufacture of metal and wood working machinery. 
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17. Manufacture of special industrial machinery and equipment such as 
textile and food machinery, paper industry machinery, oil refining 
machinery and equipment, and the like. 
18. Manufacture of office, computing and accounting machinery. 
19. Manufacture of other machinery and equipment except electrical 
equipment, pumps, air and gas compressors; blowers, air- 
conditioning and ventilating machinery; refrigerutors and the like. 
20. Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus. 
21. Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and 
apparatus. 
22. Manufacture of electrical appliances and houseware. 
23. Manufacture of electrical apparatus and supplies not elsewhere 
classified, such as insulated wires and cables, batteries, electric 
lamps and tubes, fixtures and lamp switches, sockets, switches 
insulators, and the like. 
24. Ship building and repairing (excluding boat building). 
25. Manufacture of railway equipment. 
26. Manufacture of motor vehicles and motorcycles. 
27. Manufacture of aircraft. 
28. Manufacture of professional and scientific and measuring and 
controlling equipment, such as laboratory and scientific 
instruments, surgical, medical and dental equipment, instruments 
and supplies and orthopaedic and prosthetic appliances. 
29. Manufacture of photographic and optical goods. 
30. Manufacture of watches and clocks. 
31. Ocean transport/shipping. 
32. Oil servicing companies. 
33. Storage and warehousing, the operation of storage facilities and 
warehouse (including bonded and refrigerated warehouses for hire 
by the general public). 
34. Textile manufacturing industries. 
227 
35. Hotels, rooming houses, camps and lodging places. 
36. Data processing and tabulating services (on a fee or contract 
basis). 
37. Production of cinema and television films (or motion picture 
production). 
38. Machinery and equipment rental and leasing. 
39. All other enterprises not included in Schedules 1 and 2 not being 
public sector enterprises. 
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